[Advaita-l] Nyayasudha Objections 1

[Srinath Vedagarbha]

On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 11:15 AM, Anand Hudli via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> >If I understand correctly, this is the gist of dvaitin's interpretation of
> >sUtra "Om ikshayetE na aShabdam Om" -- meaning Brahman is not
> >aShabda/avAchya because of hEtu "it is known". Given that Brahamn cannot
> be
> >known by pratyaksha and anumAna, it leads to only option Aagama. Since
> >aagma is shabda based, hence it is not correct to say Brahamn is avAchya
> by
> >all pada-s in their mukhyArtha.
>
> In simple terms, as already pointed out by others in this thread, Brahman
> is never the Object, unlike in Dvaita. It is always the Subject, which
> means there cannot be a word that can be pointed at Brahman. For instance,
> a pot can be pointed at and a child can be told,  "this is a pot". Not so,
> in the case of Brahman.



Bit clarification needed here -- the context of this topic is not about
dispute about whether or not object of knowledge gained from experience
(anthakarNa/sAkshi) is object or subject. Instead the question is about
artha of a shabda/pada. We all have experience of type "I know myself" type
and the question is not about whether or not "I" as subject or object, but
the question is about atha of a shabda when someone says "You are a good
man".  What is that the pada "you" is referring to here is the question.
Obviously the artha of this pada-prayOga has to be object of knowledge so
gained from that shabda prayOga.




> All pramANas, including the Sruti itself, fall
> short of objectively describing Brahman.


 vAchkatvaM/lakShyaM of the pada is not about description of the the
underlying object being conveyed, but rather connotation of what is being
conveyed. In the usage "you are a holy man" we are not trying to describe
underlying man, are we?



> Does this mean Brahman can never
> be known objectively? Brahman is the Self of all beings, and as Shankara

says in the adhyAsa bhAShya, na tAvadayamekAntena aviShayaH
> asmatpratyayaviShaytvAt. And as BhAmatIkAra clarifies, aviShayo .api
> asmatpratyayaviShaya iva jIvabhAvamApannaH avabhAsate. Although,
> Brahman/Self is not an object, still It appears to be an object of the
> concept 'I'.
>

That is (another) objection of pUrvapaxin -- even in order to say "it
appears to be.." one needs some help from shabda pramANa, because our
immediate experience is that I am both subject and object in
self-referential knowledge of type "I know myself" .  But as soon as one
plead help from shada pramANa in order to do nirNaya "it appears to be...",
one will run into this issue of mukhyArtha vs. amukhyArtha.


>
> The dvaitin tries to set up a trap using the paradoxical situation.
> advaitasiddhi: nanu evaM lakShyapadenApi lakShyatve tIrasya agangAtvavat
> brahmaNaH alakShyatvApattiriti cet na iShTatvAt sarvathA nirdharmakatvAt
> lakShyavyavahArasya ca vAcyatvAbhAvanibandhatvAt tathA pratipAditaM prAk|
> Objection: Now, if Brahman is said to be "implied" then it becomes the
> primary sense of the word "implied". Since the implied object, for example
> the river bank, is not the same as the object which stands for the primary
> sense, for example gangA, Brahman ceases to be something that is implied!
> Reply: (What you say) is agreeable to us. For, Brahman has no property at
> all and even the process of being implied by a secondary meaning restricts
> its nature as not being expressed through words.
>

This can be valid argument only if underlying hEtu  "Brahman has no
property" is true. But how do we say so definitively without engaging
shabda pramANa-s, such as shruti? Once we engage shabda to support that
hEtu, we run into the same issue. Since one cannot say one way or the other
about Brahman using non-shabda based pramANa-s, the very underlying hEtu
used in the above advaitasiddhi has no basis ---  so argues a pUrvapaxin.

/sv