advaita-siddhi 12 (Objection by opponent)

Anand Hudli anandhudli at HOTMAIL.COM
Sun Feb 27 15:47:36 CST 2000

On Sat, 26 Feb 2000 16:57:30 -0600, Ravi <msr at COMCO.COM> wrote:

>Why not both? I think the opponent does not provide a basis for
>the argument. And simply dismisses it. Or I do not understand why
>he objects to this.
>I think both the world and its negation are in the realm of
>vyaavahaarika. The basis for this negation is shruti which we
>hold/ assume to tell the truth about the paaramaarthika. When we
>accept that there is a paaramarthika satyam in which there in no
>second principle or second entity. Then under that condition, in
>that state, there is no need to negate/deny reality of second
>entity. OTOH, in this world, when there is a perception of
>plurality, then such a question arises in the first place.
>To a give an example, a normal man does not think he is a mouse.
>He never affirms that I am not a mouse. Such a thought does not
>arise at all. Assuming due to a state of mental coma, he gets
>into a delusion that he is a mouse. Assuming the reality of
>non-mouseness manifests (say the part of his brain which has some
>sanity) in his mind as another mouse (or as an ashariri or divine
>voice)  and tells him that you are not a mouse, you are in a
>state of illusion. The condition of mousness and it is denial
>persists only till the coma exists. Once he is out of it, both of
>them will disappear or be sublated in the reality of his

 Thanks to Ravi for his excellent analysis. Actually, my criticism
 was not directed at people like Ravi who have contributed abundantly
 to the list, but people who write their introductory message and
 are perhaps never heard from again.

 Coming back to Ravi's reply that the negation of the world can itself
 be vyAvahArika along with the vyAvahArika world itself, this is one
 of the solutions to the objection posed. Carrying Ravi's analogy
 of the man in a state of delusion (perhaps a mental disorder) who
 thinks he is a mouse, we may be faced with a fresh objection. Here
 is why.

 Once the man comes out of the delusion that he is a mouse, it is
 true that he becomes a normal man. He has no need to deny that
 he is a mouse. But can he deny that he was once subjected to
 such a delusion where he thought he was a mouse and had to deny
 the "mouse-hood"? No.

 In other words, the advaitin says the world objects are part
 of the dream and they may be negated in the dream itself. When
 he wakes up there are neither the dream objects nor the negation
 of those objects. But can the advaitin deny the fact that he had
 experienced a dream in the first place? No. In that case, when
 he wakes from the world-dream, although there will be Brahman, he
 will also admit the experience of having "dreamed." This precisely
 compromises the nonduality principle because we now have two
 realities - Brahman and the fact that there was a "dream" which
 has come to an end.

 I have heard this objection from some of my MAdhva friends. In reply,
 we may say that the analogy of dream and waking states to the waking
 state and Brahman (the fourth) cannot be carried too far. Every
 analogy has certain limitations that we need to be aware of. We
 remember the fact that we dreamed in the waking state because the
 act of dreaming is an "event" in the time frame of the waking state.
 That is why we admit the fact of having dreamed, although we do
 not have to admit the reality of content of the dream.
 But in the fourth or turIya state of Brahman, even Time vanishes. There
 can be NO events. So there cannot even be an indication of the fact that
 a "dream" occurred.


bhava shankara deshikame sharaNam

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