[Advaita-l] Permanence of the self

[R Krishnamoorthy]

Dear
Good analysis.But still when the witness is mute and it does not
desire/will anything what induces/drives one-a living being as contrasted
with a jadam to act?Why at all should one respond to the presence of
witness?
R.Krishnamoorthy.

On Wed, Feb 18, 2015 at 1:44 PM, balagopal ramakrishnan via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> Swami Paramarthananda Ji says that one has to sharpen one's intellect to
> at least begin understanding vedanta (advaita). How else the 'eye' can see
> the 'eye' itself* !!. If one refuses to step up from one's manda budhi
> (will happen only if one is willing to study vedant 'sampradayically') god
> alone can save him ! They will never understand and you will have either
> more whiter hair or the existing ones will begin to fall !! Because after a
> stage it becomes a futile discussion instead of fertile.
> Well, as Venkat Ji said - it might help to sharpen one's; but, be cautious
> while wrestling - pigs don't know pigs stink!!
> Regards
> Balagopal
> *"shrotrasya shrotram manaso mano.." (Kena Up 1.2)
>
>      On Wednesday, 18 February 2015 1:22 PM, H S Chandramouli via
> Advaita-l <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>
>
>  Dear Sri Venkataraghavan,
>
>
>  Reg 2) His second point was that if something did have true independent
> existence, it would be impossible to cognize it. That is, the very act
> of knowledge implies an observer and the observed, and then it no
> longer is a non-dual system. Without being able to cognise that
> existence, it would be as good as it not existing at all.
>
>
>  Yes. Any act of knowledge implies an observer and the observed. However
> when the observer and the observed are jada ( inert ) , that is incapable
> of the act of cognition by themselves, an enabling entity is needed to
> enable such cognition. For such an entity there need not be any action
> needed to enable it. Just its presence itself could enable it. The nearest
> illustration is that of the Sun. In the absence of sunlight no visual
> cognition occurs. The presence of the Sun enables such cognition without
> any action by the Sun. Just its presence enables it. We can now consider
> the experience of all of us. We are aware of the Creation in our waking
> state. When we pass on to the dream state, we cognize the dream creation.
> Even though there is nothing in common between these two creations, we do
> have the knowledge ( in the waking state where this analysis is being done
> ) that it is the same cognizing entity ( namely ourselves ) which
> experienced both the creations. We can now consider the deep sleep state.
> We only have recollection of that state. The recollection is that no
> creation was experienced. Not even Time. Also we enjoyed unalloyed pure
> happiness. Note that this is only a recollection in the waking state. Also
> our cognition is that it is the same entity ( namely ourselves ) which had
> earlier experienced the two types of creation that is having this
> recollection also. This is not logically possible unless there was some
> other entity which “ witnessed “ all these three states independently and
> enabled us to cognize the same as such . This enabling is not done as an
> act on its part but happens just by its proximity or its presence because
> it happens all the time automatically as it were and is universal. Your
> Budhist friend also can vouch for it.
>
>
>  We can now consider our experience with the passage of time. Right from
> our childhood days through to our last days we change so much both mentally
> and physically that it is practically impossible to recognize that it is
> the same single entity ( namely ourselves ) which has experienced all these
> changes unless that is brought to our attention automatically and all the
> time by a “ Witnessing Agent “ who is independent of the experiencing
> entity ( namely ourselves ) . This again confirms what was concluded
> previously that such a “ Witness “ is “ existent “ all the time and in all
> the states ( waking/dream/deep sleep ) which by its mere proximity or
> presence enables such cognition. This being a universal experience it can
> be logically postulated that a “ permanent “ conscious entity exists which
> is what your Budhist friend is disputing. It is not necessary that such an
> entity must itself be cognizable. It can be inferred. Even Budhists admit
> inference as permissible in a postulation. If your friend does not agree
> with this postulation he needs to logically refute such a possibility.
>
>
>  Having said this, I would like to add that going by pure logic this can at
> best be a postulate only and not an assertion. That is the limitation of
> logic by definition. The assertion that it IS so is possible only through
> the Shrutis. But that is a different story. I am very sorry if this has
> become too long. Please bear with me. I really did not want to make it too
> brief as I thought it could be misunderstood as it usually happens in
> forums like this where we do not know each other personally.
>
>
>  Regards
>
> On Tue, Feb 17, 2015 at 3:59 PM, Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>
> > Dear all,
> > I work in an office where my boss is a Buddhist, of the Madhyamaka
> > tradition of Nagarjuna. We tend to have several lively debates on the
> > nature of reality, and one of the questions that we have recently engaged
> > on is the concept of a permanent Brahman (self) onto which this universe,
> > including the BMI, is superimposed due to avidya.
> >
> > Unsurprisingly, he opposes the very notion of a self, and more
> > fundamentally, the idea of permanence itself (even on a parAmArthika
> > basis). His view, coming from the Nagarjuna school is of shunyata, or
> > emptiness (mutual interdependence of everything). And that emptyness
> itself
> > is empty.
> >
> > What are the arguments that I can make to prove the existence of the
> > Universal self to him?
> >
> > I am aware of Sri Shankara Bhagavatpada's argument in the Brahma Sutra
> > Bhashya that to deny the self is illogical - the denier would have to
> have
> > a self in existence with which to deny the self. And if he didn't have a
> > self, then the denial wouldn't exist. However, and my understanding is
> > limited here - How does this in itself establish the permanence of the
> > self? At best, it seems to me that this argument proves that the denier's
> > ego at a fixed point in time, not the universal, permanent self. I
> suspect
> > he could also reject the idea of an individual self, instead saying that
> it
> > is the momentary mind that denies, in that example.
> >
> > I can point him to shruti vAkya pramAna, but to someone that denies the
> > prAmanyam of shruti, that wouldn't be effective. Any suggestions?
> >
> > Regards,
> > Venkat
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