[Advaita-l] [advaitin] Re: Ishwara srushti - shruti bhAshya sammata

[Praveen R. Bhat]

Namaste Sadaji and others,

​I assert again, that SDV is a great prakriyA, so is DSV. Each prakriyA
should be understood on its own merits without bringing irrelevant ideas
from one to the other. That too can be done for one's own sAdhana based on
what one subscribes to. However, it can in now way refute the other
prakriyA itself. As to who is the sRShTikartA in DSV (again, NOT SDV) is
​best understood in Vedanta Siddhanta Muktavali where Swami Prakashanada
puts the onus on the other to prove the duality and its creator and what
have you. It cannot be proven. And people misunderstand this to be reducing
Vedanta to Kshanika Vijnanavada, which it is not!

On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 5:51 PM, kuntimaddi sadananda
kuntimaddisada at yahoo.com [advaitin] <advaitin at yahoogroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> The analogy of dream creation is only to negate the reality that one
> assumes to the creation perceived in the waking state also since it is also
> anityam does not remain the same all the time - a basis Goudapada says for
> rejection of the reality for the plurality that is perceived in his second
> ch. of Mandukya Karika.
>
>
​...​
 ​


> Rope/snake example is to show the adhyasa aspect of the creation to negate
> the reality that one assigns. But not to confuse the creation as
> praatibhaasika satyam - that is the mental projection of the individual
> Jeeva.
>

This "individual" adjective is borrowed from SDV understandings and
superimposed on the DSV jIva, who is no other than Ishvara. Its laughable
that some think that to be Charvakavada!! :) This leads to complete
misunderstanding of DSV/ EJV and refutation of something not said by DSV.
This is called अप्राप्तस्य निषेधः। Under Manduka Karika 2.32, one more set
of bhAshya statements clarify the DSV stance:

​न हि मनोविकल्पनाया रज्जुसर्पादिलक्षणाया रज्ज्वां प्रलय उत्पत्तिर्वा ; न च
मनसि रज्जुसर्पस्योत्पत्तिः प्रलयो वा, न चोभयतो वा ।
Indeed, there is neither birth nor destruction of the imagination in the
mind in the form of rope-snake, etc in rope [else everyone would see it].
And there is neither birth nor destruction of rope-snake, etc, in the mind
[else it would be seen to born in the mind]. So too, not in both places [in
rope and the mind].

Now, this is the all-round example-hetu used for following statement:
तथा मानसत्वाविशेषाद्द्वैतस्य ।
So too [there cannot be birth and destruction] of duality, due to
commonality of duality being in the mind.

As to what this statement meant, Bhashyakara leaves no doubt with the
following statement: न हि नियते मनसि सुषुप्ते वा द्वैतं गृह्यते ; अतो
मनोविकल्पनामात्रं द्वैतमिति सिद्धम् । Indeed, the duality is not perceived
in the absorbed mind or in deep-sleep; therefore, it is proven that duality
is *mere modification of the mind*.​

This is not applicable only to dream, that was refuted long back. It is
applicable to waking. Pray tell, whose मनोविकल्प is Bhashyakara talking of?
Ishvara's? Unfortunately, मयट् प्रत्यय doesn't come to help an SDV आरोप on
DSV here to call घटवत् मृन्मयत्वात्। Its clearly मनोविकल्प here.


> Creation is naama ruupatmikam with names and forms - naming involves
> knowing and what is perceived is ruupas - are the attributive content of
> the idam, idam, and idam, since the essence of idam and idam is only
> Brahman which being infinite is imperceptible. Hence absolute unreality of
> the creation is negated and not transactional reality.
>
This is another अप्राप्तस्य निषेधः। ​No one is rejecting transactional
reality, just as no one refuted ​transactional reality in dream. Karikakara
says that the dream world has as much transactional value as you find in
waking world. What does that prove? It just proves that both have equal
mithyAtva.


> We cannot transact with the snake perceived where the rope is.
>
​Oh, but the one who sees the snake runs away from it. That prAtibhAsika
snake has as much transactional reality for him as does the vyAvahArika
snake​.


The example provided has to be used only up to the point of its
> applicability. The truth is even the mind that perceiving the world is of
> the same order of reality as the perceived world.
>
​Yes, both are equally mithyA.​

The Mirage waters or sunrise and sunset are more appropriate for
> vyaavahaarika satyam than rope/snake example.
>
Bhagavan ​​​Bhashyakara gives the most appropriate examples. Anything else
is superimposing our own understanding on bhAShya itself. One can perhaps
supplement examples to help understand, but not replace.
​

> When Bhagavat paada talks about rope/snake example, one has to understand
> he negating the reality aspect just as the dream creation.
>
​Not so. He very much uses this example for the Ishvara's creation also. It
includes all that is created.


> However in both sRishTi-dRishTi or dRishTi-sRishTi - there is drashtaa -
> or seer. Hence we need to look at the validity of the seer before one
> evaluates the validity of the seen.
>

​Without the अभिव्यञ्जक, अभिव्यञ्ज्य cannot be known is the सिद्धान्त।​
Under Mandukya Karika 4.66, the bhAShya yells out EJV at the top of its
voice; it cannot be clearer than this: जाग्रतो दृश्या जीवाः
तच्चित्ताव्यतिरिक्ताः, चित्तेक्षणीयत्वात्, स्वप्नदृक्चित्तेक्षणीयजीववत् ।
तच्च जीवेक्षणात्मकं चित्तं द्रष्टुरव्यतिरिक्तं द्रष्टृदृश्यत्वात्
स्वप्नचित्तवत् । The living beings objectifiable for the waker are
indistinct from the waking mind, due to being seen by the mind, like the
living beings objectifiable by the mind of the dreamer. And that mind of
the nature of seen individuals is indistinct from the seer, due to being
seen by the seer, like the mind of the dreamer.



> The snake is the creation of the local Jeeva using the prior samksaara and
> based on partial attributes or saadRisyam (or similarity between perceived
> rope attributes and snake attributes), and it goes away when he knows that
> it is rope, when he gathers the full attributive content of the object.
>
​In this same way, Bhagavan Karikakara
​ says that waking projections are also created due to saMskAras. Then
there is an objection to this as to "others" seeing no snake, but rope, so
rope is real. This is the SDV subjectivity-objectivity argument used
against DSV which is refuted by Bhagavan Bhashyakara so under 4.37 so:
तद्धेतुत्वात् जागरितकार्यत्वात् तस्यैव स्वप्नदृश एव सज्जागरितम्, न
त्वन्येषाम् ; यथा स्वप्न इत्यभिप्रायः । यथा स्वप्नः स्वप्नदृश एव सन्
साधारणविद्यमानवस्तुवदवभासते, तथा तत्कारणत्वात्साधारणविद्यमानवस्तुवदवभासनम्,
न तु साधारणं विद्यमानवस्तु स्वप्नवदेवेत्यभिप्रायः ॥ Due to being the result
of waking, only for that seer of dream is the waking real, however, not for
others; just as dream, this is the idea. Just as dream is indeed real only
for the dreamer and appears like commonly existing things/  objective
reality. So too, due to being [considered as] the cause of that dream,
waking appears like commonly existing things/ objective reality [for the
waker only]. However, commonly experienced objective world is not an
existent thing, just like dream itself; this is the idea.

There is no difference at all.
I'd quoted the
​last bhAShya above
just a few days back on Advaita-L
​ on the other threa​d.

​Finally, whatever the ​आरोप is on DSV, it should apply to the author of
Dakshinamurtistotra Himself, since the stotra puts the सृष्टिकर्ता and
"बद्धः" जीवः in सामानाधिकरण्यम् that too with आत्मनेपदम् usage of verbal
root डुकृञ् करणे which should be used only if the सृष्टिक्रिया brings the
फल to oneself be it बद्धत्वम् or मुक्तिः।

​gurupAdukAbhyAm
,
--Praveen R. Bhat
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