[Advaita-l] Advaita Siddhi series 020 - panchama mithyAtva vichAra:

[Ravi Kiran]

Namaste Sri Venkatraghavanji


On Thu, Dec 21, 2017 at 4:42 PM, Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> Namaste,
> The fifth definition of mithyAtva was proposed by AnandabodhAchArya, a
> great AchArya of advaita from the 11th century. Four works are attributed
> to him, nyAyamakaranda, pramANamAla, nyAyadIpAvali and nyAyadIpika. The
> siddhikAra takes up the fifth definition of mithyAtva for analysis.
>
> सद्विविक्तत्वं वा मिथ्यात्वम् | That which is different from sat is mithyA.
>
>




> Therefore in this
> view, only mahAvAkyas (sentences that postulate the identity of the
> individual self with Brahman) are pramANas in reality, because they can
> never be sublated. Every other pramANa is imbued with some defect or the
> other - avidyA or primal nescience is the common defect afflicting all
> pramANas.
>

Will there be a separate discussion ( later ) on how avidyA is explained as
per Advaita Siddhi or does the siddhikAra references from earlier advaitic
texts?
If so, which ones ? If there is a summary on definition of avidyA as per
siddhikAra, posted here, it will help.


>
>
> Secondly, this definition extends (incorrectly) to the attributeless
> Brahman too. According to the BhAmati school, shuddha Brahman cannot be the
> object of any vritti.


As per Bhamati, sruti mahAvAkya janya aikya jnAna is not aparoksha jnAna?

Thus, as shuddha Brahman is not knowable by any
> pramANa, this definition of mithyAtva would incorrectly extend to shuddha
> Brahman too.
>
> The siddhikAra says - to remedy this, the qualifier "sattvena
> pratIyamAnatva", "capable of appearing as existing" needs to be appended to
> the definition.
>
> तयो: सत्त्वप्रकारकप्रतीतिविषयत्वाभावात् | Both shuddha Brahman and asat
> are
> not the objects of a cognition that has existence as its qualifier (ie they
> are not capable of appearing as existing), thus this addition will remedy
> the defects cited.
>
>
Thanks