[Advaita-l] Fwd: Why only jagat is mithya and jeeva is brahman !!??

Srinath Vedagarbha svedagarbha at gmail.com
Wed Apr 20 16:27:40 CDT 2016

On Fri, Mar 25, 2016 at 3:24 AM, V Subrahmanian via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> Everybody, all schools, admit the 'body is the self' as an adhyasa.

Correction -- not every school says what you are saying. Dvaita says
knowledge "body is the self" is invalid knowledge (ayathArtha jnAna) or
brAnti. There is no such thing as body itself is mithya as mAyavAda renders
the adhyAstha vastu's ontological nature.

> Without
> that adhyāsa, even Ishvara will not create a new body for a jiva to
> experience karma and to produce new karma.

This could be valid argument provide if you hold "Ishvara" Himself is sat.
Not too long ago in this forum yourself argued and denied reality to
Ishvara based on shruti's assertion about "Ishwara" is a adhyArOpa only .
Please refer here

> So, one cannot say 'there is
> already a body and one gets the idea of self in it'. Now, for dvaitins, the
> adhyasta vastu is atyanta asat, like hare's horn. in the case of the
> rope-snake, one can say that there is a real snake and one sees its
> semblance in the rope. But in the 'primary' body-adhyāsa, how does it work?
> If the rope-snake analogy is to be applied,in this case too, for the
> body-is-the-self adhyāsa to happen, the 'body'  must be known before. Where
> was that body? Are there two bodies, one that is real and another that is
> asat?

This is not a problem for dvaitins.

First, thinking "I am body" is not a adhyAsa as it is conceived in
mAyavAda. "I am body" is a ayathArtha jnAna which is due to
possessiveness/proximity/linkage between body and self. If body is
hurt/damaged, it is the self who experience/register the pain. If someone
else's body is hurt/injured I do not get that pain, and hence I never ever
have any "adhyAsa" of type "I am that body".

Second, for one who has not into scriptural pramANa framework, such as
atheists/scientists etc, there is no concept of "I" as an enduring vasthu
after the death of body. All they have, as their primary data, is that this
body-mind complex as a unitary whole given here & now. Hence, such people
has the knowledge "I am body" type. What is so wrong in it given their
premise? It is considered invalid only when you bring scriptures (aagama
pramAna) into the equation. Otherwise it is not a invalid proposition at
all. We should not forget this distinction.

Lastly, for dvaitins, the problem you have raised above is a non-issue. The
body is so intimately tied to self by the power due to agency of third
party Ishvara's sankalpa. In this model, there is no necessity or
restriction of needing "first adhyAsa" to have seen the body before. This
is the problem only for advaita or other models where there is no such
external agency (such as Ishvara and His sankalpa) etc.

So, dvaitins argues, as long as there is no third party agency, any adhyAsa
needs a prerequisite of having real perception apriori. How is that
prerequisite satisfied in advaita?

> Samsāra, including the adhyāsa, is admitted to be anādi. In advaita, it is
> held that the pūrva-adhyāsa is responsible for the uttara adhyāsa.

This position suffers from anyOnAShraya  dOSha. You cannot have
dvandvattvaM of pUrva/uttara as such unless you have avidya and its
prakriya adhyAsa. You cannot have adhyAsa unless you invoke pUrva & uttara
adhyAsa concept.


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