[Advaita-l] Advaita Siddhi series 032 - sopAdhikatva nirAsah (part 1)

Venkatraghavan S agnimile at gmail.com
Wed Apr 11 01:42:54 EDT 2018


In the analysis of the presence of the second upAdhi,
स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं, in the paksha:

1) 'There is no cognition that is sublated by brahma jnAna.' should read 'There
is no cognition that is *unsublated* by brahma jnAna.'

2) Typo in the last word of the sentence - 'Thus there is nothing which is
स्वबाधकाबाध्यं, because the akhaNDAkAra vritti (impartite knowledge of
brahman) not only sublates the world and its cause, ignorance, it sublates
all effects of ignorance, including *itself.*'


On Tue, 10 Apr 2018, 20:43 Venkatraghavan S, <agnimile at gmail.com> wrote:

> Namaste
> After having discussed the paksha, sAdhya and hetu in the mithyAtva
> anumAna, we will now proceed to refute the various defects cited by the
> nyAyAmritakAra against this anumAna proposed by the advaitin.
> The first of these is sopAdhikatva - that is, the mithyAtva anumAna of the
> advaitin is flawed because it is afflicted by upAdhi, a disturbing
> condition. The anumAna uses the hetu to prove the presence of the sAdhya in
> the paksha - critical to this is the vyApti, or invariable concomitance,
> between the hetu and the sAdhya. When the anumAna is sopAdhikam (afflicted
> by upAdhi), it affects the anumAna in two ways:
> 1) It weakens the vyApti between the hetu and the sAdhya. If the inference
> has an upAdhi, then the hetu does not invariably prove the sAdhya. Even if
> the hetu is sometimes present, the sAdhya may be absent. For instance, the
> inference of smoke from the presence of fire (the reversal of the
> time-tested inference of fire from the presence of smoke) is affected by
> upAdhi of wet fuel. If fire is present, but the fuel is not wet, then no
> smoke will occur. Thus it is possible that fire (hetu) is present, but
> smoke (sAdhya) is absent, hence vyabhichAra. upAdhi introduces vyabhichAra
> to the inference.
> 2) The absence of the upAdhi in the paksha, leads to the absence of the
> sAdhya. Where wet fuel is absent, smoke is absent. Thus, once the
> pUrvapakshi proves that the anumAna has an upAdhi, all he needs to disprove
> the sAdhya is to prove the absence of the upAdhi.
> ननु - दृश्यत्वादिहेतव: सोपाधिका: The nyAyAmritakAra alleges that the
> mithyAtva anumAna proved by the various hetus such as knowability are
> sopAdhika, with upAdhi.
> He will argue that various upAdhis are present in the anumAna. As a
> reminder, upAdhi is that which is necessarily present with the sAdhya, but
> is not necessarily present with the hetu. The methodology that we can adopt
> to detect upAdhis is to look at the drShTAnta, the example, and the paksha,
> the case under question. Both the pUrvapakshi and the siddhAntin agree that
> the hetu (knowability) and sAdhya (mithyAtva) are present in the drShTAnta
> (shell-silver). They also agree that the hetu (knowability) is present in
> the paksha (the world). The item under debate is whether the sAdhya
> (mithyAtva) is present there or not.
> To prove that something is an upAdhi, we will need to examine whether it
> is present in the drShTAnta (which contains the sAdhya), but is absent in
> the paksha (which contains the hetu).
> तथाहि  - स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं, स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति
> निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं वा विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तं समव्याप्तम्, अतएव
> व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिमदुपाधि: -
> स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं - an object that appears due to
> defects that are not sublated by the cognition that is considered to
> sublate the object.
> drShTAnta: The shell appears like silver, because it is shiny like silver.
> When light reflects on the shell, it appears to glisten like silver,
> leading the viewer to think that silver is present. Thus, the defect that
> causes the shell-silver (स्वं) to appear (दोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं) is the
> shininess off the shell. The cognition that sublates shell-silver
> (स्वबाधकं) is said to be (अभिमतं) the knowledge "this is a shell". However,
> that cognition does not sublate the shininess of the shell
> (स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषं), which leads to the appearance of shell-silver.
> Thus स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं is present in the drShTAnta,
> along with the sAdhya of mithyAtva.
> paksha: The world (स्वं) appears, according to the advaitin, because of
> the ignorance of Brahman (दोषप्रयुक्तभानं). The cognition that sublates the
> world is said to be the knowledge "I am Brahman" (स्वबाधकाभिमतं). When this
> cognition arises, it not only sublates the world, but also the ignorance of
> Brahman (स्वबाधकाभिमतबाध्यदोषं), because of which the world appears. No
> defects remain after the rise of brahma jnAna. In other words,
> स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं is absent in the paksha, where the
> hetu of drShyatva is present.
> Therefore where the sAdhya is present (drShTAnta), the upAdhi is present,
> but it is not always present where the hetu is present (paksha). This meets
> the criterion for upAdhi.
> Let us take the next candidate - स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन
> विषयत्वं - being the object of  negation in the sublating cognition which
> cognition is itself unsublated by the sublating cognition of the object.
> drShTAnta: The sublating cognition of shell-silver (स्वं) is the cognition
> "this is not shell-silver" (स्वबाधकं). A cognition that is not sublated by
> the sublating cognition of shell-silver is "there is no shell-silver here"
> (स्वबाधकाबाध्यं). This is also the sublating cognition of shell-silver
> (स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं). The object of negation conveyed in such a cognition
> is the shell-silver (स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं). Thus,
> the drShTAnta is endowed with स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन
> विषयत्वं.
> paksha:  The sublating cognition of the world (स्वं) is brahma jnAna
> (स्वबाधकं). There is no cognition that is sublated by brahma jnAna. Thus
> there is nothing which is स्वबाधकाबाध्यं, because the akhaNDAkAra vritti
> (impartite knowledge of brahman) not only sublates the world and its cause,
> ignorance, it sublates all effects of ignorance, including itseld.
> Therefore, we can conclude that the paksha is not endowed
> with  स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं.
> Therefore, this too meets the test of an upAdhi.
> विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तं समव्याप्तम्, अतएव व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिमदुपाधि: - The two
> upAdhis are absent in that which is not the paksha (Brahman and asat) and
> therefore these are not merely exclusions the paksha. Therefore these
> upAdhis are samavyAptam - ie they are co-extensive with the sAdhya, equally
> pervade with the sAdhya. The upAdhi will always be present where the sAdhya
> is present, and where the upAdhi is absent, the sAdhya also will be absent.
> According to udayanAchArya, only that which is a samavyApta can be an
> upAdhi. For example, any inference (even a valid one) can be said to have
> 'being other than the paksha' (पक्षेतरं) as upAdhi. This merely excludes
> the paksha, and will necessarily be present in everything, except the
> paksha. The drShTAnta will not be the paksha, so 'being other than the
> paksha' will be present there, whereas the paksha itself cannot be 'other
> than the paksha'. If this is not remedied, no inference would be valid.
> Hence, according to udayanAchArya, only that which is samavyApta
> (co-extensive with the sAdhya), i.e, not merely a negation of the paksha,
> is fit to be an upAdhi. These two upAdhis are samavyApta. Where the sAdhya
> is present, they are present. Therefore, the absence of the upAdhi, will
> necessarily imply the absence of the sAdhya, which is the vyatireka vyApti
> (reversal of the syllogism, where the sAdhya is present, the upAdhi is
> present).
> The siddhikAra's responses to these arguments will be taken up in the next
> post.
> Originally posted on 10th April 2018.
> (Continued).

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