Samkara's Theory please!

MC1 at AOL.COM MC1 at AOL.COM
Mon Oct 13 08:20:31 CDT 1997


Basically the quote from Pugliandla at the end of this posting sounds
fundamentally accurate to me although I not sure Sankara outlines the process
of sublating avidya in exactly the same manner as Pugliandla.

Sankara does incorporate an analysis of the five sheaths, showing each
succesive identification to be more subtle than the previous ultimately
resolving all in the Self. THis was later adopted in the  methodology of
Anvaya-Vyatireka, agreement-difference by Suresvara. But I don't recall
anywhere that Sankara addresses the process of one edifying experience
replacing a previously held mistaken judgment.

 One further comment on the last sentence below:

     "On the criterion of sublatability, Samkara
     distinguishes reality, appearance, and unreality.
     Reality is that which in principle cannot be sublated by
     any other experience. Apearance is that which in
     principle can be sublated by other experiences.
     Unreality is that which in principle neither can nor
     cannot be sublated."

I believe Sankara states that unreality (mirage in a desert), as also
appearance, must necessarily have a real substratum. In the case of
appearance, the rope is the substratum for the apparent snake; in the case of
unreality,  the "notion" of water is the substratum. In a grander sense,
Existence cannot be denied or sublated and is ever-present (in appearance and
unreality) therefore it alone is real. That which is not subject to change is
Real according to Sankara.

So perhaps Pugliandla is mistaken in saying, "Unreality is that which in
principle neither can nor cannot be sublated."

Comments or corrections would be gratefully appreciated. -m.


In a message dated 97-10-13 03:53:41 EDT, Allan Curry writes quoting
Pugliandla:

<<    "Central to Samkara's theory of reality is the concept
     of sublation. Sublation is essentially the mental
     process of correcting and rectifying errors of judgment.
     Thus one is said to sublate a previously held judgment
     when, in the light of a new experience which contradicts
     it, one either regards the judgment as false or
     disvalues it in some significant sense. It is obvious
     that sublation of a given judgment necessarily results
     in its being replaced by a new one. Not only judgments
     but also concepts, objects, relations. and in general
     any content of consciousness, can be sublated. For
     Samkara sublatability is the criterion of the
     ontological status of any content of consciousness;
     anything that is in principle sublatable is of a lesser
     degree of reality and value than that which replaces it
     as a result of sublation. It is through the concept of
     sublation that Samkara arrives at his ontological
     hierarchy. On the criterion of sublatability, Samkara
     distinguishes reality, appearance, and unreality.
     Reality is that which in principle cannot be sublated by
     any other experience. Apearance is that which in
     principle can be sublated by other experiences.
     Unreality is that which in principle neither can nor
     cannot be sublated.

     Let us first note that the act of sublation presupposes
     an essential dualism between the experiencer and the
     experienced, the subject and the object, consciousness
     and the contents of consciousness. It also presupposes a
     plurality of objects, concepts, judments - contents of
     consciousness in general. The distinction between
     subject and object is necessary for sublation because it
     is the subject who sublates the object. Plurality of
     objects is necessary for sublation because sublation
     analytically implies juxtaposing one object or
     experience against another incompatible object or
     experience and judging that the first has a lesser
     degree of reality (or is of lesser value) than the
     second. In the light of these remarks, to say that the
     experience of reality is unsublatable is to say that no
     other experience can conceivably contradict the
     experience of reality. The reason for this is that
     reality is devoid of all distinctions - not only the
     distinction between one object and another but also that
     between the subject and the object, the self and the
     non-self. Thus the experience of reality transcends all
     distinctions and is therefore the experience of pure
     identity between the subject and object, the self and
     the non-self. It is clear that the experience of reality
     is unsublatable, since there can be nothing besides the
     unitary experience which may conceivably contovert the
     experience. Reality is unsublatable because it is wholly
     bereft of any distinctions, oppositions, qualifications
     or relations. It is the experience of reality that
     sublates all else, itself being unsublatable by any
     other experience whatsoever."

 -------------end of Puligandla's quote-----------------
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