[Advaita-l] Body is the disease

[V Subrahmanian]

It is common knowledge that Shankara in the Brahmasutras, the ones like
'bhedavyapadeshAt cha anyaH' (1.1.21), has explicitly established the
difference between the jiva and the Supreme.  The 'hetu' given is, as the
Sutra itself gives: because the difference, bheda, between the jiva and the
antaryAmi Ishwara, is clearly stated in the Br.up. 3.7.9 where the jiva,
the knower, is spoken of as not knowing the antaryAmi Ishwara.
(jiva-Ishwara bheda)

This kind of explicit bheda is upheld by Shankara in such sutras as the
above, the other instances being BSB 1.1.16 and 17:  'IdRsham cha
vijnAnAtma-paramAtmabhedamAshritya 'netaro'nupapatteH' (1.1.16) and
'bhedavyapadeshAccha (1.1.17) ityuktam.

There is another sutra where Shankara very clearly establishes, along with
hetu-s, the difference between jiva-s (jiva-jiva bheda).

Thus the pancha bheda-s: jiva-jiva, jiva-Ishwara, jiva-jaDa, jaDa-Ishwara
and jaDa-jaDa bhedas which non-advaitins hold as pAramArthika, and
advaitins hold as vyAvahArika only, are yet upheld wherever necessary
across the bhAshyas of the prasthAnatraya by advancing the appropriate
hetu-s.  None can fault such a method which, is the one followed by the
Shruti/smRti.  In several places Shankara advances 'nahi dRShTe anupapannam
nAma' with regard to things which are common knowledge.  Yet such things
are vyAvahArika in Advaita.


regards
subrahmanian.v


On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 10:31 PM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>wrote:

> *Srinath Vedagarbha wrote:*
>
> >That anAditva argument is only from vyavahAra perspective, for per
> >siddhAnta time itself is mithya. Your argument, supporting vAcaspati's
> >stand, is sva-vachana virOdha if not apasiddhanta,  per your position here
> >
> http://lists.advaita-vedanta.org/archives/advaita-l/2014-January/036275.html
>
> MadhusUdana's opponent, the dvaitin, considers the world, including
> pramANas, to be real, whereas we know that advaitins grant a
> provisional (vyavahAra) status to the world. The same holds for avidyA
> too, which is considered provisionally real. The same holds for jIva
> too. Without such provisional reality assigned, it would not be
> possible for the advaitin to even enter into a debate with the
> dvaitin. For example, the advaitin could trivially dismiss the
> dvaitin's objection that there is anyonyAshraya between avidyA and
> jIva in this way. avidyA does not exist at all and jIva is
> Brahman/Atman (vAcaspati says: na khalu jIvashcidAtmano bhidyate), and
> therefore, the charge of anyonyAshraya between jIva and avidyA is
> meaningless. But the advaitin also has to be make sure he answers the
> dvaitin's objection in the vyavahAra realm. Hence, he invokes the
> anAditva argument, which is also supported by the texts.
>
>
> Anand
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