[Advaita-l] Body is the disease

kuntimaddi sadananda kuntimaddisada at yahoo.com
Fri Jan 17 01:19:01 CST 2014

Anandji - PraNAms

Enjoyed reading your explanations - particularly aanaditvam aspect of avidya and jiiva. and their mutual dependence while both depend on something that is substantial. Yes one has to be careful in extending the illustrative examples beyond their applicability. 

Dvaita differs in that they do not accept Brahman as upadana kaaraNam for the creation. Pot and pot-space do not fit as the same upaadana kaaranam, unless one takes the Tai Up statements - aatmanaH aakaasha sambuutah. aakaashaat ... etc all the way to pRithivi. 

Many of the polemical arguments have limitations and that has to be understood before we apply hair-splitting arguments of Navya nyaaya. Many times it only helps in splitting the hair but not much in understanding the essential truth. Needless to say it is good time-passing for those who are interested.  

Hari Om!

On Fri, 1/17/14, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com> wrote:

 Subject: [Advaita-l] Body is the disease
 To: advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org
 Date: Friday, January 17, 2014, 1:30 AM
 Srinath Vedagarbha wrote:
 >Madhusudhana's contention that it is impossible to
 conceive a pot without
 >the ghaTAkAsha, is not entirely correct. Pot is not just
 ghaTAkAsha alone,
 >but it is ghaTAkAsha plus mud (upAdAna) enclosing and
 holding it.   Without
 >mud's participation, it is impossible for pot to
 manifest in the first
 >place. Otherwise, we would be seeing pots everywhere,
 for space is
 >everywhere. Therefore, it is not correct to say pot is
 adhIna on ghaTAkAsha
 >alone, it should be said pot is adhIna on ghaTAkAsha and
 upAdhAna together.
 >Mapping this to our problem domain -- avidya (pot) is
 not adhIna on jIva
 >(ghaTAkAsha) alone, but it is adhIna on upAdhAna also.
 But you see, in
 >Madhusudhana's example there is nothing to represent
 upAdhAna. In this
 >sense, Madhusudhana's mapping of entities to pot example
 is incorrect. This
 >is one way of thinking.
 What madhusUdana is showing here does not require
 dependence. To explain, if A depends on B and B depends on A
 we say it
 is mutual dependence. It may very well be the case that A
 depends on B
 and other factors besides B, and B depends on A and other
 besides A. There is still mutual dependence between A and B,
 anyonyAdhInatA, though it does not exclude other factors on
 which A an
 B may depend. The argument of madhusUdana is still valid.
 Taking a
 simple example, a merchant depends on his customers for
 revenue and the customers depend on the merchant to supply
 goods. We
 can say there is mutual dependence between them, although
 the merchant
 also depends on other factors, for example, suppliers of
 goods, and
 the customers depend on their employers or sources of
 >In another way, speaking from kAraNa-kArya
 perspective,  ghaTAkAsha  is
 >caused by upAdhAna mud enclosing and limiting AkAsha. In
 this sense,
 >upAdAna should be really consider as parallel to avidya,
 which by limiting
 >Brahman causes jIva bhAva (ghaTAkAsha). So, from
 kAraNa-kArya perspective,
 >ghaTAkAsha cannot said to be exist unless upAdAna
 causing it. Where as
 >upAdAna can exist without ghaTAkAsha. So, the
 relationship between them is
 >not  anyonyAdhInatA as Madhusudhana contends, but
 it is dependence in one
 This is not a correct example. We have to remember that
 vAcaspati also
 says avidyA and jIva are anAdi, without a beginning. You
 cannot point
 to a certain point in time in the past when the avidyA clay
 transformed into a pot. The avidyA pot is anAdi. Therefore,
 the jIva
 pot-space is also anAdi. We have to examine the
 "manufactured" pot,
 not the pot during or prior to manufacturing, because there
 was no
 time when such a "manufacturing" event happened!
 >But such anyonyAdhInatA is already siddha in pratyaksha.
 The same fallacy I
 >was mentioning earlier applies if one invokes such
 anyonyAdhInatA in a
 >vAda, for entities involved in such relationship is not
 yet siddha and to
 >be established. Proponent has to establish their
 existence first
 >independent of relationship between them and then later
 show relationship
 >between them. The case here is different, for jIva
 cannot said to be
 >existed without avidya operating on Brahman, and in
 turn, avidya cannot be
 >traced without jIva exist for its locus.
 Again, the anAditva of both avidyA and jIva is sufficient
 here. I
 repeat there is no time when jIva was not there and only
 existed. Nor was there any time when avidyA was not there
 and only
 jIva existed. The two have always co-existed in a mutually
 way. If you ask how avidyA and jIva are established in
 advaita, it is
 a different question. The answer is found in standard
 advaita texts
 and there is no need for madhusUdana to establish avidyA and
 jIva in
 this specific context.
 >anyOnyAshraya is not about their locus, it was charged
 about their
 >(alleged) existence . As said above,  jIva cannot
 said to be existed
 >without avidya operating on Brahman (limiting adjunct),
 and in turn, avidya
 >cannot said to be existed without sentient entity jIva
 as its locus to
 Again, the anAditva of both avidyA and jIva is the point you
 missing. The clay, pot, and pot-space analogy has
 limitations and
 cannot be extended too far. Precisely, you cannot say when
 the pot was
 manufactured from clay or when the AkAsha (space) got
 (avacchinna) by the pot. In everyday life, we know exactly
 when a pot
 is manufactured. The pot (pots to be precise, because
 vAcaspati says
 there are many jIvas, not just one) has been there from
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