[Advaita-l] Body is the disease
v.subrahmanian at gmail.com
Mon Jan 13 22:50:46 CST 2014
On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 4:18 AM, Srinath Vedagarbha
<svedagarbha at gmail.com>wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 12:57 AM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com
> > Therefore, there is a circular dependency between
> > the two. We cannot understand the concept of jIva without avidyA and we
> > cannot understand the concept of avidyA without jIva. It is therefore
> > possible to establish either concept. As stated by vAcaspati, this
> > objection is, avidyopAdhibhedAdhIno jIvabhedo, jIvabhedAdhinashca
> > avidyopAdhibheda iti parasparAshrayAdubhayAsiddhiriti. And he answers the
> > objection by citing the example of the seed and sprout (bIjAnkura nyAya).
> > The seed is the cause of the sprout and the sprout is the cause of the
> > seed. But we accept this in everyday life, because it is impossible to
> > which came first - the seed or the sprout. Both are without a beginning,
> > anAdi.
> I heard from Dvaita friend that in their system above argument of Sri.
> vAcaspati has been refuted on following grounds;
> beejAnkura anavasta is not a dOSha at all. Anavasta is said to be a flaw
> only in if a proposition is extended to support a human proposed
> pramEya/siddhAnta. This is because the flaw arising from anavasta is
> precisely defined as 'mUlAxaya pareem prAvuHu anavastam Hi dUShaNam '.
> Meaning, given anavasta is said to be dOsha only if the final result in
> such anavasta is an impossibility (one has to be waiting perpetually for
> the determination).
I doubt whether the problem with bIjAnkura discussed in the bhAmatI is
anavasthA. From the passage cited it looks like chakrakApatti (circular
dependence) and anyonyAshraya (mutual dependence).
> beejAnkura-anavasta is not such anavasta, for this series is given fact (a
> pratyksha) and the effect (of series) has already taken place. That means,
> in these kind ofanavasta cases where the effect is already established
> (siddha), such cases can not be called dOsha.
> If one calls such series as dOSha, itself would lead to drisTa hAna dOsha.
> Moreover, beejAnkura sequence is not an hypothesis proposed by an human at
> all, but found in pratyaksha and is pramANa siddha.
> > So vAcaspati says that because of the anAditva of jIva and avidyA,
> > both have to be accepted as established.
> Even if we accept anAditva for of both jIva and avidya, it does not
> translate proposed avidya vAda is correct. In beejAnkura series, ankura
> creates the seed, but that seed is the cause for totally different ankura
> but not its cause ankura. The same cannot be said in case of jIva-avidya
> anavasta vAda. If I have a avidya, does my avidya causes another jIva? per
> this vAda, I am the cause/ashraya of my avidya, but that avidya is cause of
> me as well. This is the issue.
It is precisely to overcome this problem that the vivaraNa takes the stand
that Brahman is the Ashraya and viShaya for avidyA:
Ashrayatva-viShayatva-bhAginI nirvibhAga-chitireva kevalA
[The locus and object of avidyA is none other than the undifferentiated
(not yet differentiated as Ishwara and jIva) Pure Consciousness Brahman
alone.] For such a pratijnA the hetu is given in the next line:
pUrvasiddha-tamaso hi pashchimo nAshraya bhavti nApi gocharaH
[The jIva which is a *product* of avidyA cannot be held to be the locus and
object of the avidyA which caused it (jIvahood).
Thus, based on the above logic and the shruti vAkyams in Br.up.1.4....it is
held that 'brahmaiva svAvidyayA samsarati iva, brahmaiva svavidyayA
muchyata iva.' [Brahman alone, owing to ignorance of itself appears to be
in samsara and brahman alone, owing to knowledge of itself, appears to be
freed from samsara.] The explicit bhashya vAkyams for this position were
supplied from Br.up. 1.4.10. Being caused by ignorance, samsAra and moksha
are not absolutely real events.
That is why we find that Shankara does not 'blame' the jiva or brahman for
the state of samsAra. 'avidyAkalpitam....avidyayA adhyAroitam...etc.'
The blame is put on avidyA. And it is up to the one who acknowledges that
he is avidyAvAn to free himself from avidyA.
And as to how avidyA creates the jiva and also inheres in the jiva, here is
a verse illustrating:
svenaiva kalpite deshe vyomni yadvadghaTAdikam
tathA jIvAshritAvidyAm manyante jnAnakovidAH
[ a verse from the brahmabindupanishad(?) cited in the advaitasiddhi]
A pot is produced in space, to occupy a space and yet has space in it. In
the same way the jIva originates in avidyA and has avidyA in it. Thus
Even when we say 'Brahman is the locus of avidyA', it is nothing but
'avidyayA jIvabhAvApattiH' and 'vidyayA jIvabhAvanivRttiH'.
Also there is no problem with 'one bIja causing a different ankura and not
the same ankura which caused the original bija'. We have a similar problem
expressed in the GaudapAdakArikA (IV.14 to 20) 'whether karma caused the
body or body caused karma'? For a body to be there, there has to be karma
prior to it and for doing karma, there has to be the body. In such cases
what is important is: the body which is a product of karma, causes further
karma (avidyA) and perpetuates it. That way, it can be seen as a
perpetuation, strengthening, of avidyA. It is admitted that the pUrva
adhyAsa is the cause for the uttara adhyAsa and thus the perpetuation of
samsara is accounted for.
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