sAmAnAdhikaraNyam/part3

[ken knight]

Namaste all,

This completes the book.  The task was completed mor
quickly than expected so I will add the short
introductions in another posting.
Also, the footnotes that I had put in disappeared
somehwhere in cyber-space so i will work out how to
send and reference them.
Finally there is a chart of all types of
sAmAnAdhikaraNyam which I will find a way to present
in a posting.
There are some small charts on tat tvam asi on this
posting and I hope they do not get turned into
gobbledegook,

Happy studying

Ken Knight
Part 3 and end

 (2)    When we add a suitable meaning in understanding
the sentence without abandoning the primary meaning it
is called ajahallakshANA. Here the primary meaning is
not discarded, but it is supplemented. ajahallakshANA
is therefore, explanation by implication in which a
word, instead of discarding its own meaning, implies
something else together with its primary meaning. When
it is said that ‘The red is rushing forward,’ the
implication is ‘someone with the red colour is rushing
forward’. Here the quality that is described is added
to the object in which that quality is inherent. The
primary meaning is included in the implied meaning. In
this way, without rejecting the primary meaning, an
explanation by the secondary signification is
accepted.

(3)     When a part of the primary meaning is preserved
and another part of it is rejected, it is called
jahadajahallakshANA z; e.g., “This is that Devadatta”.
It is by rejecting the incongruous element that we
arrive at the identity of the person referred to. In
this judgment, a part of the meaning of the words
‘this’ and ‘that’, viz., Devadatta, is taken and the
other part of their meanings viz., ‘qualified by
present time’ and ‘qualified by past time’, is
rejected. Such an interpretation is known as
bhAga-tyAgalakshANA.

In this connection it may be pointed out that lakshANA
is used not only when there is contradiction of
primary meanings (mukhyArthaAdha), but also wherever
we want to get the true purport of the sentences. That
is, secondary signification may be adopted in places
even when the primary meaning does not suffer
contradiction. What is intended to be conveyed above
is
the meaning of a sentence (tAtparyavishaya). And if a
sentence does not directly express its intended
meaning, then it should be obtained from noting the
implied meaning of the words in the sentence.

In the sentence, “Protect the bowl of curd from the
crows, there is no contradiction of primary meaning of
words; but if we take the primary meaning only then it
goes against the intention of the sentence
(tAtparya-anupapatti). The tatparya is the protection
of the curd not only from the crows, but also from
other creatures that are likely to spoil the curd. So
the term crows, in addition to the primary meaning
implies all creatures that can spoil the curd. Here,
in the above example, we resort to ajahallakshANA and
take the lakshANA of the sentence. We do so not
because the primary meaning is contradicted but
because it goes against the intention of the sentence;
and the purport can be grasped only by resorting to
lakshANA. But in all the three examples cited for
jahallakshANA, ajahallakshANA and jahadajahallakshANA
we get the implied meaning of the expressions by
pointing out the inadequacy of the primary meaning of
words in getting the purport of the sentences.

Now the question arises as to the specific kind of
lakshANA (secondary signification) that could be
adopted in interpreting the mahAvAkyas. This depends
on the primary and the secondary meanings of the words
constituting the mahAvAkyas. Let us take ‘tat tvam
asi’ as representing all the mahAvAkyas and try to
apply these three lakshANA, one by one.

The primary senses of the words ‘tat’ and ‘tvam’ are
IShvara and jIva respectively. IShvara is omniscient
and is known mediately (paroksha).  jIva is ignorant
and known immediately (aparoksha). The contradiction
between them is too apparent to be reconciled. Is it
ever possible that there can be any unity between two
such mutually exclusive entities? Any literal
interpretation would contradict the accepted meanings
of both these terms. But we would do violence to the
spirit of the Shruti text if we should, on that
account, reject the underlying identity that is
implied.

The aim of the Shruti is to inculcate the identity
between Atman and Brahman. If we take the intention of
the Shruti text into consideration, jahallakshANA is
unacceptable in interpreting the mahAvAkyas. For, if
we leave the primary senses of these two terms
completely, then what is the secondary meaning that is
to be taken to show their identity? There is none,
because the terms ‘tat’ and ‘tvan’ through
jahallakshANA totally abandon their primary meanings
IShvara and jIva. Further, in the example cited to
explain jahallakshANA the village and the river Ganges
stand to each other as the sustained and the
sustainer. But such is not the case between ‘that’ and
‘thou’ in the sentence ‘that thou art’. Hence it is
not a case of jahallakshANA.

Nor can we interpret the maMvakyas through
ajahallakshANA, where we are free to add to the
primary meaning. If our aim is to find out the
underlying identity that is implied in the mahAvAkyas,
then there is no point in adding something which,
instead of stressing the identity, would widen the
differences already there in their primary senses.
Hence ajahallakshANA will not satisfy our need.

The only alternative is that a part of the direct
meaning of each of the two words, has to be
eliminated, and the remaining part of them is to be
retained just as in the example, “This is that
Devadatta.” In the example “This is that Devadatta,”
it is by rejecting the incongruous that we arrive at
the identity of the person referred to. We should
apply the same principle with reference to “tat tvam
asi.” In this mahAvAkya, when the individual self is
asserted to be identical with Brahman, the individual
self as characterised by agency, suffering and
ignorance is not asserted to be identical with
Brahman.

In the mahAvAkya, “that thou art,” the word ‘thou’
stands for the self or consciousness as characterised
by immediacy,
finitude and parviscience. The word ‘that’ stands for
the self or consciousness as characterised by mediacy,
infinitude and omniscience. In interpreting this
mahAvAkya, a part of the primary meaning of the term
‘thou’ is abandoned and a part of it is retained; and
a part of the primary meaning of the term ‘that’ is
abandoned and a part of it is retained. We abandon the
‘immediacy-mediacy’ ‘finitude-infinitude’ and
‘parviscience-omniscience’ senses of the terms ‘thou’
and ‘that’ respectively and get beyond them to the
self or consciousness which is common and is implicit
in both. That is, while rejecting one part of the
primary meaning of the terms ‘thou’ and ‘that,’ we
retain the other part of the primary meaning of the
terms ‘thou’ and ‘that’, namely ‘consciousness.’
Therefore, the final import of ‘tat tvam asi’, viz.,
the identity of the individual self with the ultimate
Self is established by jahadajahallakshANA or
bhAgavatyAga lakshANA.

Now, it may be asked: Will it not be enough to have
lakshANA for one word only in the mahAvAkyas instead
of applying lakshANA to both the words? The intention
of the question is that it is enough that we take one
of the words in each of the mahAvAkyas  in the
secondary sense and the other word in the primary
sense, and thereby deny that the mahAvAkyas are
declarations of the identity of the individual self
with the supreme Self. The argument in support of this
view is as follows.

If the purpose of resorting to lakshANA is to avoid
contradiction of primary meanings, then this can be
done successfully by resorting to lakshANA for one
word only. Hence there is no necessity for construing
both the terms in the secondary sense.

Assuming that we can have lakshANA for one word only
in the mahAvAkyas, the question arises: Are we to have
lakshANA for the first word only or for the second
word only? Let us say that we take the first word only
in lakshANA in each of the mahAvAkyas.

The mahAvAkyas are:

(i)     tat tvam asi,
(ii)    a ham BrahmAsmi
               (iii) ayam AtmA Brahma, and
               (iv) praj~nAnam Brahma.

The first word in ‘tat tvam asi’ is ‘tat’. The first
words in the other three mahAvAkyas are ‘aham’ ‘atmA’
‘praj~nAnam’. The word ‘tat’ in its primary sense
refers to IShvara and the first words in the other
three mahAvAkyas, in their primary sense, refer to
jIva. If we take the first word in each of the
mahAvAkyas in the secondary sense, and the second word
in the primary sense it would be as follows:

 tat   ………………………………….             lakshANA
………………………………..caitanya
tvam………………………………….            primary
sense……………………………..jiva
asi
Here we say that caitanya is jIva. Here there is no
contradiction of meanings of the words if we take the
first word only, in the secondary sense.

In the other three mahAvAkyas,

First word (denoting jIva)…………………………..
lakshANA…………………………….caitanya
Second word  (Brahman)……………………………primary
sense…………………….IShvara

We say that ‘caitanya is IShvara’. Here also there is
no contradiction of meanings of the words in the
mahAvAkyas if we take the first word only in the
secondary sense. In short, by resorting to lakshANAfor
the first word only, we are able to show that there is
no contradiction of meanings of words. The difficulty
here is that, if we take all the four mahAvAkyas
together, then there is contra~ diction between the
first mahAvAkya and the other three. For, the first
mahAvAkya on the above interpretation says that
‘caitanya is
jIva’ and the other three, on the above
interpretation, say that caitanya is IShvara. This
goes against the doctrine that all mahAvAkyas convey
one and the same truth (ekArtha-bodhaka). Hence,
taking the first word only in the secondary sense
leads to contradiction among the mahAvAkyasthough
there is no contradiction between the meanings of each
of the words in the mahAvAkyas.

Let us see what happens if we take the second word
only in lakshANA in each of the following mahAvAkyas.

tat……………………………………………….primary
sense………………………………….IShvara
tvam……………………………………………..secondary
sense…………………………………..caitanya
asi

Here we say that ‘caitanya is IShvara’.  In the other
three mahAvAkyas:

First word (denoting jIva)……………………primary
sense………………………….jIva
Second word (Brahman)…………………. Secondary
sense……………………caitanya

Here we say ‘caitanya is jIva’.

Here also there is contradiction among the
mahAvAkyaseven though there is no contradiction
between the meanings of each of the words in the
mahAvAkyas. For, the first mahAvAkya, on the above
interpretation, says that ‘caitanya is IShvara’ and
the other three, on the above interpretation, say that
‘caitanya is jIva’. This goes against the doctrine
that all the mahAvAkyas convey one and the same truth.
In either way, whether we take the first word only in
the secondary sense or the second word only in the
secondary sense, both lead to incompatibility between
the first and the other three mahAvAkyas.

It may be argued that, (without resorting to
lakshANAeither to the first word only, or to the
second word only) we can
take the word denoting IShvara only (wherever it
occurs) in the secondary sense, and show that there is
no contradiction among the words in the mahAvAkyas,
and also show that there is no incompatibility between
the first and the other three mahAvAkyas. On this
assumption, if we take the word denoting IShvara in
the secondary sense wherever it occurs in the
mahAvAkyas, then we have to take the word denoting
jIva in the primary sense wherever it occurs; or if we
take the word denoting Jiva in the secondary sense
wherever it occurs in the mahAvAkyas, then we have to
take the word denoting IShvara, in the primary sense
wherever it occurs.

On this assumption, let us first take the word
denoting IShvara only in the secondary sense in the
mahAvAkyas and see what happens. In ‘tat tvam asi’ the
word ‘tat’ stands for IShvara in the primary sense,
and in the other three mahAvAkyas the word denoting
Brahman stands for IShvara in the primary sense. Now
we have to take the word denoting IShvara in the
secondary sense in all the four mahAvAkyas.

                                          tat

            tvam
                asi

primary sense               IShvara
secondary sense          caitanya
                                          jIva primary
sense

In the other three mahAvAkyas:




    aham/AtmA/Praj~nAnam
                 Brahman



                                   IShvara - primary
sense


primary sense
        Jiva
                     caitanya – secondary sense



In both sets of mahAvAkyaswhat we say according to
this interpretation is that ‘caitanya is jIva’. On
this view we will be compelled to conclude that the
main purport of the Upanishads is not to say about the
ultimate reality (Brahman), but to say something about
the jIva. Further, it will amount to saying that the
knowledge of the jIva will lead to complete
liberation. Obviously this is not the purport
(tAtparya) of the Upanishads.
The intention of the Upanishad is to liberate jIva
from bondage, by showing that the jIva in essence is
Brahman itself. The Upanishadic aim is to release the
jIva from its ‘jIvabhAva’ and to make it realise its
essence, namely ‘BrahmabhAva’. This aim of the
Upanishad is thwarted if it be said that the jIva’s
aim is to attain ‘jIvabhAva’ by acquiring a knowledge
of the jIva’. Further, knowledge of the “jIvabhAva’ is
not a release from bondage but a push into it. This
way of applying lakshANAto the word denoting IShvara
only, wherever it occurs in the mahAvAkyas, leads to
the opposite purport of the mahAvAkyas, and thereby we
do violence to the spirit of the Shruti. Further, by
this process we have reduced the status of
IShvara-caitanya to a lower level i.e., the level of
the jIva. Hence it is not correct to resort to
lakshANAfor the word denoting IShvara in the
mahAvAkyas.

Now it may be argued that we can resort to lakshANA
for the the word denoting ‘jIva’ only wherever it
occurs in the four mahAvAkyas, taking the word that
stands for ‘IShvara’ in the primary sense. Let us
apply this procedure to the mahAvAkyas and find
whether this interpretation holds good.

Tvam, aham, AtmA , praj~nAnam…….    these words
denoting jIva would mean in the secondary sense to
refer to caitanya (pure). Then the meaning of the
mahAvAkyas would be ‘caitanya is IShvara.’  This
reduces nirguNa Brahman to saguNa Brahman. Even though
this way of interpretation may not lead to any
contradiction in the meanings of the words, it is
incompatible with the ideal of liberation and the
tAtparya of the Upanishads. It is also contrary to the
statement of the Upanishad “Brahmavid brahmaiva
bhavati.”

Further, by taking the word denoting ‘jIva’ only in
the secondary sense, what is left will be the caitanya
in the limited sense because it is this caitanya with
which alone the element of antaHkaraNa is associated
before. The denotation of the word jIva is caitanya
limited by antaHkaraNa.

When we resort to lakshANA for the terms denoting
‘jIva’, antaHkaraNa only is left out. ‘That which
remains is ‘limited’ caitanya.

According to the vAcyArtha, the caitanya that remains
will be limited caitanya. Let us illustrate this by an
analogy. If one looks at a building through a mirror,
the building that is seen by him is the building
limited by the scope of the mirror. If we remove
mirror and ask him what is it that he saw in the
mirror, he would say that he saw a building. The
“building” which has been referred to by him is the
building that he saw in the mirror and not “the
building itself as such.”

In the same way, if we resort to lakshANA for the term
denoting jIva, the caitanya that is referred to (and
remains after the removal of antaHkaraNa) is the
limited caitanya (which was known earlier through
antaHkaraNa). According to the primary meaning of the
word denoting ‘IShvara’ in all the four mahAvAkyas,
the caitanya that is referred to is the akhaNDa
(unlimited or rather of an infinite) caitanya…………..
(akhaNDa in the relative sense only, because the
caitanya that is referred to in IShvara is like a
building seen through a relatively bigger mirror).
Then the four mahAvAkyas are to be interpreted as
identifying the limited caitanya with the unlimited
caitanya of IShvara.

This would be an identity of the unlimited with the
limited.  Again, by identifying jIva -caitanya with
the IShvara -caitanya we have completely forgotten the
aim of jIva. The aim of jIva is not to identify itself
with IShvara (which is the vAcyArtha of the word
denoting IShvara), but to identify itself with Brahman
which is completely akhaNDa. Hence we cannot resort to
lakshANA for the word denoting jIva only.
So far we have shown that we cannot apply lakshANA (i)
only to one word, namely the first word; (ii) only to
one word, namely the second word; (iii) only to one
word, namely the word denoting if IShvara; and (iv)
only to one word, namely the word denoting jIva. This
amounts to the fact that we have to resort to lakshANA
for both the words in interpreting the mahAvAkyas.

In this connection it would be interesting to pass in
review the view that natural interpretation of the
mahAvAkyas is possible
without resorting to lakshANA or even bAdhAyAM
sAmAnAdhikaraNya. For example, take the sentence “The
pot is non-eternal” (ghataH  anityaH). Here the word
‘pot’ denotes the individual (vyakti) which has the
sAmAnya or jAti (universal) ‘potness’ in it. Here the
individual pot is non-eternal, whereas ‘potness’ is
eternal. When we say that pot is non-eternal, the
natural reference is to the individual pot and not to
‘~ti’ viz., ‘potness’ as such, even though the word
pot may stand for the individual pot as well as
‘potness’. The non-eternality in the said expression
can be indentified with the individual pot (which is
non-eternal), and not with ‘potness’ (which is
eternal).

The non-eternality referred to here has the
appropriateness of association with the ‘vyakti’ and
not the jAti’. This is the natural interpretation of
the statement, “The pot is non-eternal”. When we speak
of the non-eternality of the pot, we do not say that
we are taking the ‘vyakti’ by lakshANA. No one will
say that the above statement is a vAkya to be
interpreted through lakshANA. Let us explain it
further. When someone says, “Pot is non-eternal,’ the
non-eternality may be associated with the individual
pot directly by the principle (nyAya) “padArthaH
padArthena anveti na tu tad ekadeShena” . (one meaning
fits in with another but not with a part of it only).

But let us assume that someone says, “Pot is eternal”
here, according to the principle (nyAya) cited above,
we have to connect ‘eternality’ only with pot, and not
with ‘potness’ because ‘potness’ is part of the pot
(padArtha ekadeSha) and not a separate padArtha
(entity). But we cannot connect the eternality with
the individual pot, because the individual pot is
non-eternal, and hence we have to apply lakshANA to
the word ‘pot’, and interpret it in the secondary
sense of ‘potness’ and connect the eternality only
with the ‘potness’ which is the ‘jAti’; thus when we
speak of the eternality of the pot, we resort to
lakshANA. But when we speak of the non-eternality of
the pot, we do not resort to lakshANA ,but connect
non-eternality by a natural interpretation with the
individual pot,. So everyone understands without
resorting to lakshANA the meaning of the statement
which is a natural one. In the same way, ‘tat tvam
asi’ also may be interpreted. Then the caitanya
referred to in both the the words is appropriately
identified.

Therefore our final view is that the mahAvAkyas are
sentences which indicate a single, non-relational
entity underlying their terms. If the validity of a
sentence depends on its purport, and not on its
literal meaning, then all the mahAvAkyas convey the
identity of the individual self with the supreme Self.

Before concluding, it would be better to examine the
view that ‘identity propositions’ are, by their very
nature impossible for the simple reason that they are
restatements (anuvada). “The thing itself is identical
with itself” makes no meaning. Hence treating the
mahAvAkyas as a case of restatement amounts to
rendering them meaningless. This type of criticism can
be met easily by examining what a re-statement
(anuvAda) is. In a restatement i.e., anuvAda, we
repeat what has been stated earlier (like a tape
recorder) or express a truth that is known already
e.g., “Heat is a remedy for cold” (agnirhimasya
bheshajam).

Both the interpretations are not applicable to the
mahAvAkyas. When we say, “This is that Devadatta,” the
‘this’ may be taken as anuvAda in the first sense of
repetition, but the word ‘that’ cannot be taken as a
case of repetition. Similarly in the mahAvAkya ‘Thou
art that’, ‘Thou’ may be taken as a case of
repetition, but not the word ‘that’. This sense of
anuvAda does not fit in here. The mahAvAkyas therefore
is not an anuvAa or re-statement in the first sense of
repetition. When we say, “This is ‘that’ Devadatta” to
a man who wants to know whether ‘this’ Devadatta is
identical with the Devadatta seen earlier, we are then
expressing a truth that is not known earlier to the
man. There is an element of newness or a new idea in
this statement. He has come to know what is not known
to him earlier (aj~nAtasya j~nAnam). The same is the
case with the mahAvAkyas.

The mahAvAkyas set out to say ‘something that is not
known hitherto. Hence, on this count also, it is not
anuvAda.
Further, identity is not a real relation. One thing
cannot become identical with another. Either it is
always identical, or it is always different, and so it
never becomes identical. The identity of the self and
Brahman is an eternally accomplished identity. Only we
are ignorant of it. The aim of the mahAvAkyas is to
remove this ignorance. The Self was, is, and shall
ever remain Brahman. The knowledge by identity is not
judgmental. We do not describe Brahman or add anything
by way of qualification to Brahman. In’ the instance
that we have taken to explain identity, i.e., “This is
that Devadatta,” the ‘this’ and the ‘that’ are only
seemingly different. Similarly is the case with the
‘thou’ and the ‘that’ in ‘That thou art’. In point of
truth they are just one and the same entity. To know
the difference ‘is not a problem for us. We just start
with it. The’ problem is ‘about unity or identity. It
is the knowledge of the unity that is rewarding and
that demands both effort and discernment. The
difference between Brahman and jIva is known to all.
But their identity is hidden for us. We need to
recognize, to bring out, or to re-discover this
identity and when we do so, the two do not become one.
There is only one real substance which has appeared to
us under two different names and forms. When the
superimposition goes, the one substratum reveals
itself and comes to stay for ever.

jIva is Brahman itself. When we speak of the identity
of jIva and Brakman, one may get the impression that
there are two entities which are sought to be
identified. This impression arises as a result of the
use of language. Nowhere are the words of George Eliot
more appropriate than there — “Our language is but a
broken lamp.”

The End


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