[Advaita-l] Apaurusheyatva of Vedas.

[Siva Senani Nori]

On Sat, Sep 10, 2011 at 00:17, Omkar Deshpande <omkar_deshpande at yahoo.com>wrote:
>
>> Even if we call the third option I mentioned (where shabda and anumAna
>> derive their validity from pratyakSha) by the name of parataH-prAmANya, I
>> don't know why svataH-prAmANya is preferable to it, especially given that
>> there is no infinite regress now. How would you argue that?
>>
>
>*श्रीमल्ललितालालितः <http://www.lalitaalaalitah.com> lalitAlAlitaH <http://about.me/lalitaalaalitah/bio>* wrote:
>
>I don't know basis of your statement. I'll need exact words from bhAShyam
>of vyAsa or any other AchArya on yoga-sUtram to confirm it.
>
>- Yoga approves of the three pramANas in sAN~khya, and within sAN~khya, the three pramANas of pratyaksha, anumaana and Sabda are accepted. They are not derived from pratyaksha. Interestingly, sAN~khya proves Prakriti and Purusha, the equivalents of maaya and Brahman of Advaita in a manner of speaking (note the qaulifier phrase; the 'equivalence' suggestion is only to draw attention: it is not my thesis), using inference, not Sabda pramaaNa, and it uses Vedas to believe in Indra, svarga and apsaras as they cannot be seen or inferred. So in a way, all the neo-Vedantins who do not need the Veda to know or understand the existence of Brahman, are nearer to the position of of sAN~khya on this point. (ज्ञानादेव कैवल्यम्, the concept so comforting for those who do not have patience for the karma-kaaNDA is the motive of sAN~khya as well - or, to start with #).  The kaarika and the bhaashya of Gaudapaada with the
 translation of H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson* are  given below:
>
>SAN~khya kArika No. 6
>
>सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानात्।
>तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ।। 6 ।।
>
>Translation of Colebrooke (kaarika) and Wilson (bhaashya)* 
>
>Sensible objects become known by perception; but it is by inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is obtained; and a truth which is neither to be directly perceived, not to be inferred from reasoning is deduced from revelation.
>
>Bhashya (with translation):
>
>इन्द्रियाणामिन्द्रियाण्यतीत्यवर्तमानानां सिद्धिः प्रधानपुरुषावतीन्द्रियौ सामान्यतो दृष्टेनानुमानेन साध्यते Nautre and soul are not objects of sense, and are to be known only reasoning from analogy. 
>
>यस्मान्महदादिलिङ्गं त्रिगुणम्। यस्येदं त्रिगुणं कार्यं तत्प्रधानमिति। For as the predicates Mahat and the rest have the three qualities, so must that of which they are effects, the chief one (nature), have the three qualities; 
>
>यतश्चाचेतनं चेतनमिवाभाति अतो न्यो धिष्ठाता पुरुष इति।  and as that which is irrational appears as if it were rational, it must have a guide and superintendent, which is soul. 
>
>व्यक्तं प्रत्यक्षसाध्यम्। That which is perceptible is known by perception;
>
>त्स्मादपिचासिद्धं परोक्षाप्तागमात् सिद्धं यथेन्द्रो देवराजः, उत्तराः कुरवः, स्वर्गे प्सरस इति परोक्षमाप्तवचनात सिद्धं।। but that which is imperceptible, and which is not to be inferred from analogy, must be learnt from revelation, as, Indra, the king of the gods; the northern Kurus; the nymphs of heaven: these depend upon sacred authority.
>
>अत्र कश्चिदाह प्रधानः पुरुषो वा नोपलभ्यते यश्च नोपलभ्यते लोके तन्नासीत् तस्मात्तावपि न स्तः। यथा द्वितीयं शिरस्तृतीयो बाहुरिति। Here some one objects, Nature or soul is not apprehended, and what is not apprehended in this world does not exist; therefore those two are not, any more than a second head, or a third arm.
>
>तदुच्यते। अत्र सतामप्यर्थानामष्टधोपलब्धिर्न भवति तद्यथा **। In reply it is stated, that there are eight causes which prevent the apprehension of existing things **.
>
>Regards
>N. Siva Senani
>
># 'to start with' is applicable only for those who believe that Gaudapadaacharya is the first one to state / explain / defend / expound the Advaita philosophy; for those (including me) who believe that Advaita is the actual truth, that it is what is propounded by mantra-drashTas, that it is what is ackowledged by other Saastrakaaras like Yaaska, Paanini, Kaatyaayana, Patanjali and Bhartrihari (all pre-Gaudapaada as per modern historians), 'to start with' is inapplicable. I am inclined to believe in my present state of knowledge that Sabdabrahman is a special way of presenting the parabrahman and that it has been criticised by Sankaraacharya to avoid roopabrahman, rasabrahman etc. (which all are equally special cases of presenting parabrahman).
>
>*both from "The Sankhya Karika by Iswara Krishna; translated from the Sanscrit by Henry Thomas Colebrooke, Esq; also The Bhashya, or, Commentary of Gaudapada; Translated, and Illustrated by an Original Comment by Horace Hayman Wilson, MA, FRS; Published by Mr. Tookaram Tatya, Bombay, 1887"
>
>** The eight reasons are stated in the next kaarika.
>