[Advaita-l] Vaadiraaja Teertha's Yuktimallika - Advaita Criticism - Slokas 1-511 to 1-524

[V Subrahmanian]

Dear Sri Anand ji,

What you have said goes well with the discussion in the Advaita Siddhi
about the need to accept ajnāna as bhāva rūpa which I summarized in this
forum a few days ago. When a person is ignorant 'of' something, there is a
positive entity 'about which' there is ignorance. This cannot be a
non-entity/abhāva rupa. And the jnana that arises to dispel ignorance has a
viṣaya, a bhāva rupa vastu, and not a-viṣaya, abhava. किंविषयकं ज्ञानं
किंविषयकमज्ञानं निवर्तयति? is the upapatti for this.

regards
subrahmanian.v

On Sun, Jun 25, 2017 at 1:52 PM, Anand Hudli via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> Dear Shri Venkatraghavanji,
>
> On Sat, Jun 24, 2017 at 11:27 PM, Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>
> > Namaste Sri Anand ji,
> >
> > Thank you for that erudite post.
> > I had a question in this regard and would be most grateful if you could
> > clarify.
> >
> > You had translated Sri Anantakrishna Sastrigal's usage of ajnAnaviShayatA
> > as "content of ignorance".
> >
> > Sri Sastrigal says that when a pramANa operates correctly either ajnAna
> > nivritti or ajnAnaviShayatA nivritti happens.
> >
> > ajnAnaviShayatA therefore cannot be the object of ignorance,
> ajnAnaviShaya,
> > because no one can imply that the object's nivritti happens when ajnAna
> > nivritti happens.
> >
> > Normally, I would have understood ajnAnaviShayatA as ajnAnaviShaya bhAva
> -
> > or the characteristic of being an object of ignorance, and the nivritti
> of
> > that characteristic is certainly possible.
> >
> > Since you called it the content of ignorance, I was curious to know if
> > something else was implied.
> >
> > What does the content of ignorance actually mean? How does it differ from
> > ignorance itself? Why did Sri Ananthakrishna SAstrigal decide to split it
> > into ajnAna nivritti *or* ajnAnaviShayatA nivritti?
>
>
> MM Shri Sastri does not explain, but my guess is as follows. ajnAna of an
> object has a correspondence with jnAna.  If I don't know a pot, my specific
> ignorance is about the pot, but not another object, say cloth. When a
> person says he/she is ignorant we may ask: "Ignorant of what?" The answer
> to the question is the content of the ignorance, although I agree it could
> be confused with the object itself. It could also be the case that ajnAna
> could be general, not restricted to a specific object or specific set of
> objects. In that case, the ignorance is in its primary form, ie. mUlAvidyA.
> Both these cases have to be considered when we talk about pramANas, since a
> pramANa, in general, must satisfy the condition of providing new knowledge
> that removes ajnAna. There is also a reference to the siddhAnta-bindu
> commentary which I will try to look into in the coming days.
>
> Anand
>
> On Sat, Jun 24, 2017 at 2:27 PM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > >To this, Sri brahmAnandA says, yes mahAvAkya has avidyA apeksha, but
> here
> > >the apekshA of avidyA is not as a doSha. For example, a jaundiced
> patient,
> > >In whose driShTi, everything is yellow goes to a doctor. The doctor
> > >correctly diagnoses the patient. The doctor's knowledge (ie diagnosis)
> has
> > >an apekshA of pittam in the patient, but pittam is not a doSha for the
> > >doctor himself. So while the presence of pittam is a requirement for the
> > >doctor's jnAna, it is not capable of rendering the doctor's jnAna
> faulty,
> > >In the same manner as it affects patient's chakshu jnAna. In a similar
> > way,
> > >mahAvAkya has an apekshA for avidyA, but that avidyA is not as a doSha
> > that
> > >affects the tAttvikatva of its viShaya.
> >
> > Incidentally, the definition of "anadhigatatva" also addresses the issue
> > of how there is an apekShA of ajnAna for a pramA (valid cognition) to
> > arise. This is found in the excellent commentary by MM Shri Anantakrishna
> > Sastri on the VedAnta ParibhAShA. Says he:
> > ayaM ghaTa ityAdau svakShANa eva ajnAnasya ajnAnaviShayatAyA vA nivRttiH
> > na tu sva-avyavahitapUrvakShaNa iti ghaTAdiranadhigata eva| smRtau tu
> > saMskArodbodhasyApi ajnAnaviShaytAnivartakatvasya dvitIyamithyAtve
> > brahmAnandasarasvatIbhiruktatvAt sva-avyavahitapUrvakShaNe ghaTo nAjnAta
> > iti nAtivyAptiH| vastutastu svapUrvasvakaraNakShaNAvacchin
> nAjnAnaviShayatvameva
> > anadhigatatvam ...
> >
> > In cognitions such as "This is a pot", the ignorance (of the pot) or the
> > content of the ignorance are destroyed at the moment when the
> pot-cognition
> > arises, but (the ignorance) is not destroyed during the immediately
> > preceding moment. Hence, the pot is (previously) unknown. In the case of
> > memory (recollection), although it destroys the content of ignorance, as
> > BrahmAnanda-sarasvatI has said in the second definition of mithyAtva in
> the
> > advaita-siddhi, the pot is not unknown during the immediately preceding
> > moment. Hence, the definition is not too wide. In fact, the prevalence of
> > ignorance and its content during the preceding moment when the (pramANa)
> > karaNa operates is defined as anadhigatatvam, ie. being previously
> unknown.
> >
> > Perhaps this requires further explanation for those who are not familiar
> > with the way how advaitins view the production of knowledge of an object
> > through a pramANa. The knowledge arises as a vRtti in the mind, after the
> > ignorance of the object has been destroyed. It is necessary for this
> > ignorance of the object to exist before its destruction through the
> > operation of a pramANa and to be called an anadhigata object. Since
> > advaitins also hold that this ignorance is bhAva-rUpa, i.e. a "positive"
> > entity, they are not talking about the destruction of a mere absence or
> > nonexistent entity. This bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna of an object, say pot, must be
> > destroyed in order for the knowledge of the pot to arise as a vRtti in
> the
> > mind. Now, this bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna exists for a previously unknown object,
> > and through operation of a pramANa, it gets destroyed and replaced by the
> > knowledge of the object. However, in the case of a mere recollection or
> > memory of an object, the object is not previously unknown, and hence, the
> > bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna of the object does not exist, which means the necessary
> > condition for anadhigatatva is absent.
> >
> > In short, without the bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna of an object, the object cannot
> be
> > revealed by a pramANa, and a pramA (valid knowledge) of the object cannot
> > arise. It can, however, be recollected as a case of memory, without the
> > need for a pramANa.
> >
> > Anand
> >
> > On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 2:07 PM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
> > wrote:
> >
> >> Dear Shri Venkatraghavanji,
> >>
> >> >Re the above, Sri vAdirAja's question is if the pramANa viShaya is
> >> >vyAvahArikam, it is by definition bAdhyam upon brahma jnAna. pramANa
> >> >according to advaitins is abAdhitArtha viShayatvam, so by definition,
> all
> >> >the shruti vAkya that have vyAvahArika vastu as their viShaya are not
> >> >pramANas. This point by vAdirAja is valid in my opinion, but is not a
> >>  > problem for advaita.
> >>
> >> One of the necessary conditions for a source of knowledge to be called a
> >> pramANa is that it should make things known that are not already known
> >> (anadhigata). What happens in this case can be examined in two phases.
> In
> >> the phase before the dawn of Brahman knowledge, both abheda and bheda
> >> shrutis are pramANas, since we are still in the vyAvahArika phase and
> there
> >> is no sublation of vyAvahArika objects. After the dawn of Brahman
> >> knowledge, *both* abheda and bheda shrutis, ie. the whole shruti itself,
> >> becomes atattvAvedaka and ceases to be a pramANa, since it cannot make
> any
> >> thing known that is not already known. So what I am saying is that we
> have
> >> either a situation where 1) both bheda and abheda shrutis are
> tattvAvedaka
> >> or where 2) both abheda and bheda shrutis are atattvAvedaka. The charge
> by
> >> VAdirAja is that one type of shruti is tattvAvedaka and another is
> >> atattvAvedaka, as per the advaitin. But as we have have seen, we will
> never
> >> be in that situation.
> >>
> >> Anand
> >>
> >>
> >> On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 8:48 AM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>> As explained in the vedAnta-paribhAShA, the validity (prAmANya) of
> >>> pramANas is of two kinds. vyAvahArika-tattva-Avedakatva is the
> >>> capability to make known vyAvahArika reality.
> >>> pAramArthika-tattva-Avedakatva is the capability to make known the
> Absolute
> >>> reality, Brahman. The first kind belongs to pramANas other than the one
> >>> which yields BrahmajnAna, whereas the second kind belongs only to
> >>> statements (shruti texts) that teach the unity of jIva and Brahman, for
> >>> example, sadeva somyedamagra AsIt, tattvamasi, etc. This implies that
> Bheda
> >>> shrutis belong to the category of vyAvahArika-tattva-Avedaka pramANas,
> >>> while the abheda-shrutis belong to the category of
> >>> pAramArthika-tattva-Avedaka pramANas. However, it is also clear that
> >>> advaitins do not state there is an atattvAvedaka pramANa in the Veda,
> as
> >>> alleged by VAdirAja. If they had indeed stated that a part of the Veda
> is
> >>> atattvAvedaka while another part is tattvAvedaka there would have been
> >>> shrutahAni surely, but they did not. advaitins do agree that every
> shruti
> >>> is tattvAvedaka, although the tattva that it conveys could be
> vyAvahArika
> >>> or pAramArthika. The topic of Bheda-shrutis vis a vis the
> abheda-shrutis is
> >>> discussed in detail in the advaitasiddhi. Suffice it to say that one
> >>> solution is to accept Bheda-shrutis, those vAkyas of the shruti that
> seem
> >>> to deal with duality, as describing vyAvahArika bheda, since there
> cannot
> >>> be be any bheda at the pAramArthika level. Bheda shrutis play a role
> >>> similar to the role played by arthavAdas in the context of a vidhi,
> vide
> >>> the mImAMsA sUtra - vidhinA tu ekavAkyatvAt stutyarthatvena vidhInAM
> syuH,
> >>> 1.2.7. Just as arthavAda vAkyas are not independent pramANas but do
> >>> help by supporting and commending the enjoined act (vidhi),
> bheda-shrutis
> >>> too serve the purpose of supporting the abheda-shrutis. Taken
> >>> independently, they are not pramANas for revealing Brahman. Hence,
> there is
> >>> no shrutahani.
> >>>
> >>> Anand
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >
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