[Advaita-l] Dvaita Vaada - Vadiraja Teertha's Nyayaratnavali Slokas 267-287 Pratibimba Vaada Part 1

[Ravi Kiran]

Namaste Anandji

> (this cognition of difference is sublated by) the cognition "This
> is indeed Caitra", upon (an ascertainment) of his characteristics.

Well explained, as even though the difference is experienced by jiva
(during jagrat/svapna), it is sublated by paramartha jnanam.

Thanks and Regards

On Sun, May 31, 2015 at 11:03 PM, Anand Hudli via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> Dear Shri Sadanandaji,
>
> Madhusudana Sarasvati takes up this topic of "bimba-pratibimba-abheda" for
> discussion in his advaita siddhi and defends the position of the VivaraNa
> school, which holds that the jIva is a reflection of Brahman (jIvasya
> ahaMkArasthapratibiMbatvam)  and that the jIva is non-different from
> Brahman, just as the reflection is non-different from the original. The
> objection by the dvaitin opponent begins with "nanu dRShTAnte nAbhedaH
> saMpratipannaH caitratacChAye bhinne itivat caitratatpratibimbe bhinne
> ityeva pArshvasthitena grahaNAt, svenApi svakaratatpratibimbe bhinne iti
> grahaNAcca." Just as a person sitting beside Caitra sees Caitra and his
> shadow as different, he sees also Caitra and his reflection (in a mirror,
> for example) as different. Also, the person sees his own hand and its
> reflection as different. MadhusUdana begins his reply thus:
> iti cet na, ApApatato bhedapratItAvapi sayuktika-pratyakSheNa
> bimbapratibimbayoraikya-siddhyA dRShTAntatvopapatteH| yathA
> lakShaNAparijnAne bhedabhramavato.api bahiHsthitashcaitro
> yatsvalakShaNakatvena pratipannaH, tato gRhasthe tathA bhAti tasmin caitra
> evAyamiti dhIH, tathA grIvAsthaM mukhaM yatsvalakShaNakaM pratipannaM
> darpaNasthamapi tathetyavadhArya tathaivedaM mukhamiti sa evAyaM kara iti
> ca svaparasAdhAraNapratItirapyanubhavasiddhA|
> What you say is not right. Although there is a cognition of difference
> (between the original and the reflection) momentarily, by perception
> combined with reasoning, the original and the reflection are established to
> be the same. Hence, the example of the Sun and its reflection is
> appropriate (in the context of Brahman and jIva). When a person sees Caitra
> outside first and then (for a second time) in the house, there is
> (momentarily) an illusion of difference (in the form "Is he the same Caitra
> or not?") in the absence of an ascertainment of Caitra's characteristics.
> However, (this cognition of difference is sublated by) the cognition "This
> is indeed Caitra", upon (an ascertainment) of his characteristics.
> Likewise, when one cognizes the characteristics of one's face above the
> neck in the reflection in the mirror as "this face is exactly that" or (in
> the case of reflection of a hand) "it is exactly this hand", such common
> cognition of one's own characteristics or that of another (in the mirror)
> is proved by experience.
> Regarding the objection that the reflection in an unclean or partially
> clean mirror does not reveal all the features of the original (and thus
> does not appear the same as the original), Madhusudana replies that the
> example of reflection is given considering only a clean mirror which makes
> recognition of the original possible.
> Further, there is a verse in the Manu Smriti (4.37) that is quoted to
> indicate the identity between the sun and its reflection.
> नेक्षेदुद्यन्तमादित्यं नास्तं यान्तं कदाचन।
> नोपरक्तं न वारिस्थं न मध्यं नभसो गतम्॥ मनुस्मृ. ४.३७॥
> One should not, at any time, see the rising sun, the setting sun, the
> eclipsed sun, the sun reflected in water, and the sun at noon.
>
> The mention of the sun reflected in water is to be noted here as indicating
> that the reflection is non-different from the sun, since it does not make
> sense to prohibit seeing something that is different from the sun in the
> midst of other prohibitions that are specifically concerned with seeing the
> sun.
>
> What about differences such as lateral inversion, the fact that the
> reflected face is turned to the west when the original face is turned to
> the east, etc.? MadhusUdana says these are effects of the upAdhi, the
> reflecting medium, but not natural or intrinsic differences between the
> bimba and the pratibimba. pratyanmukhatvAdiviruddhadharmasya
> upAdhikRtatvena svAbhAvika-viruddhadharma-anadhikaraNatvasya sattvAt. Nor
> can it be said that the reflection is an illusion in the sense of the
> illusory silver in nacre, because there is a negation of the bimba
> associated with the upAdhi  "there is no face in the mirror" rather than
> the negation "this is not a face", corresponding to the negation "this is
> not silver." darpaNe na mukhamityeva upAdhisaMsRShTatayA niShiddhyate, na
> tu nedaM rUpyamitivat naitanmukhamiti svarUpeNa.
>
> The upshot of all this is that it is reasonable to say an object appears as
> a reflection in a reflecting medium (upAdhi), such as a mirror, instead of
> concluding that an object and its reflection are different. In other words,
> there is no reflected "object", rather an object appears in a reflecting
> medium, such as a mirror. Surely, there are no two objects here. In fact,
> the cognition of an object directly and the cognition of its reflection,
> ignoring the effect of lateral inversion, are exactly the same.
>
> In addition, knowing what modern science has to tell us, the position of
> the VivaraNa school can be justified considering an object and its image,
> reflected or produced by a lens or some other instrument. For example, when
> we see an object with the help of our eyes, what really happens is an image
> is formed on the retina, the screen, with the help of the lens in the eye.
> Although, the image formed on the retina is upside down, the brain corrects
> it and interprets it normally. Now, when a person sees an object such as a
> pot, he does not think that he is merely being aware of an image formed on
> his retina, but not the pot itself. The image, which is an accurate
> representation of the object "out there" (assuming a normal eye with no
> defects), *is* considered as non-different from the object. In a similar
> fashion, telescopes, microscopes, cameras, and other instruments provide
> images of objects of varying sizes and at varying distances. Here too the
> image is considered to be non-different from the original object. For
> example, if a surveillance camera image shows a person stealing something
> in a store, the thief cannot argue, "It is only an image. It is different
> from me. I committed no theft!" In this case, undoubtedly, the image *is*
> identified with the person.
>
> Anand
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