[Advaita-l] dRShTi-sRShTi definitions in the advaitasiddhi

[H S Chandramouli]

A little elaboration of the consequences of admitting only prAtibhasika in
DSV would perhaps be in order. There is no kArya-kAraNa sambandha, no
indriya janya jnAna, no pramANAs, no epistemology admitted in DSV. Hence in
case of milk transforming to curds, it is not a transformation at all. Milk
does not get transformed to curds. What appeared as milk earlier, later
appears as curds. Just as in a dream. So with other events also. A pot is
not seen through the eyes. Pot and its jnAna appear simultaneously.

This is my understanding. Could be confirmed or denied.

Regards

On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 10:43 AM, Anand Hudli via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> There is an interesting discussion in the advaitasiddhi regarding how
> adhyAsa is handled in DSV. For one thing, it is hard to explain a
> snake-rope illusion in terms of DSV since both the rope and snake are
> prAtibhAsika! Remember there is no vyAvahArika satya (objective reality) in
> DSV/EJV. Before we get to that point, let us see the definitions of DS
> (dRShTi-sRShTi)  that Madhusudana offers in response to the pUrvapakShin's
> fault-finding exercise in some ten definitions of the same. Madhusudana
> accepts the ninth and tenth of the pUrvapakShin's definitions and adds a
> couple more of his own. The first definition that is stated is a
> combination of the ninth and tenth definitions with an additional qualifier
> "doShaprayukta." The definition reads, "doShaprayuktatvanibandhanasya
> jnAtaikasattvasya-ajnAtasattvAbhAvasya (vivakShitatvAt)." BrahmAnanda
> makes
> it clear that doShaprayuktatvam is bhramatvajAtimadviShayatvam, ie. being
> the object belonging to the category of illusion. jnAtaikasattva is
> explained as jnAtaikasattvaM nAma svajnAnavyApyatvam, ie. being pervaded by
> (its) own knowledge. yadA yadA viShayastadA tadA jnAnamityeva
> jnAtaikasattvam. Whenever there exists an object there is (always) its
> knowledge. This is jnAtaikasattva. Next, ajnAtasattvAbhAva is explained by
> BrahmAnanda as svIya-ajnAnAbhAvena vyApyatvam, ie. that which is pervaded
> by (concomitant with) the absence of its own ignorance. In simpler terms,
> ajnAtasattvAbhAva is the absence of ignorance of any existing object. We
> will see how Madhusudana's treatment of ajnAtasattA admits two kinds of
> ajnAtasattA, of which one is denied and the other is accepted! So the first
> definition means that which has the property of being an object belonging
> to the category of illusion, that whose existence implies its knowledge,
> and that whose ignorance implies its nonexistence. An astute reader will
> observe that Madhusudana has introduced the qualifier doShaprayukta, caused
> by a defect (avidyA), in order to eliminate pure Consciousness (the Self)
> and a tuccha vastu (hare's horns) from consideration in dRShTi-sRShTi,
> since a tucchavastu is ajnAta, not known and does not exist, and the Self
> exists but is not known.(If the Self is known there is obviously no need
> for any VedAntaprakriyA, including DSV!) Only mithyA objects are to be
> considered here.
>
> The second definition of dRShTi-sRShTi put forth by Madhusudana is:
> pratipannopAdhidRShTi-janya-jnAtaikasattvam. This requires some
> background.
> The pUrvapakShin in showing that the tenth definition, jnAtaikasattA, is
> defective had argued earlier that pleasure, pain, and the like have this
> property of jnAtaikasattA, since the existence of pleasure, for example,
> implies it is known/experienced. This leads to a siddha-sAdhana doSha,
> because jnAtaikasattA is nothing new and it is already established.
> Further, according to the pUrvapakShin, pleasure, pain, etc. which have
> jnAtaikasattA are real. If the advaitin tries to establish the mithyAtva of
> the world through the jnAtaikasattA definition, he actually ends up
> establishing the world is real, like pleasure, pain, etc. This is called
> arthAntaradoSha, ie. establishing something other than what was sought to
> be established. In order to deal with these objections, Madhusudana says
> the definition is not just jnAtaikasattA but
> pratipannopAdhidRShTi-janya-jnAtaikasattvam.
> The additional qualifier doShaprayuktatva is also said to carry over to
> this definition. Nobody experiences/knows pleasure, pain, etc. in
> *isolation*, but only through an experiencer, the substratum, adhiShThAna
> of the pleasure, pain, etc. For example, you can say "I am pleased" or "he
> is pleased" but not "pleasure is being experienced" without specifying who
> is the experiencer. Hence, this knowledge/experience of pleasure, pain,
> etc. is only through the knowledge of the substratum. It is, therefore,
> pratipannopAdhidRShTijanya, where the term pratipannopAdhi means what is
> one of the terms in the second definition of mithyAtva (pratipannopAdhau
> traikAlikaniShedhapratiyogitvaM vA mithyAtvam). pratipannopAdhi is the
> substratum where the mithyA vastu is cognized
> and pratipannopAdhidRShTijanya is that which arises from the knowledge
> (dRShTi) of the substratum where the thing is cognized. BrahmAnanda
> describes this definition as
> svapratipattivisheShyadRShTijanyavRttijnAtaikasattvam. In the case of
> pleasure, pain, etc., these are not visheShya but visheShaNa of the
> experiencer (visheShya). In the case of things such as a pot, BrahmAnanda
> says there is an adhiShThAnasAmAnyAmshadRShTi, ie. the knowledge of a
> general substratum, as in "this is a pot", where "this" is the generic
> substratum. The knowledge of the generic substratum "this" (or "that",
> "it", etc) gives rise to cognitions such as "this is a pot", "this is a
> mat", etc.  This addresses one part of the objection. The remaining part is
> addressed by applying the doShaprayuktatva term, which means the pleasure,
> pain, etc. are also caused by avidyA, and hence they are mithyA.
>
> The third definition, again with the carry over term doShaprayuktatva, is:
> draShTrantara-avedyatve sati jnAtaikasattvam, ie. jnAtaikasattA that is not
> known to another draShTA.  This is understood if we bear in mind that the
> dream analogy is always in the backdrop when DSV is being discussed. In a
> dream, the objects that are seen are known only to the dreamer, the
> draShTA, and none else (draShTantara). And the dream objects have
> jnAtaikasattA in the sense their existence necessarily means they are
> known. However, there can be an objection along these lines. When Devadatta
> observes Yajnadatta experiencing or expressing pleasure over some matter
> (for instance, Yajnadatta won a lottery), from Devadatta's point of view
> there is another draShTA for the pleasure. BrahmAnanda addresses this
> objection saying that Devadatta imagines, in his own mind, another person
> (Yajnadatta) to be experiencing pleasure, although Devadatta himself cannot
> perceive the pleasure of Yajnadatta. "dRShTisRShTipakShe
> puruShAntarIyasukhAdikaM na jnAyate, kiMtu puruShAntarIyatvena svasminneva
> kalpyate iti bhAvaH."
>
> Anand
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