[Advaita-l] Shruti prAmANya and jnAna
agnimile at gmail.com
Fri Oct 7 00:00:57 CDT 2016
Namaste Sri Srinath ji,
On 7 Oct 2016 2:16 a.m., "Srinath Vedagarbha" <svedagarbha at gmail.com> wrote:
> Namaste Sri.Venkatraghavan-ji,
> Please pardon me if I am acting as advocate of devil for this discussion.
My goal is to make these concepts clear and doubt free.
>>> On this, a pUrvapaxin (to PM) would ask;
>>> 1. How do you know vEdas have no sources?
>> The pUrva mImAmsaka has empiricism at the heart of his philosophy - the
world was never other than what it is now that is, one cannot believe in
the existence of something which has never been observed.
>> He says that the complete absence of evidence for something establishes
its non-existence (anupalabdhi).
> This true for abhAva padArtha-s. But you know vEda-s are bhAva vastu and
we are talking about abhAva property (having no author) of bhAva vastu.
> So, a skeptic would argue anupalabdhi would not applicable for abhAva
guNa of bhAva vastu
What about the horns of a hare? Each exists independently, but not
together. anupalabdhi can be applied for abhAva features of bhAva vastu
>> We have not observed anyone to have composed vedAs in our own time.
> So also folk literature. So why they are not apourushEya?
The attributes of cause are in effect. The cause can be inferred from the
presence of those attributes in the effect. Human beings have defects. I
can see defects in folk literature. Different people report the same story
with different, contradictory details. Hence folk stories are composed by
Your argument was that there was no known author of Veda, and to reply to
that I said there can't be a known author, because I haven't seen one. For
unknown author, the next sentence below was said.
>> Tradition has not given us the name of its authors (rishis are not
authors). We only observe people who have learned it from others who have
learned it from others previously.
> It might have been in several recent generation, but since vEdas have
long history, somewhere in the chain in antiquity we might have last
knowledge about author. So?
Again it's because of the principle of parsimony. I do not postulate
something not observed to prove something observed.
>> What is not observed by any pramANa is non-existent and hence the
composers of the vedA are non-existent, or the vedAs have no sources and
> But again, that argument would hold for totally abhAva vastus. But since
we know vEda exist and very much bhAva, and given the fact that we do not
have a single example (and hence no hEtu), I would argue authorless texts
are impossibility. So?
Not true. Even existing objects can come under the purview of anupalabdhi.
A pot missing from a room is known after searching for it and not finding
>>> 2. Given that we do not see any texts without author and we always see
a text has known author or forgotten author, so also vEdas must have "some
author(s)" even though we might not know who they are.
>> To answer this question, the mImAmsaka will argue that the vedAs cannot
have a known author because he has not observed such an author in the
present. And if the author is forgotten, how can we accept that there was a
person at some point in the past who has the ability to know alaukika
> This argument is not valid. You (as a PM) first assume vEda has to
necessarily teach alaukika viShaya and based on such assumption you do
tarka (pratyAnumAna to be specific) how can texts with author can possibly
teach such viShaya. As a pUrvapaxin, I argue there is no alOukika at all
(because it is not given to our pratyaksha and pratyksha based anumAna).
So, there is no valid hEtu for your argument.
No, that it teaches alaukika things is not in question, the validity of
what is taught is in question. Veda says that if you want to go to heaven
do jyotishToma. That there is a heaven and I will go there if I do the
specific ritual in a specific manner is an alaukika matter. Why? I search
for heaven on earth as described and cannot find it. Hence the veda is not
talking of laukika things here.
Whether what I am talking of is valid is a separate matter.
> Purvapaxin continues and asks you -- which is first -- from alaukika
viShaya argument you establish apouruSheyatva? or from apouruShEya concept
you establish presence of aloukika/atIndria and its viShaya?
>From svatah prAmANya I know what Veda is teaching is true. If you think it
is untrue, prove that you will not go to heaven if you do jyotoshToma as
described. If you cannot, what I say is proved as there is no bAdhaka
jnAna. Apaurusheya doesn't come in here.
> If former, then why you need vEdas because you allegedly already know
about presence of aloukika/atIndria. If later, then we are back to question
>> We do not observe any men who are omniscient now, on what basis can we
conclude that they have existed in the past? Further, just because one is
an expert in one subject, one cannot conclude that he is an expert in
another subject. So just because someone has the knowledge of laukika
matters, we cannot conclude that he would have the knowledge of alaukika
matters that are beyond the world.
> Mere want of alaukia does not establishes its presence. Just as I am
thirsty and need water badly, it does not establishes water in the well.
You are confusing subject matter with its validity.
>> More importantly, why should we postulate something extraneous / unseen
which cannot be proven to explain something seen?
> Because we have a bhAdaka of we do not have any example of texts (other
than vEdas) without author. If you say both vEda and their author(s) are
abhAva, then we do not have problem. But you claim is about abhAva property
of bhAva vastu.
See above for why bhAva vastu can have abhAva property.
>> "All these are good, but pUrva-mImAmsakas do not deny reality of this
jagat either. Hence their concepts of prAmANya-svatatsva,
vEda-apoUruShEyaatvaM are all coherent and strong internally."
>> True, they do not deny reality of jagat. However, svatah prAmANya has a
corresponding principle of paratah aprAmANya also. A cognition is valid
until it is sublated by another cognition generated by a pramANa. Similarly
the reality of jagat is valid until it is sublated by the brahma satyatva -
jagat mithyAtva jnAna generated by shruti pramANa.
> It is not "until" , but rather "unless". Otherwise, there is no niSchaya
in any cognition in general as we all waiting to be confirmed until
Yes, correct. I meant unless.
> Speculating jagat will sublate one day is quite leap and forward looking
aspect. Is this sublation a speculative or a pramAna-siddha? It cannot be
pramANa-siddha (at least yet) as we are still debating apourushEyatvaM of
vEda as a pramANa. Unless apouruShyatvaM itself is siddha (I mean all
bhAdaka-s are resolved), vEda is quite useless as a pramANa in such
speculations. Then all you have is other six pramANas. Are you saying jagat
sublation is siddha based one of those six ?
I say that vedAs are valid because of svatah prAmANya, not because of
apaurusheyatva. Please also note that svatah prAmANya is not because of
apaurusheyatva, as even paurusheya pramANas also have svatah prAmANya.
The sublation of jagat is by definition an alaukika matter, which is
outside the jurisdiction of any other pramANa. So bAdha of a cognition
generates by veda on an alaukika matter by any other pramANa is not
More information about the Advaita-l mailing list