[Advaita-l] Body is the disease

[H S Chandramouli]

H S Chandramouli


< Besides, Shankara has also hinted that the jIva is locus
of avidyA in his sUtra bhAShya 4.1.3: kasya punaḥ ayam aprabodha iti cet
/ yas tvaṃ pṛcchasi tasya ta iti vadāmaḥ /, if you ask - whose is avidyA?
We say it is yours who ask thus. Again, in the gItA bhAshya, Shankara says
as much (13.2): avidyA kasya, yasya dRshyate tasyaiva. Whose is ignorance?
It is his by whom it is seen.>

Because jiva has avidya, he is said to be the locus ( ashraya )  of avidya.
When a person says he has the money which is in a box, he is the ashraya
for the money only in a limited/secondary  sense, one born of Abhimana (
sense of belonging or ownership ). The real ashraya for the money is the
box. In the same way, when it is said jiva has avidya, the jiva becomes the
ashraya for the avidya  only in a secondary/limited  sense , through
abhimana only ( sense of belonging or ownership ). The real ashraya is
Brahman only. Jiva is antahkarana vishishta Chaitanyam ( Brahman ) . What
actually subsists in the Visheshya ( Brahman )  also appears in the
Vishishta (jiva).

I seek a clarification in this regard. I am told that Sri Vachaspati
Mishra's interpretation in Bhamati is more in favour of the advaita
advocated by Sri Mandana Mishra in his work < Brahmasidhi > which favours
the Bhedabheda concept than Sri Bhagavatpada's interpretation which holds
only Abheda as acceptable. Sri Vachaspati Mishra accepts an infinite number
of jivas and avidyas.Could this be the reason for the above interpretation
of jiva as the locus of avidya.

Regards


On Mon, Jan 13, 2014 at 11:27 AM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>wrote:

> Two questions may be asked of avidyA (ignorance). For example, if a person
> does not know a pot, we may say he/she has ignorance regarding the pot. In
> other words, the locus (Ashraya) of ignorance is the person while the
> content (viShaya) of ignorance is the pot itself. Basically, the locus is
> the answer to the question: Who has the ignorance or who is ignorant? The
> content is the answer to the question: What is the ignorance regarding? We
> may ask the same two questions of ignorance regarding Brahman. Who has
> avidyA? What is the avidyA regarding? In this case, all advaitins agree
> that the content (viShaya) of avidyA is Brahman, but not so on the first
> question. According to the VivaraNa school, the locus of avidyA is Brahman,
> but the bhAmatI school takes the locus of avidyA to be the individual soul
> (jIva). Shankara says in his sUtra bhAShya (1.4.3): avidyātmikā hi
> bījaśaktiravyaktaśabdanirdeśyā *parameśvarāśrayā* māyāmayī mahāsuptiḥ,
> yasyāṃ svarūpapratibodharahitāḥ śerate saṃsāriṇo jīvāḥ / . Here Shankara's
> position that avidyA has its locus (Ashraya) in Ishvara has been
> interpreted by bhAmatIkAra vAcaspati mishra as jIvAdhikaraNApyavidyA
> nimittatayA viShayatayA vA IshvaramAshrayata iti IshvarAshrayetyucyate na
> tu AdhAratayA vidyAsvabhAve brahmaNi tadanupapatteH. Although avidyA is
> spoken of as having Ishvara (Brahman) as the Ashraya, what is meant is that
> the content of avidyA is Brahman, not the locus of avidyA, because it is
> not possible for Brahman, whose nature is vidyA (knowledge), to be the
> locus of avidyA. Besides, Shankara has also hinted that the jIva is locus
> of avidyA in his sUtra bhAShya 4.1.3: kasya punaḥ ayam aprabodha iti cet
> / yas tvaṃ pṛcchasi tasya ta iti vadāmaḥ /, if you ask - whose is avidyA?
> We say it is yours who ask thus. Again, in the gItA bhAshya, Shankara says
> as much (13.2): avidyA kasya, yasya dRshyate tasyaiva. Whose is ignorance?
> It is his by whom it is seen.
>
> Therefore, vAcaspati declares (1.1.4), na avidyA brahmAshrayA, kintu jIve,
> sA tvanirvacanIyetyuktam, tena nityashuddhameva brahma, the locus of
> ignorance is not Brahman, but the individual soul, jIva. And that avidyA
> has been stated to be anirvacanIyA, not definable as sat or asat. It
> follows that Brahman is ever pure (i.e. not tainted by ignorance). An
> objection is also met by vAcaspati. It is said that jIva is Brahman with
> avidyA as the upAdhi. However, according to bhAmatI, jIva is also the locus
> or substratum of avidyA. Therefore, there is a circular dependency between
> the two. We cannot understand the concept of jIva without avidyA and we
> cannot understand the concept of avidyA without jIva. It is  therefore not
> possible to establish either concept. As stated by vAcaspati, this
> objection is, avidyopAdhibhedAdhIno jIvabhedo, jIvabhedAdhinashca
> avidyopAdhibheda iti parasparAshrayAdubhayAsiddhiriti. And he answers the
> objection by citing the example of the seed and sprout (bIjAnkura nyAya).
> The seed is the cause of the sprout and the sprout is the cause of the
> seed. But we accept this in everyday life, because it is impossible to say
> which came first - the seed or the sprout. Both are without a beginning,
> anAdi. So vAcaspati says that because of the anAditva of jIva and avidyA,
> both have to be accepted as established. anditvAdbIjAMkuravadubhayasiddheH.
>
> Anand
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