advaita-siddhi - 9 (Partial redundancy? No way!)

[Anand V. Hudli]

MadhusUdana set the sAdhya, what is to be established, as the mithyAtva
 of duality, the unreality of duality. In defining mithyAtva, one of the
 definitions taken up was the one from the panchapAdikA of PadmapAda.
 MithyAtva is defined here as anirvachanIya, that which cannot be
 categorized as sat or asat. More specifically, this was defined to be
 sadasadanadhikaraNatva, which was clarified by MadhusUdana to be the
 absolute absence of sattva and the absolute absence of asattva.

 The opponent had raised the objection of arthAntara against the definition
 of mithyAtva or sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not being a substratum of
 either existence or non-existence. MadhusUdana refuted these objections.
 He also offered an alternative definition of sadasadanadhikaraNatva,
 namely the absolute difference from existence and the absolute difference
 from nonexistence which rules out any possibility of arthAntara (proving
 something other than what is intended).

 The opponent could, however, level another charge against MadhusUdana's
 definition. By defining sadasadanadhikaraNatva as the difference from
 existence and difference from nonexistence, there is at least a defect
 of proving something a part of which has already been proved. For
 example, if you seek to prove A AND B, when you know that one of the two,
 say B, is already proved, your proof will have the defect of partial
 siddha-sAdhana, ie.  aMshataH siddha-sAdhana. Your proof will be
 partially redundant and one of the worst mistakes a logician can commit
 is being redundant! Here, the opponent claims, the partial siddha-sAdhana
 arises from the fact that the realists, including the navya-naiyAyikas
 and the mAdhvas, already have accepted the world's absolute difference
 from nonexistence, in the sense that the world is absolutely real. So
 the part of the advaitin's proof which establishes absolute difference
 from nonexistence is redundant.

 But, MadhusUdana explains,  the sAdhya in this case CANNOT be split
 into two terms A and B, such that each can be independently proved. We
 HAVE to consider the combined difference from existence and nonexistence.
 Why? Because, the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptiblity), in this case is the
 hetu for the CONJUNCTION (or combination) of absolute difference from
 existence AND absolute difference from nonexistence. (Recall that the
 sAdhya is to be inferred from the invariable concomitance of the hetu
 with the sAdhya.)

 Without further ado, let us hear the unassailable reply of MadhusUdana:

 Text:

 nacha - asattvavyatireka-aMshasya-asadbhedasya cha prapaJNche
 siddhattvena-aMshataH siddha-sAdhanamiti - vAchyam.h | "guNAdikaM
 guNyAdinA bhinnAbhinnaM samAnAdhikR^itatvAt.h" iti bhedAbhedavAdiprayoge
 tArkikAdyaN^gIkR^itasya bhinnatvasya siddhAvapi uddeshya-pratItyasiddher-
 yathA na siddha-sAdhanaM, tathA prakR^ite .api militapratIteruddeshyatvA-
 nna siddha-sAdhanam.h | yathA tattvAbhede ghaTaH kuMbha iti sAmAnAdhi-
 karaNya-pratIteradarshanena militasiddhiruddeshyA, tathA prakR^ite .api
 sattvarahite tuchchhe dR^ishyatva-adarshanena militasya tatprayojakatayA
 militasiddhiruddeshyeti samAnam.h |

 Translation:

 (And you) cannot charge that there is the defect of partial siddha-sAdhana
 (aMshataH siddha-sAdhana) because the part (of the proof) consisting
 of (establishing) the absence of asattva (nonexistence) and the
 difference from nonexistence (in the alternative definition) is already
 established regarding the world. The (mAdhvas) hold that a quality
 and the substance that possesses that quality are different AND
 non-different from each other. In arguing with the tArkikas (the
 naiyAyikas, sAnkhyas, the bhATTas, etc.) who accept the difference
 (of a quality from the possessor of the quality), they (the mAdhvas)
 say:  "the quality and its possessor are different
 and non-different from each other because they can be cognized to be
 related by a relation of non-difference."  (So, they say,) there is no
 siddha-sAdhana because the intended cognition (CONJUNCTION of difference
 and nondifference of a quality and its possessor) is NOT proved , even
 though the difference (of a quality from its possessor) is already proved.
 Similarly, in (our) present case (of establishing absence of sattva AND the
 absence of asattva) too, the cognition that is intended (to be proved)
 is CONJUNCTION (combination of absence of sattva and absence of asattva).
 So (we) cannot (be charged with) siddha-sAdhana (redundancy in reasoning).
 (You may say that the CONJUNCTION of ours is not justified. But we say,
 no!) In the case of identical things such as a "pot" and a "jar" (which are
 terms that stand for the same thing), there is no cognition of difference
 and nondifference of the form "The pot is the jar." (Therefore,) the
 conjunction of difference and nondifference is intended to be established.
 (This is your stand.)
 Similarly, in the present case (ie. of absence of sattva and absence of
 asattva), perceptibility is not (a characteristic of) a totally nonexistent
 thing that lacks existence (sattva). (Therefore,) conjunction (of absence
 of sattva and absence of asattva, or equivalently, difference from sattva
 and difference from  asattva) is a prayojaka (a necessary factor) for
 dR^ishyatva, perceptibility (which is the hetu) and (so) the establishing
 of that CONJUNCTION is what is intended.

 Notes:

   ViTThalesha describes that the hetu dR^ishyatva is an invariable
   concomitant (vyApya) of ubhayatva ("both-ness" or conjunction) of
   sadbheda and asadbheda.

   dR^ishyatvasya sadbheda-asadbhedobhayatva-avachchhinnaM vyApyatvam.h

   The vyApyatva (invariable concomitance) of perceptibility (the hetu
   in this case) is delimited (characterized) by the conjunction of
   difference from sat and difference from asat (or equivalently the
   absence of sattva and absence of asattva, in which case the proper
   term would be "sattva-abhAva-asattva-abhAvobhayatva-avachchhinnaM").

   And as BrahmAnanda explains, such "ubhayatva" is the prayojaka
   in establishing dR^ishyatva:

   tatprayojakatA-  ubhayatva-vishishhTasya dR^ishyatvopapAdakatA


 Discussion:
 ------------

 Here the argument runs as follows:

 mAdhva:
  We may make a charge or partial siddha-sAdhana against you, the
  advaitin, because the establishing of absence of sattva and absence
  of asattva has a part, the establishing of absence of asattva with
  regard to the world, that is already established by others.

 advaitin:
  Well, in that case, we can make the same charge against you
  because your establishing of the difference and nondifference of a
  quality from its possessor has a part, the establishing of difference
  of a quality from its possessor, is already established by others such
  as the bhATTas, naiyAyikas, sAMkhyas, etc., who admit the difference
  of a quality from its possessor.

 mAdhva:
  Not so. You cannot establish such difference and nondifference
  independently of each other. You have got to establish the conjunction of
  the two conditions, namely difference and nondifference of a quality
  from its possessor. The hetu here is "samAnAdhikR^itatva", which is
  explained as being capable of being the content of a cognition of a
  relation of nondifference in the same substratum where there is
  difference. Or, we can explain the hetu, samAnAdhikR^itatva, as being
  capable of being cognized as a qualifier (visheshhaNa) of the possessor
  of the quality. In the cognition, "the pot is blue", (ghaTo nIlaH),
  the blue color of the pot is cognized as the qualifier, visheshhaNa of
  the pot which is the qualificand, visheshhya. The particular instance of
  blue color of the pot is different and nondifferent  from the pot
  (although the generic character of blue color is accepted to be only
  different from the pot.) If we split the sAdhya into bheda (difference)
  and abheda (nondifference), then we run into the following problem.
  The sAdhya abheda in itself CANNOT be a necessary factor (prayojaka)
  of the (sole) hetu. For example, there is no cognition of the form "the
  pot is the jar", where the terms "pot" and "jar" are synonyms and the
  hetu samAnAdhikR^itatva is present. Therefore, even though there is
  abheda between "pot" and "jar" here, there is no hetu. And in the case
  of the (erroneous) cognition "the pot is the cloth", there is bheda
  between the pot and the cloth but again there is no hetu, samAnAdhi-
  kR^itatva. Therefore, we need the conjunction of bheda and abheda
  as the sAdhya so that the sAdhya becomes a prayojaka of the hetu.

  But, in your (advaitin's) case, things are different. You claim that
  the world is unreal (mithyA) or has the absence of sattva and the
  absence of asattva (or the difference from sattva and the difference
  from asattva), because of the hetu, dR^ishyatva, perceptibility.
  (What is perceptible or cognizable is mithyA.) Now, perceptibility
  is a characteristic of everything other than Brahman, as per your
  view. And Brahman is "sat". All you need to prove is absence of
  sattva or difference from sattva with regard to the world. Proving
  the absence of asattva (or difference from asattva) is redundant.
   Hence the charge of partial siddha-sAdhana.

 advaitin:
  What you say is not justifiable. Just as in your case,
  the conjunction of bheda and abheda is a necessary factor (prayojaka)
  of the hetu, so in our case too the conjunction of absence of
  sattva and the absence of asattva (or equivalently the conjunction
  of difference from sattva and the difference from asattva) is the
  prayojaka of the hetu, dR^ishyatva (perceptibility). Here is why.
  If we make just the absence of sattva the sAdhya, then we run into a
  problem in the case of a fictitious entity (a chimera). A fictitious
  entity, such as the horn of a hare, has absence of sattva only. But
  here the hetu, dR^ishyatva is NOT present. A fictitious entity is never
  perceived. Again, if we make just the absence of asattva the sAdhya,
  then we run into a problem in the case of Brahman. Here, we have
  absence of asattva, but again the hetu, dR^ishyatva is NOT present in
  Brahman. Therefore, we need to have the conjunction of absence of
  sattva and absence of asattva as the sAdhya in order to make the
  sAdhya a necessary factor (prayojaka) of the hetu. The charge of
  siddha-sAdhana against us cannot be made.

 Notes:

 1)
  The thrust of the argument is that the hetu for the sAdhya in the
  mAdhva's case as well as for the advaitin has to be a prayojaka,
  a necessary factor of the hetu. In other words, the hetu must occur
  exactly wherever the sAdhya occurs, no more no less. This is more
  restrictive than the general form of vyApti, as may be recalled from
  the introduction to nyAya in the third part of this series. When
  the mountain has the hetu, smoke and we infer the sAdhya, fire, the
  vyApti is less restrictive in the sense that we may allow the sAdhya
  fire to occur without smoke, although the smoke must always be
  accompanied by fire in order for the inference to be valid. But in the
  present discussion, we cannot allow the sAdhya to occur where the
  hetu is not found. The occurrences of sAdhya and hetu must exactly
  coincide. Here, the sAdhya for the advaitin is sadbheda and asadbheda
  and the hetu is dR^ishyatva. By defining a "tight" form of vyApti,
  what the advaitin is saying is:

  Whatever is perceptible (cognizable) is different from sat AND
  different from asat.

  The converse also holds.

  Whatever is different from sat AND different from asat is perceptible
  (cognizable).

  Symbolically speaking, if H is the hetu, and the sAdhya is the logical
  conjunction (AND) of S1 (sad-bheda) and S2 (asad-bheda), we may write:

   H -> S1 AND S2
   S1 AND S2 -> H

  where "->" means "implies"

 2) The mAdhvas' view here regarding the bheda-abheda of a quality from
    the possessor of the quality is used here by MadhusUdana as an example
    only. It does not necessarily mean that MadhusUdana endorses this view
    of the mAdhvas in a broader context, as for example, with respect to
    an exegetical context. Indeed, the mAdhvas seem to come under some
    heavy attack from the VishishhTa-advaitins for not recognizing  the
    bheda (difference) between dravya and adravya as RAmAnuja holds.
    In his fourth volume titled "History of Indian Philosophy", Dasgupta
    outlines the criticism of the mAdhvas by the vishishhTa-advaitin,
    ParakAla Yati in his VijayIndra-parAjaya. Parakala Yati points out
    how several texts in the upanishads become absurd if the mAdhva
    position on dravya and adravya is held. Another major disagree-
    ment between the two schools of Vaishnavism is the Ananda-tAratamya
    position which is held by the mAdhvas but rejected by the
    vishishhTa-advaitins. The latter cannot accept (nor can the advaitins)
    that there is gradation in Bliss (Ananda) in the state of mokshha.
    This position is also criticized by ParakAla Yati on exegetical
    grounds as well. There is another vishishhTa-advaitin work named
    Ananda-tAratamya-khaNDana that is also mentioned by Dasgupta.

   Nevertheless, it must be noted that the advaitin's use of the
   mAdhva example on "guNa" and "guNI" is for illustration purposes only.
   Any other example would also be fine.


 Anand

--
bhava shankara deshikame sharaNam

Archives : http://lists.advaita-vedanta.org/archives/advaita-l.html
Help     : Email to listmaster at lists.advaita-vedanta.org
Options  : To leave the list send a mail to
           listserv at lists.advaita-vedanta.org with
           SIGNOFF ADVAITA-L in the body.