An Interesting article - any response?
Shrisha Rao
shrao at NYX.NET
Thu Dec 5 21:31:40 CST 1996
>
> Shrisha Rao wrote:
>
> > >
> > > There are serious logical flaws in *this* argument. First, it assumes
> > > that the relationship between the "absolute" state and the waking
> > > state is exactly like the relationship between the waking state
> > > and the dream state. How do we know this? In other words,
> > >
> > > variety in dream state implies variety in waking state
> > >
> > > does not necessarily imply
> > >
> > >
> > > variety in waking state implies variety in absolute state
> >
> > See, the thing is, he's talking of *causation*, not *implication*,
> > viz., that
> >
> > variety in the waking state causes variety in the dream state,
> >
> > and that
> >
> > non-variety in the absolute state cannot cause variety in the
> > waking state (which has to be caused by something).
> >
>
> True, causality and implication are different. Causality is used
> more in proving a hypothesis (scientifically) whereas implication
> is used in logic. Since I believe we are discussing the issue at
> hand at a logical level, not a scientific level, I saw it fit to use
> the logical implication. Certainly, we are not talking (nor are we
> qualified)
> to talk about what scientifically causes dreams, etc.
>
>
> Moreover if you talk of causality, an important question remains
> unanswered -- what causes the absence of variety in deep sleep (
> sushhupti)? Deep sleep is also a state. According to you, if
> the absence of variety in deep sleep is caused by the variety
> in the waking state, then we will have the following relations
>
> variety in waking state causes variety in dream state
> variety in waking state causes nonvariety in deep sleep
>
> If this be the case, is it so inconceivable to add one more:
>
> nonvariety in absolute state causes variety in waking state
>
> On the other hand, if you say the nonvariety of deep sleep is not
> caused by the variety of the waking state, then what is it caused by?
> If you say the cause has nothing to do with the waking state, then
> you have admitted that a causal relation between variety/nonvariety
> in one state and another might not exist at all. So you can't complain
> if the advaitin says that there is nonvariety in the absolute state
> even though there is variety in the waking state.
>
> If, however, you say that the nonvariety in the deep sleep is caused
> by something that is common between the waking state and deep sleep,
> then you are getting closer to advaita. What is common between the
> waking and deep sleep states? It is pure consciousness. Is it not?
> This consciousness is of the nature "I exist."
>
> In fact, this consciousness is *the* only common thing between the
> three states commonly known to people, waking, dream, and deep sleep.
>
> Now, is there variety or nonvariety in this consciousness? This is
> question that dvaitins will have to ponder over.
>
>
> > Causation and implication are very different beasts, I'm sure you'll
> > agree.
>
> The difference from a logician's standpoint is not that great.
>
> For example, you can say flu causes fever. Absence of flu does not
> necessarily mean there is no fever, (because fever could be caused by
> other factors). You could also say, flu implies fever. And you would
> also be logically correct in saying absence of flu does not imply
> lack of fever. If there is no fever, whatever that state is, is not caused
> by flu. Logically, no fever implies no flu.
>
> A causes B does not necessarily mean not A causes not B.
> A implies B does not necessarily mean not A implies not B.
>
> However,
>
> A causes B means not B implies not A.
> A implies B means not B implies not A.
>
> Example, if there is no fever, there is no flu.
>
>
> >
> > While one can have an implication relationship between any two of the
> > three variables (length of pole, length of shadow, angle of sun) and
> > the third, the causal relationship is not similarly malleable. Thus,
> > any attempt to reason about causal relationships in terms of
> > implicational relationships is fallacious. It is for this reason that
>
> I think it is not so fallacious as you think. And I am in good
> company. In writing expert systems, for example, it is routine
> to represent causal relationships as logical implications.
>
> >
> > Your criticism is thus based on a false presumption that causality is
> > the same as implication, and is thus subject to improvement. If you
> > can come up with a different/better one, I'd love to see it.
>
> Your criticism that my criticism is based on a false presumption is
> unfounded.
>
> >
> > > There would be such an implication if the absolute state were
> > > similar to the two other states in some sense. But this is impossible
> > > according to the scriptures. The absolute is not only advaita (devoid
> > > of duality) but also advaya (one without a second) and nirupama
> > > (incomparable to anything).
> > >
> > > So the absolute state cannot be compared to any state or for that
matter
> > > anything at all. The statement :
> > >
> > > The absolute state must be similar to the waking state
> > >
> > > and even the statement:
> > >
> > > the relationship between the absolute and waking state is similar
> > > to the relationship between the waking and dream state
> > >
> > > are both not logically provable.
> >
> > The above has already been attended to, but let's go on to your piece
> > de resistance:
> >
> > But of course, there is no need to do that. For the logic can be
> > dismissed in and of itself. For there is no acceptance by the
> > Tattvavaada school that duality needs a cause. It simply *is*. It
> > has no more a cause than Brahman does. Only those things that arise,
> > are created, etc., need causes, while duality is accepted to have
> > existed for all time in the past. As such, speculation about its
> > causes is mere moonshine.
>
> Then duality is taken as an axiom. Incorrectly perhaps. because
> the shruti speaks of nonduality, ekameva advitiiyaM etc. So duality
> cannot be taken as a fundamental axiom.
>
> >
> > And in fact, since it is your assertion (I think?) that the duality of
> > the waking state is not caused by the duality of the absolute state,
> > for the excellent reason of the latter being absent, what is its cause
> > then? Since it arises and subsides, it needs must have a cause. If
> > it were spontaneous, without a cause, then it would be like Brahman,
> > and would not subside at all, and you'd be left with eternal duality.
> > Thus, given that duality in the waking is a fact, whether one likes it
> > or not, a cause must be given for it, else it would have to be that
> > the duality is eternal, a conclusion you do not accept.
> >
>
> I can explain more. But let me mince words and say that the cause
> of duality and everything else is Brahman. I only said the duality
> is not caused by duality in Brahman. But that does not prevent me from
> saying Brahman itself, nonduality is the cause of duality.
>
> > Therefore, since you yourself have shown that the postulation that
> > duality at a certain state is caused by that in a higher state leads
> > to infinite regress, it would follow that the duality of the waking
> > state is not caused by something else, but is in and of itself an
> > ultimate, unsubsiding truth.
>
> this is where shruti will say " neha naanaa .asti kiJNchana"
> there is no variety here whatsoever. All logic ceases.
>
> >
> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > Conclusion: the world is real. Jeeva can never be the same as
> > > > Brahman.
> > > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> > > Maybe according to PuraaNas and other fairy tales. But I seriously doubt
> > > if the Vedas say so.
> >
> > Try the Rg Veda, X.71-6:
> >
> > yastityAja sachividaM sakhAyaM na tasya vAchyapi bhAgo.asti |
> > yadIM shR^iNotyalakaM na hi praveda sukR^itasya panthAm.h ||
> >
> > One who gives up his True Companion, there is no truth even in his
> > speech; whatever he hears, he hears amiss; he cannot be said to be on
> > the path of virtuous action.
> >
> > It is significant that the same word `sakha' used elsewhere in the Rg Veda
> > in the context of `dvA suparNA', is used here as well. Now, if the "sakha"
> > were an incomplete truth, an illusion, etc., why would the Veda say what
> > it does? Beats me...
> >
>
> Good. A step in the right direction. "sakhaa" is not an illusion. It is
> God. It is Brahman. It is you. tat tvam asi. Did I miss an "a" somehere?
> :-)
>
> > Regards,
> >
> > Shrisha Rao
> >
> > > > K.Guruprasad
> > > > Department of Mathematics
> > > > Indian Institute of Science
> > > > Bangalore-560 012
>
> Anand
>
>From Thu Dec 5 20:37:48 1996
Message-Id: <THU.5.DEC.1996.203748.0700.>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 1996 20:37:48 -0700
Reply-To: dvaita-list at eskimo.com, ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU
To: "Advaita (non-duality) with reverence" <ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU>
From: Shrisha Rao <shrao at NYX.NET>
Subject: Re: An Interesting article - any response?
Comments: To: ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU, dvaita-list at eskimo.com
In-Reply-To: <Pine.A32.3.91.961205103459.12294A-100000 at appn.ci.in.ameritech.com> from "Anand Hudli" at Dec 5,
96 12:08:07 pm
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[Apologies for the faux pas in posting just a short while ago. -- SR]
Anand Hudli wrote:
> Shrisha Rao wrote:
>
> > >
> > > There are serious logical flaws in *this* argument. First, it assumes
> > > that the relationship between the "absolute" state and the waking
> > > state is exactly like the relationship between the waking state
> > > and the dream state. How do we know this? In other words,
> > >
> > > variety in dream state implies variety in waking state
> > >
> > > does not necessarily imply
> > >
> > >
> > > variety in waking state implies variety in absolute state
> >
> > See, the thing is, he's talking of *causation*, not *implication*,
> > viz., that
> >
> > variety in the waking state causes variety in the dream state,
> >
> > and that
> >
> > non-variety in the absolute state cannot cause variety in the
> > waking state (which has to be caused by something).
> >
>
> True, causality and implication are different. Causality is used
> more in proving a hypothesis (scientifically) whereas implication
> is used in logic. Since I believe we are discussing the issue at
> hand at a logical level, not a scientific level, I saw it fit to use
> the logical implication. Certainly, we are not talking (nor are we
> qualified)
> to talk about what scientifically causes dreams, etc.
I am not aware that there is any such separation between science and
logic; to posit such would automatically imply that science is not
logical, and that logic is not scientific. I do not accept either to
be the case. And also, why are we automatically unqualified to talk
about what causes dreams, etc.? Studying the same has been the effort
of Vedantins as well as modern scientists, and both have tried to
present their conclusions in a manner that even people of limited
training can appreciate. And in fact, even psychologists are not
necessarily in any better shape than keen amateurs, in appreciating
the causes of dreams, &c., because they are not wizards or geniuses.
But anyway, all of this is a digression. Let's go on --
> Moreover if you talk of causality, an important question remains
> unanswered -- what causes the absence of variety in deep sleep (
> sushhupti)? Deep sleep is also a state. According to you, if
> the absence of variety in deep sleep is caused by the variety
> in the waking state, then we will have the following relations
>
> variety in waking state causes variety in dream state
> variety in waking state causes nonvariety in deep sleep
Mind you, it is not accepted by me that variety in one state is caused
by that in another, and such, at all. So where's the question? Also,
the different states waking, dreaming, sleep represent different
states of cognition, not different states of reality as such. It may
be that while you are fast asleep, someone else is wide awake and
perceives things you temporarily do not. And vice versa. As such,
variety is always there, but is sometimes perceived and sometimes
not. There is no question of it being caused by something else, etc.,
and variety exists even when one is in deep sleep, only one is not
aware of it.
> If this be the case, is it so inconceivable to add one more:
>
> nonvariety in absolute state causes variety in waking state
As I said, causation of variety is part of your hypothesis, not mine.
When I deny any cause for variety, where's the validity to the above?
> On the other hand, if you say the nonvariety of deep sleep is not
> caused by the variety of the waking state, then what is it caused by?
Two things: first, "nonvariety of deep sleep" is false -- variety is a
fact, in deep sleep and in every other state. If variety were ever to
cease, then it should cease for all, not locally for some particular
sleeper(s), and secondly, it should never come back, while it does
always do so. If you would assert that knowing something is the same
as causing it, et cetera, that would be a vignyaanavaadi position, and
one might well ask if the Brahman, or Self, or whatever, is a
temporary illusion caused by knowledge of the same, rather than a
permanent reality. As such, the fact that variety is discontinuously
known is not evidence that it is discontinuous in its presence.
> If you say the cause has nothing to do with the waking state, then
> you have admitted that a causal relation between variety/nonvariety
> in one state and another might not exist at all. So you can't complain
> if the advaitin says that there is nonvariety in the absolute state
> even though there is variety in the waking state.
As I said above, the very idea that there is a cause, is part of your
idea and not mine.
> If, however, you say that the nonvariety in the deep sleep is caused
> by something that is common between the waking state and deep sleep,
> then you are getting closer to advaita. What is common between the
> waking and deep sleep states? It is pure consciousness. Is it not?
> This consciousness is of the nature "I exist."
Not just _that_ consciousness, but all else seen in the waking is
common. The fact that I cannot see the other side of the moon, the
one that's always pointed away from the Earth, does not mean that said
other side does not at all exist. It is possible to infer its
existence from the part that I can see. So also, I can infer the
continuous existence of the wakefully experienced over my sleeping
periods, even though I then have no perception of the same while
asleep, because there is no "bAdhaka" (obstacle) for this inference
showing its invalidity. And in fact, this inference is commonly
made. How else would I know that I am the same person with the same
name, that this is the same terminal I used before, etc., although
there has been a sleep period in between? If there were discontinuity
in the reality of the wakefully experienced, I would not have a
continuous identity, my education, etc., would not be possible, and so
on. Thus, since there is a continuity of identity over the deep sleep
state, it has to be said that all that is seen in waking is also
common to the sleeping, although it is not perceived then.
Or look at it in another way: on what basis do you say that there is
*anything* at all, even the "pure consciousness" of the nature of "I
exist" in common to waking and sleep? How can one say that there is
any consciousness at all in sleep? Why not say there is a nihil state
where one does not exist at all? The answer can only be that to say
so is opposed to experience, specifically, to experience upon
awakening, since one remembers having slept soundly and having enjoyed
the experience. But, given the fact that the "I" who enjoyed the
sleep and the "I" who awoke can only be identified as the same by
wakeful experience, there is no way on Earth to dilute the strength of
reality of that experience and still assert the identity. If the
waking is illusory, et cetera, then the memory, "I slept well," which
is part of the waking, would also be illusory, as the Buddhists would
assert, and there is nothing at all in common between the waker and
the sleeper.
> In fact, this consciousness is *the* only common thing between the
> three states commonly known to people, waking, dream, and deep sleep.
>
> Now, is there variety or nonvariety in this consciousness? This is
> question that dvaitins will have to ponder over.
I've attended to that above. Going on --
> > Causation and implication are very different beasts, I'm sure you'll
> > agree.
>
> The difference from a logician's standpoint is not that great.
Again, there is no separation between logic and science such as you
posit.
> For example, you can say flu causes fever. Absence of flu does not
> necessarily mean there is no fever, (because fever could be caused by
> other factors). You could also say, flu implies fever. And you would
> also be logically correct in saying absence of flu does not imply
> lack of fever. If there is no fever, whatever that state is, is not caused
> by flu. Logically, no fever implies no flu.
>
> A causes B does not necessarily mean not A causes not B.
> A implies B does not necessarily mean not A implies not B.
>
> However,
>
> A causes B means not B implies not A.
> A implies B means not B implies not A.
>
> Example, if there is no fever, there is no flu.
I fail to see the point of the above.
> > While one can have an implication relationship between any two of the
> > three variables (length of pole, length of shadow, angle of sun) and
> > the third, the causal relationship is not similarly malleable. Thus,
> > any attempt to reason about causal relationships in terms of
> > implicational relationships is fallacious. It is for this reason that
>
> I think it is not so fallacious as you think. And I am in good
> company. In writing expert systems, for example, it is routine
> to represent causal relationships as logical implications.
So much for expert systems. That may only be because expert systems,
as indeed any Turing machine programs, can only model implication, not
causality. That hardly means that the idea of modeling causality by
implication is worthwhile. It is a fact that even today, terrestrial
astronomy uses the geocentric model that went out as a description of
cosmic truth some four centuries ago, but this is because from the
standpoint of a terrestrial observer, that model is the easiest to
use. It does not actually mean that geocentrism rather than
heliocentrism is correct in a larger sense.
> > Your criticism is thus based on a false presumption that causality is
> > the same as implication, and is thus subject to improvement. If you
> > can come up with a different/better one, I'd love to see it.
>
> Your criticism that my criticism is based on a false presumption is
> unfounded.
I think I've clarified: in particular, please note that the notion
that variety in any state needs a cause, is solely your own, and any
criticism resting upon the same, whether from a causal or an
implicational perspective, can only be a criticism of your own view.
> > But of course, there is no need to do that. For the logic can be
> > dismissed in and of itself. For there is no acceptance by the
> > Tattvavaada school that duality needs a cause. It simply *is*. It
> > has no more a cause than Brahman does. Only those things that arise,
> > are created, etc., need causes, while duality is accepted to have
> > existed for all time in the past. As such, speculation about its
> > causes is mere moonshine.
>
> Then duality is taken as an axiom. Incorrectly perhaps. because
> the shruti speaks of nonduality, ekameva advitiiyaM etc. So duality
> cannot be taken as a fundamental axiom.
Fine, so don't take it as one, then. But the point remains, that
given that there is complete lack of agreement on this point, viz.,
that there is a cause for duality, your criticism based on that notion
is not part of a well-founded common basis. That is the point here.
> > And in fact, since it is your assertion (I think?) that the duality of
> > the waking state is not caused by the duality of the absolute state,
> > for the excellent reason of the latter being absent, what is its cause
> > then? Since it arises and subsides, it needs must have a cause. If
> > it were spontaneous, without a cause, then it would be like Brahman,
> > and would not subside at all, and you'd be left with eternal duality.
> > Thus, given that duality in the waking is a fact, whether one likes it
> > or not, a cause must be given for it, else it would have to be that
> > the duality is eternal, a conclusion you do not accept.
> >
>
> I can explain more. But let me mince words and say that the cause
> of duality and everything else is Brahman. I only said the duality
> is not caused by duality in Brahman. But that does not prevent me from
> saying Brahman itself, nonduality is the cause of duality.
In which case, duality must be eternal as well? Since the cause is
eternal, so must the effect be. In order to explain why duality
does/would cease, one would have to posit another agency or upAdhi
than Brahman, the cause of it. To say that Brahman causes duality but
duality automatically ceases without an adjunct while Brahman does
not, is opposed to the very notion of causation. And if you could say
that, then one might as well say that Brahman itself will also
automatically cease although there is no cause for it to do so.
> > Therefore, since you yourself have shown that the postulation that
> > duality at a certain state is caused by that in a higher state leads
> > to infinite regress, it would follow that the duality of the waking
> > state is not caused by something else, but is in and of itself an
> > ultimate, unsubsiding truth.
>
> this is where shruti will say " neha naanaa .asti kiJNchana"
> there is no variety here whatsoever. All logic ceases.
Well, no; logic doesn't cease, but just that it stops serving your
purpose. If there is no variety here, then there is no Shruti either,
and nothing to take note of. And it has been accepted by you that
Brahman causes duality. Said duality, in fact, is part of one's
native experience, something which is a source for Shruti as well.
> > Try the Rg Veda, X.71-6:
> >
> > yastityAja sachividaM sakhAyaM na tasya vAchyapi bhAgo.asti |
> > yadIM shR^iNotyalakaM na hi praveda sukR^itasya panthAm.h ||
> >
> > One who gives up his True Companion, there is no truth even in his
> > speech; whatever he hears, he hears amiss; he cannot be said to be on
> > the path of virtuous action.
> >
> > It is significant that the same word `sakha' used elsewhere in the Rg Veda
> > in the context of `dvA suparNA', is used here as well. Now, if the "sakha"
> > were an incomplete truth, an illusion, etc., why would the Veda say what
> > it does? Beats me...
> >
>
> Good. A step in the right direction. "sakhaa" is not an illusion. It is
> God. It is Brahman. It is you. tat tvam asi. Did I miss an "a" somehere?
> :-)
Not that I noticed. But the fact is, a "companion" being not an
illusion means that _companionship_ is not an illusion either. If the
"companion" is one's own self, then it would have to be. That is
precisely my point. Thus, the "Brahman" is not the same as oneself,
and to regard it as one is strictured by Shruti strongly as you can
see.
Regards,
Shrisha Rao
> Anand
>From Thu Dec 5 21:32:47 1996
Message-Id: <THU.5.DEC.1996.213247.0700.>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 1996 21:32:47 -0700
Reply-To: dvaita-list at eskimo.com, advaita-l at TAMU.EDU
To: "Advaita (non-duality) with reverence" <ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU>
From: Shrisha Rao <shrao at NYX.NET>
Subject: Re: An Interesting article - any response?
Comments: To: ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU, dvaita-list at eskimo.com
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.95.961205120451.7101A-100000 at piccolo> from
"Vidyasankar Sundaresan" at Dec 5, 96 01:13:38 pm
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Vidyasankar Sundaresan wrote:
> In the recent past, I have been trying to keep away from dvaita vs.
> advaita debates on any forum, including the newsgroups, srv and srh. The
> main reason is that these debates are endless. We do not agree on
> fundamentals, and I see little point in constantly debating peripheral
> issues. I do not think this is the right forum for such a debate. Nor do I
> think that the dvaita list is a forum for the debate, and so I've
> refrained from even subscribing to it.
You are entitied to your views, of course, but debate, ordered by
decency, is certainly on topic for the Dvaita list; whether you wish
to or not is another matter. In general, until M K Turumella, we
never had any there.
> > > They seem to be real as long as the dream persists. For the dreamer,
> > > they are real enough. What is pointed out in advaita is that the
> > > dream objects have no reality *independent of the dreamer*. Your
> > > dream objects have no meaning for me, they are forever inaccessible
> > > to me. I cannot even claim to know them, much less talk about their
> > > reality or otherwise.
> >
> > If that is the case, then why are you talking of their reality or
> > otherwise, by saying they are not unreal, that they are real enough to
> > the dreamer, and that they seem to be real as long as the dream
> > persists?
>
> svata: pramANa, parata: apramANa, my dear Shrisha. We advaitins do not
> like to leave the perceiver out of the analysis of perception. When I say
> something about dream objects, I am saying something about the dreamer
> also. Certainly I can talk about dreamers and about dream objects, because
> I myself do have dreams! I am only admitting that I have no access to your
> dreams. But I do not doubt that you dream too, and that your dreams
> presumably have objects in them.
If you have no access to my dreams, how do you know that I dream too,
or that we even mean the same thing by "dream"? Or "dream object"?
> > > The analogy of dreams is given just to point out the meaning of the
> > > Sruti statements that the universe has no reality *independent of
> > > brahman*. However, everybody perceives the universe to be
> > > independent of any higher reality. This is the essential paradox,
> > > which advaita vedAnta seeks to describe as avidyA or ignorance about
> > > the true nature of reality.
> >
> > Now see. Not too long ago it seemed like you were saying that Anand Hudli
> > was right in criticizing Guruprasad for saying that the relationship
> > between dreams and waking is not of a piece with that between waking and
> > the absolute. Yet, you are saying the same above?
>
> No, because there is no proper analogy to brahman. We do not insist that
> analogies have some given number of points of congruence, because the
> exact number of congruences I want to use in an analogy is up to me. You
> cannot insist that an analogy has to have, say, nine points of congruence,
> and find fault with my analogy because it has only eight. In your
> opinion, I might be rather poor at coming up with analogies, but then,
> hey, I am no Kalidasa.
I am not aware that there is any system except in things like
fingerprinting, where a match with a certain number of points of
congruence is expected for an analogy to be accepted. An analogy
should correctly represent whichever aspect of the real thing it is
illustrating, that is all. There is no need to have specific number
of congruences, etc. And in fact, all this talk of congruences is
off-track, since I did not specify a need for such. What I was asking
was if you were also drawing a parallel between the states of dreaming
and waking, on the one hand, and between waking and the absolute, on
the other, as you didn't like to see Guruprasad do? -- that's all.
> > If you are not saying the same, then the "Brahman" referred to must be the
> > Ishvara or the saguNa-Brahman, and saying that the universe has no reality
> > apart from Him, is a dualistic truth that describes something other than
> > the highest. Was this your intention?
>
> So long as the universe exists, yes, vide "yatra tu dvaitamiva bhavati".
> We advaitins do not deny that duality appears in the perceived universe,
> do we?
In which case, as I was pointing out not too long ago, the universe,
and the dualistic truth, must be real as well? Because the duality
appears, and "nAsato vidyate bhAvaH, nA.abhAvo vidyate sataH," etc.;
nothing that is not real would appear, and nothing that appears is
not real.
> > > Here, it might be well to point out the advaitic conception of the
> > > validity of cognition. Any cognition is held to be "svata: pramANa,
> > > parata: apramANa." i.e. a cognition is valid by itself, it is only
> > > invalidated by another cognition, which in turn is self-valid, and so on.
> > > This is nothing more than a statement of what all human beings take for
> > > granted all through their life.
> >
> > That's not quite right. David Hilbert would never have formulated the
> > famous Hilbert's Program, an idea to automate all theorem-proving
> > completely, had he known and understood prAmANya-svatastva. And
> > besides, the meaning of prAmANya-svatastva is not that all cognition
> > (all pramANa, actually) is valid by itself -- if it were so, then
>
> What David Hilbert did has no relevance to a discussion on dvaita and
> advaita. Scientific theorem solving assumes that any statement is in need
> of proof by other statements of known truth value. The vedAntic assumption
> is radically different.
That's not exactly what theorem proving involves, either, strictly
speaking.
> Furthermore, I would like to point out that we advaitins never leave the
> experiencer out of any analysis of experience. When we say, "valid by
> itself", we always mean that "valid by itself for the perceiver". It gets
> tiresome to repeat "for the perceiver" everytime, so we leave it out. I
> was after all writing the above on an advaita list, where everybody knew
> my assumptions, presumably. I honestly did not know that you were a list
> member too. I will be more careful in my choice of words the next time
> around.
That wanders...
> > there would be no incorrect cognition at all, and/or any conflicts
> > that arose would be eternally unresolved. It is that the prAmANya of
> > any cognition is perceived by the same agent as responsible for the
> > cognition itself, as part of the same knowledge. This keeps the door
> > open to possible aprAmANya, whose paratastva again means that the
> > aprAmANya is perceived via a different source than the original
> > cognition. This is quite non-trivial, and I submit any human being
> > who can think up all this by himself is very much out of the
> > ordinary.
>
> This does not follow, because we see that men are constantly correcting
> their own errors.
Yes, they are, but they are unable to make a detailed exposition of
the concept of prAmANya-svatastva, &c. That is what I said.
> However, so long as they are under error, they never know it. They
> assume that they are right.
Strictly not true! If that were the case, then there would never be
any error-correction at all. It is only when one is in error and one
knows it, that one is motivated to change. If it were that when one
is wrong one does not know that one is wrong, then one will forever be
wrong only.
> Quite obviously, you and I mean
> very different things by pramANa svatastva. I would appreciate it if you
> kept *my* meaning in mind when you respond to a statement *I* make. Do
> not impose your meanings on my statements.
Is there an exposition of your style of prAmANya-svatastva? I'd be
interested, genuinely. As far as I know, your concept is strictly
your own, not even that of your school as such.
> > > But this is hardly the real point of adviata vedAnta. Instead of
> > > assuming that there are in reality multiple perceivers, advaita asks you
> > > to analyze the ultimate reality of the perceiver himself.
> >
> > -- or, in other words, it asks you to assume that in ultimate reality
> > there is but one perceiver? How is that any different from assuming
> > that there are many? At least, there is cognition (your style of
> > svataH pramANa, even) for there being many perceivers; what cognition
> > exists to show that there is only one?
>
> No cognition, but Sruti. "yatra tvasya sarvam AtmaivAbhUt ...", "neha
> nAnAsti kincana", etc. We cannot present evidence for absence of anything,
> and you well know it.
I'm not sure what you mean here. If that when something is present
you cannot produce evidence for its absence, you're quite right. But
that means that that thing is present. Period. If on the other hand
you mean that no absence can ever be proved with evidence, then I beg
to differ. The absence of a million dollars in my bank account is
proved by the evidence of my bank statement.
> But you are mistaken if you think that this is a
> flaw in our system. Sruti denies multiplicity in ultimate reality,
> including multiplicity of perceivers, and we advaitins see no reason to
> doubt it, or to explain away the explicit Sruti.
-- even if it means having to explain away "explicit" cognition of
multiplicity, and "explicit" Shruti that says otherwise? On what
basis is there a decision to favor one explicit Shruti over another,
although it means junking the explicit experience as well?
By the way, if you see no reason, here's one: there are two kinds of
opposition of pramaaNa -- `virodha' and `pratirodha'. The former is
when something is opposed by a stronger pramaaNa, and the latter when
something is opposed by a pramaaNa of like strength. When there is a
case of pratirodha, then both mutually-opposed pramaaNa-s tie each
other up completely and cannot be used to decide the case, which needs
recourse to some other source. When there is virodha, the stronger
pramaaNa runs over the weaker and decides.
Now, the explicit Shruti statements supporting and denying duality are
in a position fo deadlock, for being both Shruti and of the same
worth. Thus, the non-dualistic conclusion from Shruti is pratiruddha,
and duality is decided by the evidence of experience, which has no
barrier at all. One cannot assert that the abheda-Shruti is
generically a stronger pramaaNa and that there is virodha, since the
opposite conclusion, that the bheda-Shruti is stronger, is also
possible with equal efficacy, and there is no way of favoring the one
over the other except due to a pre-existing bias.
> > > The blind logic of the dvaitin might claim that the assumption that the
> > > waking state is really real cannot be doubted.
> >
> > Well, no. The "blind logic of the dvaitin" will merely say that you
> > cannot define what you mean by "real" without reference to the waking
> > state, and that thus, its reality is a matter of definition rather
> > than assumption. If you can show differently, I'll be glad to learn.
>
> Apparently, for centuries, the advaitins have been defining real quite
> independent of waking state realities - "trikAla-abAdhitam". This computer
> I am using right now, did not exist before 1994. It will one day be thrown
> away and salvaged for parts. There is no more computer then, but for the
> purposes of sending you this mail, I assume that the computer exists. I do
> not wish to attribute any greater reality to this computer than necessary.
Good. Now, what I meant before was the following: since your
definition is that something which is real is "unobstructed in all
three states of time," it would come to pass that there is an
unavoidable reference to the reality of the waking state.
For it is by recourse to your waking experience *alone* that you know
that the computer did not exist prior to '94, and infer that it will
cease to exist at some unspecified future date. But for the wakeful
experience, you have no basis for saying so at all. And in fact, the
notion that something is, or could be, unobstructed in three states,
comes from waking experience alone, since it is not felt in dreaming
or in sleep. That is to say, `trikAla-bAdhitatva' is itself an aspect
of wakefulness, and if wakefulness were not ultimately real, then the
concept itself would dissolve completely leaving only a void.
Also, the fact that the computer did not exist previously, or that it
will cease in future, is not a `bAdhaka' at all, since its reality in
any one state is not voided by another. I was a child some years ago,
and am not one now, yet my childhood is not voided by my present
adulthood.
> > > However, it is only by questioning the validity of one's assumptions
> > > that any real understanding develops.
> >
> > That's good. Let's start, then, by questioning the validity of the
> > assumption that there is one ultimate reality of *the* perceiver
> > himself.
> >
>
> It is not an assumption, Shrisha. It is given to us from Sruti. So long as
> we accept Sruti as a pramANa, and a superior one to other pramANas, the
> advaitins are perfectly justified. Note that what we say about the
> paramArtha reality of even this pramANa does not affect a statement made
> from the basis of this pramANa for the purposes of vyavahAra. If you think
> this is being "pracanna bauddha", so be it. You are after all entitled to
> your own opinions, however misguided they be.
See, now, the same argument can run also in reverse: the eternality of
duality, or the multiplicity of perceivers rather, is not an
assumption as you said it was, but is rather given by Shruti. As long
as we accept Shruti, &c., for the rest.
> > > Unlike the dvaitin who twists Sruti to conform to his assumption
> > > that the waking state is ultimately real, advaita vedAnta holds to the
> > > tenet that where ordinary perception seems to be opposed to the knowledge
> > > of the Atman gained from Sruti, the latter is true.
> >
> > But isn't it the case that the "knowledge of the Atman gained from Sruti"
> > is itself channelled through the knowledge of the waking state? And
> > that if the latter is opposed by the former, and the former is true,
> > then we have a logical error?
>
> You have no reason to assume that the mantra-drashTas gave us the Sruti
> only from the waking state.
It stands to reason. What reason is there to accept otherwise? The
fullness of their d.rshhTi-experience can hardly have come in a dream,
because it is described as being very vivid, and `j~nAna-darshana' can
hardly be a dream-imagination. Besides, it is not the seer I was
referring to, but the ordinary mortals who study Shruti.
> You also have no reason to assume that I
> understand Sruti only in the waking state. Many times I remember on waking
> up, that I was thinking of some Sruti statement while asleep.
:-)
Your sleep is very unique, I must say. That, however, seems to
conflict with the idea that the "I" is the only thing common between
the three states. At least in your case, Shruti also is in common.
> Sometimes I
> even get the impression that I understood it better while asleep than ever
> before.
Sometimes I get the impression that I could fly better while dreaming
than awake; that's hardly the point.
> I do not see any reason to assert that the knowledge gained from
> Sruti is channelled only through the waking state. At least for me, it is
> channelled through waking, dreaming and sleeping states.
-- which, as I said, is a straightforward conflict with the notion
that only the "I" is common to all three.
Regards,
Shrisha Rao
> Vidyasankar
>
> ps. Note, this *is* my only response on this thread. To ensure that I
> don't get sucked into further discussion, I promise not to say anything
> bad (or for that matter, anything at all) about tattvavAda or tattvavAdins
> till the 5th of January, 1997, i.e. for a whole month. I hope saying
> something good about advaita/advaitins does not automatically mean
> something bad about dvaita/dvaitins.
P.S. I myself will restrict my participation on this list to this one
thread, unless the circumstances that caused it should chance to repeat.
>From Thu Dec 5 21:39:55 1996
Message-Id: <THU.5.DEC.1996.213955.0700.>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 1996 21:39:55 -0700
Reply-To: dvaita-list at eskimo.com, advaita-l at TAMU.EDU
To: "Advaita (non-duality) with reverence" <ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU>
From: Shrisha Rao <shrao at NYX.NET>
Subject: Re: An Interesting article - any response?
Comments: To: ADVAITA-L at TAMU.EDU, dvaita-list at eskimo.com
In-Reply-To: <M.120596.172046.33 at ddi.digital.net> from "egodust" at Dec 5,
96 10:20:46 pm
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Frank Maiello wrote:
> The entire dvaitic conception is based on the idea that the jiva is real.
> On the 'path' to moksha, what does it matter if it's considered so or not?
It matters because unless there is a real entity needing moksha, there
cannot be moksha at all. Just as unless there is a real person
needing food, there cannot be a meal. Thus, any path that does not
consider the mumukshu to be real is not a path to moksha at all.
(This of course is a more explicit argument against the Buddhists, but
a valid point in this context nonetheless.)
> If dvaitins are able to accomplish [their own professed] mission in the art
> of surrender, we can then ask them how real the jiva might be. If they'll
> *still* uphold its alleged reality, then they haven't really surrendered.
One does not "surrender" by asserting one's identity with the one to
whom one surrenders. If I were to lose in a war and surrender to the
victor, I in fact should not even assert likeness with him, for that
would result in bad consequences for me. If there is no separate
reality, there is no surrender either, given the very notion of
surrender.
> namaste.
To you as well.
Regards,
Shrisha Rao
> Frank Maiello
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