[Advaita-l] Vaadiraaja Teertha's Yuktimallika - Advaita Criticism - Slokas 1-511 to 1-524

[Anand Hudli]

On Mon, Jun 26, 2017 at 7:13 PM, Srinath Vedagarbha via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> On Sun, Jun 25, 2017 at 8:01 AM, Anand Hudli via Advaita-l <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>
>
> > iti pare manyante|, wherein he supplies a justification for using
> > bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna as existing prior to the arising of knowledge. It is
> not
> > proper to say "previously unknown" means there is an absence of knowledge
> > about an object prior to the arising of knowledge, rather it is proper to
> > say there is an ignorance of the object prior to the arising of knowledge
> > about the object, according to all schools of advaitavedAnta (bhAmatI,
> > vivaraNa, etc), since they accept ajnAna as bhAva-rUpa.
> >
> >
> >
> Is this paxa (of accepting bhAvarUpa ajnAna prior to jnAnOdaya) applicable
> to brahma-jnAna also?
>
>
Yes. MM Shri Sastri remarks in his VP commentary 1.9 - akhaNDAkAravRttireva
sarvadRshyanAsharUpeti svasyApi virodhinIti. The final vRtti, called the
akhaNDAkAra vRtti destroys all bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna ignorance and itself. We
had a discussion on akhaNDAkAra vRtti sometime ago. Please consult the
archives for more information.

On Sun, Jun 25, 2017 at 5:48 PM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com> wrote:

> On Sun, Jun 25, 2017 at 2:22 PM, Praveen R. Bhat via Advaita-l <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>
>> Namaste Anandji,
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 25, 2017 at 2:14 PM, Anand Hudli via Advaita-l <
>> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>>
>> > On Sun, Jun 25, 2017 at 2:25 AM, kuntimaddi sadananda via Advaita-l <
>> > advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>> > Just to make a quick couple of observations based on what you wrote, the
>> > Vedanta paribhAShA deals with the topic of "dhArAvAhikabuddhi" and says
>> > that if there is a series of cognitions resulting from perceiving an
>> > object, it should be treated as a single cognition.
>>
>>
>> ​Does this indicate the series of vRttis in seeing any object? For
>> example,
>> if I keep looking at a ghaTa, there is a ghaTa-vRtti which is momentary,
>> but another momentary ghaTa-vRtti follows it which is exactly the same in
>> space, but with a little difference in time, and so on. Are these series
>> of
>> cognitions considered as a single cognition without the role of smRRiti?
>
> Dear Shri Praveenji,
> The VP (intro 6) says, "yAvat ghaTasphuraNaM tAvad
> ghaTAkAra-antaHkaraNavRttir ekaiva na tu nAnA vRtteH
> svavirodhivRttyutpattiparyantaM sthAyitva-abhyupagamAt| tathA ca
> tatpratiphalitacaitanyarUpaM ghaTAdijnAnamapi tatra
> tAvatkAlikamekameveti... So there will be one vRtti and one corresponding
> cognition (jnAna) for the contiguous series(dhArAvAhika)  of cognitions.
> This single cognition and vRtti will last until an opposing vRtti arises
> and cancels it out, which should happen when the pot is no longer being
> perceived. Also, note that memory has no role to play here.
>
> Anand
>
> On Sun, Jun 25, 2017 at 5:31 PM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Jun 25, 2017 at 2:14 PM, V Subrahmanian via Advaita-l <
>> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Sri Anand ji,
>>>
>>> What you have said goes well with the discussion in the Advaita Siddhi
>>> about the need to accept ajnāna as bhāva rūpa which I summarized in this
>>> forum a few days ago. When a person is ignorant 'of' something, there is
>>> a
>>> positive entity 'about which' there is ignorance. This cannot be a
>>> non-entity/abhāva rupa. And the jnana that arises to dispel ignorance
>>> has a
>>> viṣaya, a bhāva rupa vastu, and not a-viṣaya, abhava. किंविषयकं ज्ञानं
>>> किंविषयकमज्ञानं निवर्तयति? is the upapatti for this.
>>>
>> Dear Shri Subrahmanianji,
>> MM Shri Sastri remarks in his commentary on Vedanta ParibhAShA
>> Introduction (4) - sarveShu pakSheShu vedAntinAM mate ajnAnasya
>> bhAvarUpatvena anadhigatapadasya ajnAnaviShayatvaparatvasyaiva yogena
>> jnAnaviShayatva-abhAvAdiparatayA anadhigatapadavivaraNa-ayoga
>> ityanadhigatatvaM sva-avyavahitapUrvakShaNa-avacchinna-ajnAnaviShayatvarUpaM
>> vivakShaNIyam iti pare manyante|, wherein he supplies a justification for
>> using bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna as existing prior to the arising of knowledge. It
>> is not proper to say "previously unknown" means there is an absence of
>> knowledge about an object prior to the arising of knowledge, rather it is
>> proper to say there is an ignorance of the object prior to the arising of
>> knowledge about the object, according to all schools of advaitavedAnta
>> (bhAmatI, vivaraNa, etc), since they accept ajnAna as bhAva-rUpa.
>>
>> Anand
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 25, 2017 at 2:14 PM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Jun 25, 2017 at 2:25 AM, kuntimaddi sadananda via Advaita-l <
>>> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Anandaji - PraNAms
>>>> Just a comment for clarification based on my understanding.
>>>> Formation of vRitti in the pratyaksha pramaana involves sense input.
>>>> Senses that go with the mind to the obeject can only cognize the reflected
>>>> attributes of the object since attributes are inseparable from their locus.
>>>> If the senses are defective as in person who is color blind, then the sense
>>>> input to the mind is defective as it does not reflects true attributes of
>>>> the obejct. Erronious perception can occur due to defective or incomplete
>>>> attributive content in the formation of the vRitti in the mind.
>>>> When I perceive an object, the vRitti of the object that forms in the
>>>> mind contains the (form) ruupa or other attributes of the object that the
>>>> senses can sense. The object is identified as pot if I have a pot knowledge
>>>> before which is stored in memory. The cognition and recognition both are
>>>> involved in the knowledge that this is  a pot. anadigatatvam here involves
>>>> only cognition of the existence of the object, pot, via perceptual
>>>> processes which could not happen until I see. Recognition has to come from
>>>> memory only.
>>>> If I am seeing the pot for the first time (in essence I have no
>>>> knowledge of the pot in my memory) then anadigatatvam ends with the
>>>> knowledge that - here is an object, which some form, and I do not know what
>>>> this is. If my mother or teacher tells me that - this is pot - then only I
>>>> have knowledge of object with its attributive content (rupa), and a name or
>>>> naama for the form that I perceive. Hence nemability involves knowability.
>>>> Jagat is naama ruupatmakam - since knowability is also included as the
>>>> existence of an object is established only the knowledge of its existence.
>>>> Of course, if an object looks similar to something that I know, then
>>>> upamana pramana operates, but that is not complete knowledge of the
>>>> object.  Hence even in perception memory to some extent operates not in the
>>>> cognition but in the recognition. Ignorance has two aspects - one is
>>>> removed by cognition and the other by recognition from memory. Not sure
>>>> which one pertains to the bhaava ruupa ajnaana here.
>>>> Just recollection from memory - if somebody says POT - visualition of a
>>>> pot in the mind- does not involve sense input - hence it is separated from
>>>> pratyaksha pramaana.
>>>> Some Vedantins try to separate the two steps as indeterminate vs
>>>> determinate perceptions.
>>>> Just my 2c
>>>> Hari Om!Sadananda
>>>
>>> Dear Shri Sadanandaji,
>>> Just to make a quick couple of observations based on what you wrote, the
>>> Vedanta paribhAShA deals with the topic of "dhArAvAhikabuddhi" and says
>>> that if there is a series of cognitions resulting from perceiving an
>>> object, it should be treated as a single cognition. However, a question may
>>> be raised as to how to treat seeing an object, say a pot, for the first
>>> time and then after an interval of time seeing it again, seeing the same
>>> pot in a different place, etc. Do we mean to say that the second (and
>>> subsequent cognitions) are not pramA, but only the first one? The solution
>>> to this lies in introducing the space-time complex as part of the
>>> perception. The second and subsequent cognitions of the same object brought
>>> about by the PratyakSha pramANa are indeed valid cognitions, because the
>>> space-time complex varies from one cognition to another. Thus every valid
>>> cognition has some element of anadhigatatva. For instance, if I see a pot
>>> now and see the same pot an hour later, the second cognition is also new,
>>> since the time factor is different from the first cognition. (One could
>>> argue that because I see a pot now does not guarantee that it will be there
>>> after an hour and in that sense seeing it again after an hour is new
>>> information.) Or, I may see a pot now and see the same pot in another place
>>> an hour later. In this case, both the space and time factors differ from
>>> the first cognition.
>>>
>>> Also, the concepts of savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka perceptions are
>>> treated in the Vedanta ParibhASha as well.
>>>
>>> Anand
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Jun 24, 2017 at 2:27 PM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> >To this, Sri brahmAnandA says, yes mahAvAkya has avidyA apeksha, but
>>>> here
>>>> >the apekshA of avidyA is not as a doSha. For example, a jaundiced
>>>> patient,
>>>> >In whose driShTi, everything is yellow goes to a doctor. The doctor
>>>> >correctly diagnoses the patient. The doctor's knowledge (ie diagnosis)
>>>> has
>>>> >an apekshA of pittam in the patient, but pittam is not a doSha for the
>>>> >doctor himself. So while the presence of pittam is a requirement for
>>>> the
>>>> >doctor's jnAna, it is not capable of rendering the doctor's jnAna
>>>> faulty,
>>>> >In the same manner as it affects patient's chakshu jnAna. In a similar
>>>> way,
>>>> >mahAvAkya has an apekshA for avidyA, but that avidyA is not as a doSha
>>>> that
>>>> >affects the tAttvikatva of its viShaya.
>>>>
>>>> Incidentally, the definition of "anadhigatatva" also addresses the
>>>> issue of how there is an apekShA of ajnAna for a pramA (valid cognition) to
>>>> arise. This is found in the excellent commentary by MM Shri Anantakrishna
>>>> Sastri on the VedAnta ParibhAShA. Says he:
>>>> ayaM ghaTa ityAdau svakShANa eva ajnAnasya ajnAnaviShayatAyA vA
>>>> nivRttiH na tu sva-avyavahitapUrvakShaNa iti ghaTAdiranadhigata eva| smRtau
>>>> tu saMskArodbodhasyApi ajnAnaviShaytAnivartakatvasya dvitIyamithyAtve
>>>> brahmAnandasarasvatIbhiruktatvAt sva-avyavahitapUrvakShaNe ghaTo
>>>> nAjnAta iti nAtivyAptiH| vastutastu svapUrvasvakaraNakShaNAvacchinnAjnAnaviShayatvameva
>>>> anadhigatatvam ...
>>>>
>>>> In cognitions such as "This is a pot", the ignorance (of the pot) or
>>>> the content of the ignorance are destroyed at the moment when the
>>>> pot-cognition arises, but (the ignorance) is not destroyed during the
>>>> immediately preceding moment. Hence, the pot is (previously) unknown. In
>>>> the case of memory (recollection), although it destroys the content of
>>>> ignorance, as BrahmAnanda-sarasvatI has said in the second definition of
>>>> mithyAtva in the advaita-siddhi, the pot is not unknown during the
>>>> immediately preceding moment. Hence, the definition is not too wide. In
>>>> fact, the prevalence of ignorance and its content during the preceding
>>>> moment when the (pramANa) karaNa operates is defined as anadhigatatvam, ie.
>>>> being previously unknown.
>>>>
>>>> Perhaps this requires further explanation for those who are not
>>>> familiar with the way how advaitins view the production of knowledge of an
>>>> object through a pramANa. The knowledge arises as a vRtti in the mind,
>>>> after the ignorance of the object has been destroyed. It is necessary for
>>>> this ignorance of the object to exist before its destruction through the
>>>> operation of a pramANa and to be called an anadhigata object. Since
>>>> advaitins also hold that this ignorance is bhAva-rUpa, i.e. a "positive"
>>>> entity, they are not talking about the destruction of a mere absence or
>>>> nonexistent entity. This bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna of an object, say pot, must be
>>>> destroyed in order for the knowledge of the pot to arise as a vRtti in the
>>>> mind. Now, this bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna exists for a previously unknown object,
>>>> and through operation of a pramANa, it gets destroyed and replaced by the
>>>> knowledge of the object. However, in the case of a mere recollection or
>>>> memory of an object, the object is not previously unknown, and hence, the
>>>> bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna of the object does not exist, which means the necessary
>>>> condition for anadhigatatva is absent.
>>>>
>>>> In short, without the bhAva-rUpa-ajnAna of an object, the object cannot
>>>> be revealed by a pramANa, and a pramA (valid knowledge) of the object
>>>> cannot arise. It can, however, be recollected as a case of memory, without
>>>> the need for a pramANa.
>>>>
>>>> Anand
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 2:07 PM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Dear Shri Venkatraghavanji,
>>>>>
>>>>> >Re the above, Sri vAdirAja's question is if the pramANa viShaya is
>>>>> >vyAvahArikam, it is by definition bAdhyam upon brahma jnAna. pramANa
>>>>> >according to advaitins is abAdhitArtha viShayatvam, so by definition,
>>>>> all
>>>>> >the shruti vAkya that have vyAvahArika vastu as their viShaya are not
>>>>> >pramANas. This point by vAdirAja is valid in my opinion, but is not a
>>>>>  > problem for advaita.
>>>>>
>>>>> One of the necessary conditions for a source of knowledge to be called
>>>>> a pramANa is that it should make things known that are not already known
>>>>> (anadhigata). What happens in this case can be examined in two phases. In
>>>>> the phase before the dawn of Brahman knowledge, both abheda and bheda
>>>>> shrutis are pramANas, since we are still in the vyAvahArika phase and there
>>>>> is no sublation of vyAvahArika objects. After the dawn of Brahman
>>>>> knowledge, *both* abheda and bheda shrutis, ie. the whole shruti itself,
>>>>> becomes atattvAvedaka and ceases to be a pramANa, since it cannot make any
>>>>> thing known that is not already known. So what I am saying is that we have
>>>>> either a situation where 1) both bheda and abheda shrutis are tattvAvedaka
>>>>> or where 2) both abheda and bheda shrutis are atattvAvedaka. The charge by
>>>>> VAdirAja is that one type of shruti is tattvAvedaka and another is
>>>>> atattvAvedaka, as per the advaitin. But as we have have seen, we will never
>>>>> be in that situation.
>>>>>
>>>>> Anand
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 8:48 AM, Anand Hudli <anandhudli at hotmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> As explained in the vedAnta-paribhAShA, the validity (prAmANya) of
>>>>>> pramANas is of two kinds. vyAvahArika-tattva-Avedakatva is the
>>>>>> capability to make known vyAvahArika reality.
>>>>>> pAramArthika-tattva-Avedakatva is the capability to make known the Absolute
>>>>>> reality, Brahman. The first kind belongs to pramANas other than the one
>>>>>> which yields BrahmajnAna, whereas the second kind belongs only to
>>>>>> statements (shruti texts) that teach the unity of jIva and Brahman, for
>>>>>> example, sadeva somyedamagra AsIt, tattvamasi, etc. This implies that Bheda
>>>>>> shrutis belong to the category of vyAvahArika-tattva-Avedaka pramANas,
>>>>>> while the abheda-shrutis belong to the category of
>>>>>> pAramArthika-tattva-Avedaka pramANas. However, it is also clear that
>>>>>> advaitins do not state there is an atattvAvedaka pramANa in the Veda, as
>>>>>> alleged by VAdirAja. If they had indeed stated that a part of the Veda is
>>>>>> atattvAvedaka while another part is tattvAvedaka there would have been
>>>>>> shrutahAni surely, but they did not. advaitins do agree that every shruti
>>>>>> is tattvAvedaka, although the tattva that it conveys could be vyAvahArika
>>>>>> or pAramArthika. The topic of Bheda-shrutis vis a vis the abheda-shrutis is
>>>>>> discussed in detail in the advaitasiddhi. Suffice it to say that one
>>>>>> solution is to accept Bheda-shrutis, those vAkyas of the shruti that seem
>>>>>> to deal with duality, as describing vyAvahArika bheda, since there cannot
>>>>>> be be any bheda at the pAramArthika level. Bheda shrutis play a role
>>>>>> similar to the role played by arthavAdas in the context of a vidhi, vide
>>>>>> the mImAMsA sUtra - vidhinA tu ekavAkyatvAt stutyarthatvena vidhInAM syuH,
>>>>>> 1.2.7. Just as arthavAda vAkyas are not independent pramANas but do
>>>>>> help by supporting and commending the enjoined act (vidhi), bheda-shrutis
>>>>>> too serve the purpose of supporting the abheda-shrutis. Taken
>>>>>> independently, they are not pramANas for revealing Brahman. Hence, there is
>>>>>> no shrutahani.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Anand
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>