[Advaita-l] DSV in the advaitasiddhi: DS itself subject to DS

[Anand Hudli]

न च- दृष्टिसृष्टेरपि दृष्टिसृष्टित्वेन घटादेरदृष्टिसृष्टित्वापत्तिरिति-
वाच्यम्। You should not object thus: Since dRShTi-sRShTi itself is
subjected to dRShTi-sRShTi, objects such as a pot cannot be subjected to
dRShTi-sRShTi(DS).
The tAtparya of the objection is as follows:
घटादेर्दृष्टिसृष्टित्वे घटादेः सत्यत्वापहारो भवति। तस्या अपि
दृष्टिसृष्टेर्दृष्टिसृष्टित्वे घटादेरपहृतं सत्यत्वं पुनः प्रतिष्ठितं
स्यात्। मिथ्यात्वमिथ्यात्वे सत्यत्वमिव।  By subjecting an object such as a
pot to DS, its reality is removed. However, as DS itself subjected to DS,
the reality of the pot becomes re-established. This is akin to the
mithyAtva-mithyAtva argument where the mithyAtva of mithyAtva implies
satyatva. This is answered with an example. Suppose you see an illusory
snake in a dream, which you realize is nothing but rope in the same dream
as "this is not a snake but a rope." Upon waking up, you realize it was all
a dream, and hence, neither the snake nor its canceling knowledge are real.
However, based on the observation that the canceling knowledge itself was
not real, one cannot conclude that the snake is real! That is absurd. A
second example: any knowledge of an object, say pot, is itself the object
(content) of the anuvyavasAya, "I know the pot" (ghaTajnAnavAn aham). Just
by virtue of the knowledge of the pot being itself the content of the
anuvyavasAya, one cannot conclude the pot is not known. This is the line of
argument that Madhusudana adopts.

Madhusudana: ज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयत्वेऽपि विषयस्याज्ञेयत्वाभाववत्
दृष्टिसृष्टेर्दृष्टिसृष्टित्वेऽपि घटादेर्दृष्टिसृष्टित्वोपपत्तिः। Even when
the knowledge (of an object) is known, the object is not unknown. Likewise,
even when dRShTi-sRShTi (of an object) is established through
dRShTi-sRShTi, the dRShTi-sRShTi of the object, such as pot, is
substantiated. Brahmananda clarifies in his laghuchandrikA: यथा ज्ञानस्य
ज्ञेयत्वेऽपि तद्विषयस्य नाज्ञेयत्वं, तथा दृष्टिसृष्टेः
स्वसमसत्ताकदृष्टिसिद्धावपि तद्विषयघटादेरपि स्वसमसत्ताकदृष्टिरव्याहतेति
भावः। Just as when the knowledge is known, there is no unknown-ness of the
object (of the primary knowledge), so too when the dRShTi-sRShTi (of an
object) is established as belonging to the same order of reality as the
dRShTi (of that dRShTi-sRShTi), there is no contradiction with the dRShTi
of the object, such as pot, belonging to the same order of reality. In
essence, the prAtibhAsika reality of an object in DSV does not contradict
with the prAtibhAsika reality of the dRShTi of the object, nor with the
prAtibhAsika reality of the anuvyasAya dRShTi (knowledge of knowledge). All
the three are prAtibhAsika. Strictly speaking, anuvyavasAya is a misnomer
in DSV, since there is a further requirement that dRShTi and sRShTi should
be cotemporaneous (samakAlIna), while term anuvyavasAya as used in
nyAyashAstra is an *after* cognition. First the pot is cognized, and then
there is an *after* cognition (anuvyavasAya) of the form, "I know the pot."
However, in DSV, any cognition must be cotemporaneous with the object that
is the content of that cognition. In the case of anuvyavasAya, the primary
knowledge (this is a pot) is the object (content) of the anuvyavasAya.
Hence, both the primary knowledge (this is a pot) and the "anuvyavasAya"
must be cotemporaneous. What this means is, a) the object, say pot, b) its
cognition (this is a pot), and c) the cognition of b) (I know the pot) are
all cotemporaneous.

The next topic is about the important concept of pratyabhijnA
(recognition), which plays a crucial role in upanishadvAkyas, such as
"tattvamasi", and laukika examples, such as "so .ayaM devadattaH" (this is
that Devadutta).

Anand