[Advaita-l] Difficulty with Akhandakara Vrtti

[Anand Hudli]

The tarka saMgraha defines savikalpaka (determinate) and nirvikalpaka
(indeterminate) jnAna (cognition) thus: tatra niShprakArakaM jnAnaM
nirvikalpakam| saprakArakaM jnAnaM savikalpakam. An indeterminate cognition
is one without an attribute (or adjunct). A determinate cognition is one
with an attribute (or adjunct). Any savikalpaka-GYAna can be broken down
into three components, as per nyAya. Or more precisely, any
savikalpaka-GYAna has an objective content (viShaya) consisting of 1) a
visheShya or qualificand, 2) a visheShaNa (also prakAra), ie. a qualifier,
and 3) a saMsarga or relation between the qualificand and qualifier. This
also corresponds roughly to the subject-predicate form of a sentence in
natural language. Consider the Sanskrit sentence "nIlo ghaTaH" (the pot is
blue.) Here the visheShya is "pot", the visheShaNa is "nIla" and the
relation between them is that of inherence of blue color in the pot. Such a
relation is called "samavAya" in nyAya. The naiyAyikas (logicians) hold
that the qualificand, the qualifier, and even the relation between them is
presented in an undifferentiated form in a nirvikalpaka cognition.
JayantabhaTTa, in his nyAyamanjarI remarks that whatever reality is
presented in a savikalpaka cognition is also presented in a nirvikalpaka
one, the difference being that the nirvikalpaka cognition cannot be
expressed in words, unlike the savikalpaka cognition which can. "tasmAd ya
eva vastvAtmA savikalpasya gocaraH sa eva nirvikalpasya
shabdollekhavivarjitaH". Later logicians of the navya nyAya school, led by
ga~ngesha, further reduce the importance of the nirvikalpaka cognition to
being a mere supplier of the ingredients (qualificand, qualifier, and the
relation) to the savikalpaka cognition. In the logician's hands, the
nirvikalpaka cognition is "raw perception", such as for example, the
perception of a cow for the very first time by a child. In other words, a
nirvikalpaka cognition does not involve any *concept*, while the
savikalpaka cognition is said to involve concepts.

While advaitins have no great objection to the way the savikalpaka
cognition is described by the logicians, there is a crucial difference
between the two groups in the way the nirvikaplaka cognition is defined.
For example, the vedAnta paribhAShA says: tacca pratyakShaM dvividhaM
savikalpakanirvikalpakabhedAt| tatra savikalpakaM vaishiShTyAvagAhi jnAnaM,
yathA "ghaTamahaM jAnAmi" ityAdi jnAnam| nirvikalpakaM tu saMsargAnavagAhi
jnAnaM, yathA "so.ayam devadattaH", "tat tvamasi" ityAdivAkyajanyaM jnAnam|

Perception is of two kinds - determinate and indeterminate. The determinate
is the cognition which involves apprehending relatedness, as for example
the cognition "I cognize a pot". The indeterminate, however, is the
cognition which does not involve apprehending any relation, such as, for
example, the cognition produced by the statements, "This is that
Devadatta", "You are That", etc.

So nirvikalpaka jnAna is not mere "raw perception", despite its not
involving comprehending any relation. The reason is quite simple. A
savikalpaka cognition may be expressed as aRb where two things a and b are
related by a relation R. However, the nirvikalpaka cognition cannot be
expressed in the form aRb. Why? aRb implies a duality, between two things a
and b. The advaitin is unwilling to accept even the simple identity
relation (tAdAtmya) in a nirvikalpaka cognition, as the laghuchandrikA
states -  yatra tAdAtmyaM na sambhavati tatra akhaNDArthatvAt,
jIvatveshatvopahitayoH tAdAtmya-asambhavAt akhaNDArthatvam.

Taking the example of "this is that Devadatta", the Devadatta seen earlier
may have had a different appearance from the Devadatta seen presently.
However, by discarding the contradicting features of the Devadatta seen
earlier and the Devadatta seen now (jahadajahallakShaNa), one may arrive at
the conclusion "This is that Devadatta." The relation is not technically
identity (tAdAtmya), but svarUpa-abheda, the natural non-difference between
the Devadatta seen earlier and now. The same process is briefly described
in the samkShepa shArIraka I.196-197. As CitsukhAchArya says:
saMsargAsa~ngisamyagdhIhetutA yA girAmiyam uktAkhaNDArthatA, the capacity
of the words to produce a valid cognition not involving a relation is said
to be the property of impartite sense (of the words).

Finally, the dvaitins hold that all perception is determinate only. As BNK
Sharma says, "all Pratyaksha is considered to be fundamentally Savikalpaka
or determinate in origin and nature..." (Philosophy of Madhvacharya, page
144).

Anand