Shankara on pramaaNas, including Vedic testimony (long)

[Anand Hudli]

  Right knowledge is called pramaa. pramaaNa is a means to right knowledge.
  Advaita accepts six pramaaNas, whereas some other systems accept only
  three namely, pratyakshha (perception), anumaana (inference), and
  shabda (testimony from the Vedas or shaastras).Both advaita and miimaamsa
  add three more, arthaapatti (postulation), upamaana (comparison), and
  anupalabdhi (nonapprehension).For brevity's sake, we will consider
  only perception, inference, and shabda here. This should not be
  taken to mean that the three other sources of knowledge are not
  important. The discussion here applies to all six pramaaNas.

  Perception allows us to know something by sense organs such as eyes,
  ears, etc. Inference enables us to know something by reasoning. The
  Vedas make known something that we cannot know either by perception or
  inference.

  Shankara holds that each means to right knowledge has its own sphere
  of operation. And within its sphere of operation, each pramaaNa is
  more powerful than other pramaaNas. This means that in case there is
  a conflict between one pramaaNa and another regarding some knowledge,
  the conflict must be decided in favor of the pramaaNa which has
  jurisdiction over the domain in which the knowledge lies.

  As an illustrative example of this principle, a story about Galileo
  can be cited. Several scholars were arguing about which fish -- a
  dead fish or a live one-- would reach the ground earlier when dropped
  from a tower. Galileo, who was a young boy at the time, simply ascended
  the tower and dropped the dead fish and the live one simultaneously.
  They both were seen to reach the ground at the same time. This silenced
  the arguing scholars. The point here is that perception in this case
  is more powerful than inference. What was observed by perception
  could not be negated by any amount of inference.

  However, one may argue that the sun seems to move around the earth
  if we believe perception, but we know that the fact is otherwise.
  What happens in this case is that what we perceive is only apparently
  true. But this perception is negated not by the theory (inference)
  that the earth moves around the sun, but conclusively by some
  observations (perceptions) that support the theory! Einstein's
  theory that light is attracted by gravitational force was
  verified (and made true) only when an experiment confirmed that
  light did indeed bend due to gravity.

  This may sound familiar to those who do scientific research.
  A few years ago, I developed a  theory about how computers can
  do certain computations efficiently. Those working in the field asked
  me, "Yeah, it is a nice theory. But does it work?" I implemented
  the theory and ran several experiments to confirm the theory.

  Coming back to Shankara's views, let us see what he has to say.

  Shankara says perceived objects cannot be denied.

   na cha dR^ishhTe anupapannaM naama, dR^ishhTatvaadeva |

   Something which is perceived cannot be negated, by the very fact
   that it is perceived! (Shankara's Suutra bhaashhya 4.1.2)

   Can inference sublate (negate) something that we know by perception?
   Shankara says no!

   na hi pratyakshhaM anumaanena baadhituM shakyate |

   "Perception certainly cannot be sublated by inference."
                            (Shankara's Brihadaaranyaka Upanishad bhaashhya)

   Note, however, that Shankara is not ruling out cases where inference
   can guide us so that we have a perception which sublates a previous
   perception. This is what happens in the case of the perception of
   the sun's going around the earth. We can, by a series of inferences,
   conclude that the fact is otherwise, but we then need to support this
   fact by observations (perceptions).

   Shankara clearly says that each pramaaNa has its own sphere of
   operation.

   svavishhayashuuraaNi hi pramaaNaani shrotraadivat.h |

   PramaaNas are powerful in their respective spheres, just as
   the ear, etc. are powerful in their spheres.

   The example given by Shankara is that of the spheres of operation of
   the sense organs. The ear can hear something, but the eye cannot
   hear anything. The eye can see something but the ear cannot see
   anything. If the ear hears a sound, the eye is incapable of
   sublating the sound that was just heard. If the eye see something,
   the ear is incapable of sublating what was just seen. But it must
   also be understood that the ear and eye can complement each other.
   We can know something by hearing about it, and we can know something
   more about the same thing by seeing it.

   Extending this to the pramaaNas, each pramaaNa can complement what
   we know through another pramaaNa. Also, each pramaaNa makes known
   to us things that are not made known to us by other pramaaNas.
   By perception, we know that the sun gives us light, but we cannot
   know this by inference alone. By inference or reasoning, I know that
   at this time (2:30 EST), it will be night in India. I don't actually
   perceive that it is night there. Finally, the Vedas make known
   to us the knowledge of Brahman, which is impossible to get from
   perception, inference, or by any other means of knowledge.

   Shankara makes this point regarding how one pramaaNa supplies
   knowledge not gained through other pramaaNas.

   pramaaNaantaraavishhayameva pramaaNaantaraM GYaapayati|

   (Each) pramaaNa makes known objects that are not known by
   another pramaaNa. (Br. Up. Bhaashya of Shankara, 2.20)

   It follows now that any reasoning (inference) that contradicts
   shruti (Vedas) in the sphere of shruti, is nullified and is a
   fallacy.

    shrutivirodhe nyaayaabhaasatvopagamaat.h |

     Reasoning that is against shruti is a fallacy.
                      (Shankara's Br. Up. bhaashhya)


   The importance of Vedas as pramaaNa
   -----------------------------------

   The Vedas make things known to us that we cannot know through perception
   inference, or the other three pramaaNas. If indeed shruti were to let us
   know things that are also known through other means, then the utility of
   shruti will be seriously undermined. We might as well do away with
   shruti. Now, perception and the other pramaaNas (except the Vedas) have
   been proved to be incapable of producing an accurate definition of what
   is reality. The proof is in Shriharshha's monumental work, the
   khaNDanakhaNDakhaadya, literally "the delicacy of refutation." If the
   five pramaaNas are incapable of telling us what is reality, then the
   Vedas are our only hope.

   Coming back to the question of the utility of the Vedas, Shankara says:


   yat.h svato .apraaptaM tachchhaastreNa bodhitavyaM |

   What is not known by itself (or naturally) should be known through
   the shaastras.
                       (Aitareya Upanishad bhaashhya of Shankara)

    Now, what exactly does shruti make known? The knowledge from shruti
    is something that is beyond the grasp of the senses and mind.


   shrutishcha naH pramaaNaM atiindriyavishhayaviGYaanotpattau |

   Shruti is our source of knowledge of something that is beyond the
   reach of senses (and mind).
                             (Brahma suutra bhaashhya of Shankara)

   I must hasten to add that reasoning not contradicting the shruti is
   perfectly acceptable and must be encouraged. In fact, as we can see,
   the task of interpreting or giving an exegesis of the Vedas involves
   reasoning. Also, it is well known that the Vedas talk about not just
   things that are not known through other pramaaNas, but also about things
   that are known through other pramaaNas. Such things are included for
   explanatory or subsidiary purposes, and are called anuvaadas or
   arthavaadas. Now an interesting question arises. If shruti (Vedas)
   is in contradiction with reasoning and perception with respect to
   a thing that is also known by perception and reasoning, then what
   should we believe in? In such cases, the shruti sentence in question
   must be reinterpreted using the secondary or metaphorical meaning.
   This is the opinion of Shankara.

   na hyasatyapi saMbhave mukhyasyaivaarthasya grahaNaM iti kashchit.h
   aaGYaapayitaa vidyate|

   Verily, no authority is known to (direct us) to accept the primary
   (or literal) meaning when it is not appropriate.

     (Shankara's Brahma suutra bhaashhya)

   tatra hi gauNii kalpanaa shabdasya yatra mukhyaartho na saMbhavati|

    In those cases where the literal meaning of a word(s) is not possible
    to accommodate, there the secondary or metaphorical meaning should be
    used.
                (Shankara's Prashna Upanishhad Bhaashhya)

    The above shows that the method of Vedic exegesis does not force us to
    literally interpret each and every sentence of the Vedas. This is in
    sharp contrast to the method of exegesis of scriptures of other religions,
    where the literal meaning of each sentence is taken.

   Anand