[Advaita-l] akhanDaakara-vRtti

[Anand Hudli]

On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 1:09 PM, kuntimaddi sadananda via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
> Chandramouli ji - PraNAms
>
> In the case of soyam devadattaH - as Sadananda yogi illustrates as an
example of jadajahallakshNa. Lakshana involves not vaachyaartha but
lakshyaartha and jahat ajahat involves bhaga tyaaga - where contradictory
parts have to be rejected and only equate the non-contradictory - here
unchanging entity. How fast this is done is of no consequence. Viveka
involves nithya anitya vastu viveka. In this example the buddhi does
instantly or slowly by remembering that devadatta depending on how sharp
that memory is - some times more prodding may be required to recapitulate
that devadatta.  It can be instant process but the mind has to drop the two
contradictory attributes to arrive at oneness of this and that devadattas
or aham and tat -In the case of Devadatta  mind may do fast but in the case
of tat tvam asi - the previous notions inhibit seeing that equation. Soyam
devadattaH is classical example to illustrate the jahdajahallakshaNa - in
illustrating the viveka
>  required to appreciate the tat tvam asi
>
> Yes I know Shree Aandaji - Not sure if he is particularly interested to
join. One can try. I am ccing this to Him, if he cares to comment.
>
> Hari Om!
> Sada
>
>

I am not sure what exactly is being discussed, so I'll just say this. I
remember seeing comments to the effect that anything with attributes cannot
be the object of  "nirvikalpaka" or indeterminate perception. However, we
have the example of "this is that Devadatta". Both the Devadatta seen now
as "this" and the Devadatta seen earlier as "that" have attributes. They
are both men, with parts such as hands, feet, etc. What is going on here?
Although Devadatta is very much a perceivable person with attributes, the
crucial point here is that the perception "this is that Devadatta" does not
involve any of those attributes. It is exactly expressing an identity
between two objects, this Devadatta and that Devadatta, nothing less,
nothing more. So there is no "appeal" made to any attribute in the
knowledge "this is that Devadatta", although Devadatta does have
attributes. Obviously, the same Devadatta could be an object of determinate
perception, "Devadatta is stout", "Devadatta is short", etc.

Anand