(nibbana) = (Nirguna Brahman) ?

[egodust]

Vidyasankar wrote:
>
> The vedantins always assert an atman, which is provisionally seen as an
> individual, but ultimately known to be the same as brahman, which is
> eternal and beyond empirical individuality. The early bauddhas, on the
> other hand, assert anatta (this pali word was later sanskritized into
> nairatmya, in mahayana texts), when they say that the provisionally known
> individual does not last. Thus, they emphasize that no thing has an
> abiding atman. Realizing that this is so, is equivalent with nibbana, and
> this is what nagarjuna also means when he says that nirvana is sunya
> (empty) in its content. He is not interested in asserting nirvana/sunyata
> as a separate, higher entity. Clearly, after asserting anatta/nairatmya,
> the bauddha is not overly eager to reinstate the concept of the atman, by
> describing nibbana/nirvana as the Self. All things (objects) are said to
> be the same, in that no thing has an atman, so that every thing is sunya.
> In contrast, the vedantic notion has always been to realize one's own self
> as the one brahman. Here, all things (objects) are said to be the same, in
> that truly, every thing is known to be the same as brahman, which is also
> one's own self. Closely tied in with this comparison is that the vedantins
> always say that every thing has an own nature (svabhava), whereas the
> bauddhas never say such a thing.
>
>  [...]
>
> The centuries-old bauddha vs. advaitin debate is not a mere
> quibble over syntax/semantics, with neither side realizing that they are
> saying the same thing, until English speaking translators came along in
> the 19th century.
>

I disagree.

If we're careful in analyzing this issue, it should become evident
that infact it quite is a matter of semantics.

Even from the vedantic perpective the atman can be equally regarded
as sunya, in the special sense that it can be thought of as merely
a temporal reference point with respect to the jiva (viz. it is
none other than brahman, and its name ['atman'] is only necessary
due to the existence of the jiva.  That is, it has the connotation
that its nature [the word 'atman,' as a separative individualized
consciousness] is eternal, which isn't true).

Granted this is a hair-splitting observation; nevertheless, if we're
capable of recognizing the end result verity of realization the Buddha
achieved, by virtue of his absolute and nonprovisional doctrine of
'neti, neti,' (which is what it really is) we should see the forest
through the trees.

We must also bear in mind how both schools' *founders* had an aversion
to the human mind's habitual reliance on mentation/conceptualization,
yet set about on different courses in order to affect the extinguishing
of the flame (nirvana via, ultimately, nirvada).  And, the *result* is
the important thing! ...the means also are neither true nor false, but
suitable to the varying temperaments.

For example, for some people steeped in vedanta, the idea of the Self
can prove to be their last and most formidable obstacle--because they're
dwelling on a concept [which constructs their final limit] that they'll
swear is the truth *itself*!  Where infact it's only a philosophical
reference point.  If we don't lose sight of the fact that brahman defies
not only names but conceptions, we'll recognize in fact that the last
step we'll take toward our 'blowout' will be to effortlessly forget all
we know, including the *idea* of Self.


Namaste.


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"There are no answers
       because
there are no questions."
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