[Advaita-l] Vaadiraaja Teertha's Yuktimallika - Advaita Criticism - Slokas 1-511 to 1-524

[Anand Hudli]

>To this, Sri brahmAnandA says, yes mahAvAkya has avidyA apeksha, but here
>the apekshA of avidyA is not as a doSha. For example, a jaundiced patient,
>In whose driShTi, everything is yellow goes to a doctor. The doctor
>correctly diagnoses the patient. The doctor's knowledge (ie diagnosis) has
>an apekshA of pittam in the patient, but pittam is not a doSha for the
>doctor himself. So while the presence of pittam is a requirement for the
>doctor's jnAna, it is not capable of rendering the doctor's jnAna faulty,
>In the same manner as it affects patient's chakshu jnAna. In a similar way,
>mahAvAkya has an apekshA for avidyA, but that avidyA is not as a doSha that
>affects the tAttvikatva of its viShaya.

Incidentally, the definition of "anadhigatatva" also addresses the issue of
how there is an apekShA of ajnAna for a pramA (valid cognition) to arise.
This is found in the excellent commentary by MM Shri Anantakrishna Sastri
on the VedAnta ParibhAShA. Says he:
ayaM ghaTa ityAdau svakShANa eva ajnAnasya ajnAnaviShayatAyA vA nivRttiH na
tu sva-avyavahitapUrvakShaNa iti ghaTAdiranadhigata eva| smRtau tu
saMskArodbodhasyApi ajnAnaviShaytAnivartakatvasya dvitIyamithyAtve
brahmAnandasarasvatIbhiruktatvAt sva-avyavahitapUrvakShaNe ghaTo nAjnAta
iti nAtivyAptiH| vastutastu
svapUrvasvakaraNakShaNAvacchinnAjnAnaviShayatvameva anadhigatatvam ...

In cognitions such as "This is a pot", the ignorance (of the pot) or the
content of the ignorance are destroyed at the moment when the pot-cognition
arises, but (the ignorance) is not destroyed during the immediately
preceding moment. Hence, the pot is (previously) unknown. In the case of
memory (recollection), although it destroys the content of ignorance, as
BrahmAnanda-sarasvatI has said in the second definition of mithyAtva in the
advaita-siddhi, the pot is not unknown during the immediately preceding
moment. Hence, the definition is not too wide. In fact, the prevalence of
ignorance and its content during the preceding moment when the (pramANa)
karaNa operates is defined as anadhigatatvam, ie. being previously unknown.

Perhaps this requires further explanation for those who are not familiar
with the way how advaitins view the production of knowledge of an object
through a pramANa. The knowledge arises as a vRtti in the mind, after the
ignorance of the object has been destroyed. It is necessary for this
ignorance of the object to exist before its destruction through the
operation of a pramANa and to be called an anadhigata object. Since
advaitins also hold that this ignorance is bhAva-rUpa, i.e. a "positive"
entity, they are not talking about the destruction of a mere absence or
nonexistent entity. This bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna of an object, say pot, must be
destroyed in order for the knowledge of the pot to arise as a vRtti in the
mind. Now, this bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna exists for a previously unknown object,
and through operation of a pramANa, it gets destroyed and replaced by the
knowledge of the object. However, in the case of a mere recollection or
memory of an object, the object is not previously unknown, and hence, the
bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna of the object does not exist, which means the necessary
condition for anadhigatatva is absent.

In short, without the bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna of an object, the object cannot be
revealed by a pramANa, and a pramA (valid knowledge) of the object cannot
arise. It can, however, be recollected as a case of memory, without the
need for a pramANa.

Anand

On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 2:07 PM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com> wrote:

> Dear Shri Venkatraghavanji,
>
> >Re the above, Sri vAdirAja's question is if the pramANa viShaya is
> >vyAvahArikam, it is by definition bAdhyam upon brahma jnAna. pramANa
> >according to advaitins is abAdhitArtha viShayatvam, so by definition, all
> >the shruti vAkya that have vyAvahArika vastu as their viShaya are not
> >pramANas. This point by vAdirAja is valid in my opinion, but is not a
>  > problem for advaita.
>
> One of the necessary conditions for a source of knowledge to be called a
> pramANa is that it should make things known that are not already known
> (anadhigata). What happens in this case can be examined in two phases. In
> the phase before the dawn of Brahman knowledge, both abheda and bheda
> shrutis are pramANas, since we are still in the vyAvahArika phase and there
> is no sublation of vyAvahArika objects. After the dawn of Brahman
> knowledge, *both* abheda and bheda shrutis, ie. the whole shruti itself,
> becomes atattvAvedaka and ceases to be a pramANa, since it cannot make any
> thing known that is not already known. So what I am saying is that we have
> either a situation where 1) both bheda and abheda shrutis are tattvAvedaka
> or where 2) both abheda and bheda shrutis are atattvAvedaka. The charge by
> VAdirAja is that one type of shruti is tattvAvedaka and another is
> atattvAvedaka, as per the advaitin. But as we have have seen, we will never
> be in that situation.
>
> Anand
>
>
> On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 8:48 AM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> As explained in the vedAnta-paribhAShA, the validity (prAmANya) of
>> pramANas is of two kinds. vyAvahArika-tattva-Avedakatva is the
>> capability to make known vyAvahArika reality.
>> pAramArthika-tattva-Avedakatva is the capability to make known the Absolute
>> reality, Brahman. The first kind belongs to pramANas other than the one
>> which yields BrahmajnAna, whereas the second kind belongs only to
>> statements (shruti texts) that teach the unity of jIva and Brahman, for
>> example, sadeva somyedamagra AsIt, tattvamasi, etc. This implies that Bheda
>> shrutis belong to the category of vyAvahArika-tattva-Avedaka pramANas,
>> while the abheda-shrutis belong to the category of
>> pAramArthika-tattva-Avedaka pramANas. However, it is also clear that
>> advaitins do not state there is an atattvAvedaka pramANa in the Veda, as
>> alleged by VAdirAja. If they had indeed stated that a part of the Veda is
>> atattvAvedaka while another part is tattvAvedaka there would have been
>> shrutahAni surely, but they did not. advaitins do agree that every shruti
>> is tattvAvedaka, although the tattva that it conveys could be vyAvahArika
>> or pAramArthika. The topic of Bheda-shrutis vis a vis the abheda-shrutis is
>> discussed in detail in the advaitasiddhi. Suffice it to say that one
>> solution is to accept Bheda-shrutis, those vAkyas of the shruti that seem
>> to deal with duality, as describing vyAvahArika bheda, since there cannot
>> be be any bheda at the pAramArthika level. Bheda shrutis play a role
>> similar to the role played by arthavAdas in the context of a vidhi, vide
>> the mImAMsA sUtra - vidhinA tu ekavAkyatvAt stutyarthatvena vidhInAM syuH,
>> 1.2.7. Just as arthavAda vAkyas are not independent pramANas but do help
>> by supporting and commending the enjoined act (vidhi), bheda-shrutis too
>> serve the purpose of supporting the abheda-shrutis. Taken independently,
>> they are not pramANas for revealing Brahman. Hence, there is no shrutahani.
>>
>> Anand
>>
>>
>