[Advaita-l] Debunking Drishti-Srishti Vada and Eka Jiva Vada - part 1

Aditya Kumar kumaraditya22 at yahoo.com
Sun Jul 16 00:10:52 EDT 2017

World is a phenomenon. Maya is a definition/concept. We can say world is tuccha. But how does saying maya is tuccha makes sense? It is like saying Anirvachaniya/indescribable is Tuccha/non-existent. So that establishes only sat and asat are possible. Then we have to say world is asat like hare's horn. If we say it is only from the absolute position, then we have to accept maya. It's not a question of whether we need maya to explain Advaita. Rather it is a denial of such a concept/possibility even provisionally. So in a way, Prakasananda says SDV is fundamentally wrong and DSV alone is the truth. 
The fact that you insist these are only prakriyas and we can choose whichever proves that, one need not arrive at DSV at any point until moksha. 

      From: Praveen R. Bhat via Advaita-l <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
 To: A discussion group for Advaita Vedanta <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> 
Cc: Praveen R. Bhat <bhatpraveen at gmail.com>
 Sent: Saturday, 15 July 2017 5:44 PM
 Subject: Re: [Advaita-l] Debunking Drishti-Srishti Vada and Eka Jiva Vada - part 1
​Part 2:​

>> सतो ह्युत्पत्तिः प्रलयो वा स्यात्, नासतः शशविषाणादेः । There can be
> creation and dissolution of existent only, not of non-existent rabbit's
> horn, etc.
> //
> A : Sir, this establishes Ajat vada not DSV.​
Ajati/ Ajata Vada (AV) goes one step ahead of DSV. If you agree with AV and
not DSV, it is self-contradictory; one can't land on AV without DSV.
Karikakara uses the embedded hetu everywhere as स्वप्नवत् कल्पितत्वात्।

I don't know how you draw parlance with this and prakasananda who says Maya
> is tuccha. There is a difference between saying 'The world is tuccha' and
> saying 'Maya is tuccha'.
​Maya is brought in by Advaitins to explain the impossibility of creation
in nirguNa brahma​, thereby making the creator as saguNa brahma. If the
creation and jagat is called as tuccha wholesale, what good is holding on
to Maya doing you?

> In any case, I suggest you to study Mandukya with Karika before attacking
> (#) DSV or its great proponents any which way. Else, stick to SDV, which is
> also a great प्रक्रिया that leads to मोक्ष। If you use SDV, try to
> logically land on एकमेवाद्वितीयब्रह्म without using dream example. If you
> use a dream example, you will have unknowingly, reluctantly or helplessly
> subscribed to DSV. This is my firm conclusion. :)
> A : I don't have a problem with dream example itself but I am aware of
> it's limitations.
​You got it the other way around, my friend. The dream example is the ​ONLY
example that proves the mithyAtva in logic, of course based on Shruti. SDV
has its limitations, due to which it cannot do without dream example (which
IS DSV indeed) during manana. Shruti shravaNa can give mukti to the
uttamottamAdhikAri. Others need manana and manana questions are resolved by
shruti-based tarka. This example establishes the vastu, without doubt, who
is the subject, the tAtparya of the Shruti.

Dream is just an analogy. It is not the proof of unreality of the world.
Okay, if I say the dream world itself is real​, how will you refute that?
Waking refutes it. Similarly, waking up to the knowledge of advaita Atma,
it becomes the proof of unreality of the world.

The proof is shruti statements.
​The dream example or rope-snake example is used by other Shrutis, please
look up those or the archives, I had posted a list of Upanishad quotes.
That becomes proof, based on which Bhashyakara uses it.​

> That is the difference between subjective-idealism and Vedanta established
> by Maya concept.
​The objective reality is not established either by Shruti ​

​or tarka. So it fails in all ways.

> Eventually, we will subscribe to ajati vada and not DSV.
No, eventually, there is no vAda at all.​

Finally, do not hold onto adhyAropa Shrutis, go to apavAda as well. Maya is
brought in in the adhyAropa prakriyA, which is negated in apavAda. There is
no causality in brahman to need Maya at all. This is called as निमित्तापाये
नैमित्तिकस्य अपायः। When something for which the other was brought in, that
other also goes away when the reason for its being brought goes away.

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