[Advaita-l] Dvaita Vaada - Vadiraja Teertha's Nyayaratnavali Slokas 310 - 314 Pativrataa Stree

[V Subrahmanian]

On Sat, May 9, 2015 at 1:30 PM, H S Chandramouli via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> Dear Sri Anandji,
>
> Namaskarams.
>
> Reg your observation
>
> << However, Shankara's adhyAsa bhAShya's point about the Self being the
> "asmatpratyayaviShaya", as was pointed out, must be remembered in
> interpreting vAkyas such as "AtmA vA are draShTavyaH", etc. In fact,
> Sureshvara, in his Br. Up. vArtika, says that the AtmA vA are draShTavyaH
> vAkya cannot be an injunction,>>
>
>  the use of the term " etc " leads to a confusion as to which are all the
> portions of the vakya are being referred to. Specifically is the
> immediately following portion << shrotavyaH, manthavyah,
> nidhidhyaasitavya,>> included in " etc " which would lead to the
> conclusion that it is also not considered to be a vidhi ( injunction in
> your post ) vakya. In this regard kindly also refer to my reply to the post
> by Sri
> Sadanandaji. Perhaps you could also clarify your post.
>


Namaste3

In this regard this statement of Shankara in the BSB 'Tat tu samanvayāt'
the very fourth sūtra, will be helpful.  There the discussion is whether
the Atman is a product of action or not.  In that context Shankara has said:

तत्रैवं सति यथाभूतब्रह्मात्मविषयमपि ज्ञानं न चोदनातन्त्रम् । तद्विषये
लिङादयः श्रूयमाणा अपि अनियोज्यविषयत्वात्कुण्ठीभवन्ति उपलादिषु
प्रयुक्तक्षुरतैक्ष्ण्यादिवत्, अहेयानुपादेयवस्तुविषयत्वात् । किमर्थानि
तर्हि ‘आत्मा
वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः’ (बृ. उ. २-४-५)
<http://advaitasharada.sringeri.net/php/format.php?bhashya=Brha&page=02&hval=%E2%80%98%E0%A4%86%E0%A4%A4%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%AE%E0%A4%BE%20%E0%A4%B5%E0%A4%BE%20%E0%A4%85%E0%A4%B0%E0%A5%87%20%E0%A4%A6%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%B7%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%9F%E0%A4%B5%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%AF%E0%A4%83%20%E0%A4%B6%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B0%E0%A5%8B%E0%A4%A4%E0%A4%B5%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%AF%E0%A4%83%E2%80%99%20%28%E0%A4%AC%E0%A5%83.%20%E0%A4%89.%20%E0%A5%A8-%E0%A5%AA-%E0%A5%AB%29#BR_C02_S04_V05>
इत्यादीनि *विधिच्छायानि वचनानि* ? स्वाभाविकप्रवृत्तिविषयविमुखीकरणार्थानीति
ब्रूमः । यो हि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्तते पुरुषः ‘इष्टं मे भूयादनिष्टं मा भूत्’
इति, न च तत्रात्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं लभते, तमात्यन्तिकपुरुषार्थवाञ्छिनं
स्वाभाविकात्कार्यकरण- सङ्घातप्रवृत्तिगोचराद्विमुखीकृत्य
प्रत्यगात्मस्रोतस्तया प्रवर्तयन्ति ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः’ इत्यादीनि ;

One may read the Swami Gambhirananda translation for this on p. 35 of the
Advaita Ashrama edition.  The gist of the discussion is: Why then are there
sentences *that are of a semblance of vidhi,* such as 'the self is to be
realized; it has to be heard, etc.' there?  The reply is: such sentences
are there to weaning the aspirant (who is naturally prone to engage in some
or the other activity to attain some worldly goal) from activity and turn
his attention to the contemplation of the inward Self.

Thus, according to Advaitins the sentence 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः
श्रोतव्यः’ (बृ. उ. २-४-५)
<http://advaitasharada.sringeri.net/php/format.php?bhashya=Brha&page=02&hval=%E2%80%98%E0%A4%86%E0%A4%A4%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%AE%E0%A4%BE%20%E0%A4%B5%E0%A4%BE%20%E0%A4%85%E0%A4%B0%E0%A5%87%20%E0%A4%A6%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%B7%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%9F%E0%A4%B5%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%AF%E0%A4%83%20%E0%A4%B6%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B0%E0%A5%8B%E0%A4%A4%E0%A4%B5%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%AF%E0%A4%83%E2%80%99%20%28%E0%A4%AC%E0%A5%83.%20%E0%A4%89.%20%E0%A5%A8-%E0%A5%AA-%E0%A5%AB%29#BR_C02_S04_V05>'
is not a vidhivākya like agnihotram juhuyāt.  In the latter, a new,
non-existent, goal, fruit, is produced by the enjoined action.  Whereas,
the Atman/Brahman is an already existing 'siddha' vastu which need not be
produced afresh but only requires to be known/realized as 'I am that.'
Hence, there is no vidhi involved here.  In another context, such
vidhi-like sentences are explained as: ajñāta-jñāpanam vidhiḥ' = a 'vidhi'
is that which makes known that which lies unknown.

regards
subrahmanian.v

>
> With Warm Regards
>
> Chandramouli
>
> On Fri, May 8, 2015 at 10:07 AM, Anand Hudli via Advaita-l <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>
> > Perhaps, VAdirAja's contention that the advaitin admits the subject and
> > object of a cognition must necessarily be different is not without a
> basis
> > in an advaitic text, albeit this principle is taken out of context and
> > applied cleverly in the nyAyaratnAvali in an attempt to discredit the
> > abheda shruti. The influential work, nyAyamakaranda of Anandabodha, for
> > example, is concerned with, among other things, arguments with
> naiyAyikas,
> > PrAbhAkaras, Buddhists, and others on the Self-luminosity or
> > Self-manifestedness (svyaMprakAshatva) of Atman and JnAna as well. To
> > understand what Anandabodha is saying when he rules out the identity of
> the
> > subject and object in a cognition, we need to be aware of the nature of
> his
> > arguments in the nyAyamakaranda. First, according to naiyAyikas,
> knowledge
> > of jnAna is one of the attributes of the soul Atman, in which it inheres,
> > jnAnAdhikaramAtmA, as the tarkasaMgraha says. Atman is the substratum or
> > adhikaraNa in which jnAna inheres by means of the samavAya (inherence)
> > relation. Further, many naiyAyikas maintain that the Atman is revealed in
> > an inner perception of the mind, which they call "mAnasapratyakSha". This
> > mental perception, mAnasapratyakSha takes place independently of external
> > senses and is of the form "I know", "I will", "I feel", "I wish", etc.
> > However, even in such "inner perceptions", the Atman is not presented as
> > itself, but only as the substratum of jnAna, sukha, duHkha, icchA, and
> > yatna. To give a rough analogy, when we see a pot placed on the ground,
> the
> > substratum of the pot is the ground, and the perception of the pot is the
> > "foreground" perception, while that of the ground is the "background"
> > perception. The ground is undoubtedly perceived, but only as the
> substratum
> > of the pot, not in isolation. Even so in the case of the inner
> perception,
> > "I know", knowledge is perceived as inhering in its substratum, the
> Atman.
> > For this reason, a naiyAyika would describe the adhikaraNatA
> > (substratum-ness) of Atman (in a somewhat complicated way) as,
> >
> >
> "jnAnatva-avacchinna-samavAya-saMbandha-avacchinna-jnAna-niShTha-AdheyatA-nirUpita-adhikaraNatA."
> > Thus, in short, the Atman is an object of inner perception,
> > mAnasapratyakSha.
> >
> > In total contrast with the above, the advaitins hold that jnAna is not an
> > attribute of Atman, but jnAna *is* Atman/Brahman, vide satyaM jnAnam
> > anantaM brahma, prajnAnaM brahma, etc. And Atman is a self-luminous
> entity,
> > which does not require another entity to reveal it. Rather, the
> > self-luminous Atman reveals/manifests other objects in the empirical
> > (vyavahArika)  world, which themselves are not self-luminous. Cognition
> or
> > jnAna, is also self-luminous and manifests itself. This being the case,
> > Anandabodha argues that the Atman cannot be an object of cognition, in
> the
> > sense objects of the empirical world are. He neatly sums up his argument:
> > saMveditA na saMvidadhInaprakAshaH
> > saMvitkarmatAmantareNAparokShatvAtsaMvedanavaditi | The Cognizer cannot
> > depend on Cognition for His manifestation, because He is not an object of
> > Cognition, (but) directly reveals Himself, just as Cognition.
> >
> > In other words, the Atman is the subject or witness of all empirical
> > cognitions, and it is self-luminous. Being the subject, it cannot be an
> > object of cognition. Anandabodha refutes the theory of mAnasa-pratyakSha
> of
> > the naiyAyikas thus: kartRkarmaNoraikAtmyAnupalambhAd, no
> > khlavangulyaivAngulI spRshyate chidyate vA dharayaivAsidhArA|  The Atman
> > cannot be the object of a vRtti (modification of the mind) because the
> > subject and object of a cognition cannot be the same, just as a finger
> > cannot touch itself, nor can a sword cut itself. It is also natural to
> > expect that Anandabodha was well aware of Shankara's bhAShya dealing with
> > the topic of adhyAsa and upanishad statements such as "na
> dRShTerdraShTAraM
> > pashyeH" (you cannot see the witness of vision), taM pratyagAtmAnaM
> > dRShTerdraShTAram na pashyeH, ataH naiva darshayituM shakyate gavAdivat
> > (hence It cannot be pointed out objectively like a cow), etc. To sum up,
> > the Atman cannot be an object of a cognition in the sense an empirical
> > object can be. It cannot be known in the sense an empirical object can
> be.
> > However, Shankara's adhyAsa bhAShya's point about the Self being the
> > "asmatpratyayaviShaya", as was pointed out, must be remembered in
> > interpreting vAkyas such as "AtmA vA are draShTavyaH", etc. In fact,
> > Sureshvara, in his Br. Up. vArtika, says that the AtmA vA are draShTavyaH
> > vAkya cannot be an injunction, in the sense of an injunction to perform
> an
> > act, precisely because the realizer (draShTR) and the realized
> (draShTavya)
> > have to be different in order for such an injunction to exist. When there
> > is no difference between one who is enjoined to perform an act and the
> > object of the act, no such injunction is possible.
> >
> > द्रष्टृद्रष्टव्ययोर्भेदे सत्येवं धीर्विधीयते।
> > नियोज्यविषयाभेदे घटते न विधिर्यतः॥९७॥ (vArtika on Br. Up. 4.5.6)
> >
> > Anand
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