[Advaita-l] Advaita Siddhi series 033 - sopAdhikatva nirAsah (part 2)
agnimile at gmail.com
Mon Apr 30 09:55:44 EDT 2018
The previous post in this chapter can be found here:
The pUrvapakshi had argued previously that the inference establishing the
unreality of the world is afflicted by the problem of upAdhi, or disturbing
conditions. Two upAdhis were suggested:
1) स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं - an object that appears due to
defects that are not sublated by the cognition that is considered to
sublate the object.
2) स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं - being the object of
negation in the sublating cognition which cognition is itself unsublated by
the sublating cognition of the object.
The siddhikAra, in reply, says : - इति चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.
ब्रह्मज्ञानमात्रबाध्ये देहात्मैक्ये मिथ्याभूते साध्याव्यापकत्वात्, The
above two cannot be upAdhis because they do not pervade the sAdhya fully.
For something to be an upAdhi, every instance of the sAdhya must contain
the upAdhi. The notion that the body is the same as the Atma is accepted as
mithyA, erroneous by both us and the dvaitin. Thus it is part of the
sAdhya. However, both स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं
and स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं do not apply in the case
of taking the body to be the Atma. Why? Because it is sublated only due to
Let us see whether the first candidate for upAdhi,
स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं, is applicable to the notion of body
स्व= the notion that the body is the Atma
बाधकाभिमत = that which is considered to sublate it = ie brahma jnAna
अबाध्य = that which is unsublated by brahma jnAna. However, nothing is
unsublated by brahma jnAna.
Thus स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं is not applicable to the
erroneous notion of the body as Atma and therefore, cannot be upAdhi at all.
Let us consider the second candidate for upAdhi, स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति
स्व = the notion that the body is the Atma
बाधक = that which sublates it = ie brahma jnAna
अबाध्य = but is unsublated by it = However, nothing is unsublated by brahma
Therefore स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं does not apply to
the erroneous notion of the body as Atma and therefore, cannot be upAdhi
Both definitions do not have sAdhya vyApyatvam, and therefore are not
पक्षेतरत्वतुल्यत्वाच्च | "Being located anywhere except in a part of the
mountain" cannot be cited as an upAdhi for the inference of fire, because
all it does is exclude the instance of the paksha which contains the
sAdhya. By definition, such an item will technically fall under the scope
of upAdhi, but that is not taken as an upAdhi because no valid inference is
possible then. This is dismissed on the same grounds as pakshetara, or
"being other than the paksha". Similarly, the two upAdhis suggested by the
pUrvapakshi exclude only the paksha containing the sAdhya, and nothing
else, and thus cannot be taken as the upAdhi.
The pUrva pakshi says when a defect is already present in the inference,
this rule does not apply.
नच बाधोन्नीतत्वात् सोऽप्युपाधि:, Do not argue thus - As the inference is
already contradicted (by direct perception), these can serve as upAdhis.
बाधस्याग्रे निरसिष्यमाणत्वात् | Because, that the inference is not
contradicted by perception will be proven shortly.
अपिच यद्व्यतिरेकस्य साध्यव्यतिरेकसाधकत्वं तस्यैव साध्यव्यापकत्वम् ; इतरांशे
अनुकूलतर्काप्रसरात् | Moreover, only those qualifiers necessary to be
present in order to prove the absence of the sAdhya through the absence of
the upAdhi can serve as the upAdhi. The remaining qualifiers cited do not
have supporting logic which justifies their presence.
To explain, it is sufficient to say that दोषप्रयुक्तभानत्व is the upAdhi
(ie that which appears due to a defect) - the other qualifiers are
udayanAchArya in nyAya kusumAnjali cites an inference to prove the
existence of God. He says that the world must have a Creator, because it
happens to be created. क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकम्, कार्यत्वात्, घटवत्.
In response, the buddhist argues that the world is not created by anyone
with a body (unlike a pot, which is created by a potter, who has a body).
Thus he cites an upAdhi in udayana's inference - शरीरजन्यत्वं. This pot was
created by a person with a body.
The naiyyAyika argues that the qualifier 'by a body' is redundant. He could
simply say that the world is not created, and therefore cannot have a
Creator - क्षित्यादिकं नकर्तृजन्यम्, अजन्यत्वात्. Why was a redundant
qualifier "by someone with a body" added?
The siddhikAra argues that the upAdhi suggested by the nyAyAmritakAra
suffers from the same defect.
तथाच 'क्षित्यादिकं, न कर्तृजन्यम्, शरीराजन्यत्वा'दित्यत्र यथा
शरीरविशेषणवैयर्थ्यान्न शरीरजन्यत्वम् कर्तृजन्यत्वव्यापकम्,
Just like in the case of the inference "The world is not a product of a
Creator because it is not created by someone with a body", the qualifier
"with a body" is redundant; Therefore, being a product of a Creator does
not imply that the Creator has a body.
एवं 'वियदादिकं, न मिथ्या,
वैयर्थ्यात् स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं न मिथ्यात्वव्यापकम् |
Similarly in the pUrvapakshi's inference "the world is not unreal because
the defects that cause it to appear are not unsublated by the cognition
that is considered to sublate the world", there are redundant qualifiers.
To prove the absence of unreality (the sAdhya), the portion "unsublated by
the cognition that sublates it" is not necessary. It would have been
sufficient to say that "world is not unreal because it does not appear due
to any defects". Therefore, we can conclude that being unreal does not
imply that "the object appears due to defects unsublated by a cognition
considered to sublate it".
However, we cannot simply say "appearance due to defects" is an upAdhi
दोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वम् तु भवति साध्यव्यापकम्, तच्च साधनव्यापकमपीति नोपाधि: |
While "appearance due to defects" pervades every instance of mithyA, it
pervades every instance of the hetu, knowability, also. Therefore it cannot
be an upAdhi.
Either you will have svarUpa asiddhi or you will not have upAdhi.
दृश्यत्वादिनैव मिथ्यात्ववत्तस्यापि साधनात् | Like drishyatva itself is
unreal, "appearing due to defects" is also knowable, and thus is unreal
एवं द्वितीयोपाधावपि 'स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रती'ति विशेषणं व्यतिरेकसाधने
व्यर्थम् | Similarly, in the second (candidate for the) upAdhi, the
qualifier "for the sublating cognition which is itself unsublated by the
sublating cognition of the object" is a redundant qualifier. It would have
been sufficient to merely say "being the object of negation".
विशेष्यभागस्तु साध्यसाधनयोर्व्यापक इति नोपाधि: | However, (similarly) if
the qualified part alone is used (ie if only "being the object of negation"
is the upAdhi), then both the sAdhya (unreality) and sAdhana (knowability)
are pervaded by it, which means that it ends up as not an upAdhi.
The pUrvapakshi argues for another upAdhi
अतएवाधिष्ठानत्वाभिमतसमसत्ताकदोषवद्धेतुजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वमुपाधि: | For the
same reason, being the object of a cognition that is caused by something
containing a defect which is of the same order of reality as the substratum
can be an upAdhi.
The substratum of the shell silver is the shell, which is vyAvahArika. The
defect that causes the shell-silver to appear is the shininess of silver,
which is also vyAvahArika. Sense organs which perceive the shininess of the
shell cause one to perceive shell-silver.
However, the world is created by Ishvara, God. He can have no defects. The
world cannot be said to be created by a defective God. Therefore the world
is not created by a God (Brahman) which contains a defect which is of the
same order of reality as the world's substratum, Brahman.
अत्र च ब्रह्मणोऽपि बौद्धकल्पितदोषवद्धेतुजन्यक्षणिकत्वादिज्ञानविषयत्वात्
Here, the buddhist postulates an imaginary defect (momentariness) in
Brahman and says that such a defect causes the world. That defect is not of
the same order of reality as Brahman. Therefore, this upAdhi cannot be said
to exist in the world. To ensure that the paksha is fully pervaded by the
hetu, we added the qualifier "being of the same order of reality as the
substratum". Thus it is not a redundant qualifier here.
नतु पक्षमात्रव्यावृत्त्यर्थं, And not merely to exclude the paksha with a
view of proving that this is an upAdhi and thus disproving the advaitin.
अतो न पक्षेतरतुल्यतेत्यपास्तम् | Thus to claim that such an adjective is
equivalent to the qualifier "being other than the paksha" is not true.
The siddhikAra in reply argues:
ब्रह्मणीव ब्रह्मणि कल्पिते क्षणिकत्वादावपि मिथ्याभूते धर्मे
अधिष्ठानसमसत्ताकदोषवद्धेतुजन्यज्ञानाविषयत्वमुपाधे: साध्याव्याप्ते:, The
attribute of momentariness is imagined in Brahman. That is, it is unreal.
The cognition that perceives such an attribute in Brahman is not generated
by a cause that is of the same order of reality as the substratum, Brahman.
It is an erroneous cognition. Thus the attribute of momentariness which is
accepted as unreal (ie the sAdhya is present), does not contain the upAdhi.
Therefore this does not pervade every instance of the sAdhya and hence
cannot be termed an upAdhi.
व्यतिरेकसाधने व्यर्थविशेषणत्वस्योक्तत्वाच्च | Further, as argued
previously, it is sufficient to say that the world is not the object of a
cognition that is born from a defective source, the rest of the adjectives
The pUrvapakshi suggests other upAdhis:
नापि श्रुतितात्पर्याविषयत्वमुपाधि:, श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्वस्य
ब्रह्ममात्रनिष्ठतया तदाभावस्य साधनव्यापकत्वात् | "Not being the object of a
shruti sentence with ultimate import" cannot be an upAdhi too. The
pUrvapakshi argues that shell-silver is not the ultimate import of the
shruti, but the world is so, at least according to groups like the
pUrvamImAmsakas. Thus this can be an upAdhi.
The siddhikAra says no. The ultimate import of scripture is to only reveal
Brahman - thus everything knowable is not the object of shruti. Hence,
every aspect of the hetu is pervaded by this and therefore cannot be the
नापि प्रातिभासिकत्वमुपाधि: Being a prAtibhAsika object also cannot be the
तद्धि ब्रह्ममज्ञानेतरबाध्यत्वम्, तस्य च देहात्मैक्ये मिथ्याभुतेऽप्यसत्त्वेन
साध्याव्याप्ते:, Because being prAtibhAsika implies that it is sublated by
something other than brahmajnAna. This is not present in every instance of
the sAdhya - the notion of taking the body to be the Atma is not
prAtibhAsika, but is accepted as mithyA. Therefore prAtibhAsikatva does not
pervade every instance of the sAdhya and cannot be an upAdhi.
व्यतिरेके व्यर्थविशेषणत्वाच्च | If you want to use "being sublated by
anything other than brahmajnAna" as an upAdhi, it would be sufficient to
merely say "being sublated", the rest is redundant.
नापि प्रातिभासमात्रशरीरत्वमुपाधि:, Existence merely at the time of
cognition is not an upAdhi either.
दृष्टिसृष्टिपक्षे साधनव्यापकत्वात् In the view that creation is
perception, it pervades the hetu.
परेषामसिद्धेश्चेति | In the dvaita school on the other hand, the concept of
prAtibhAsika itself does not exist as according to them the shell-silver is
aLika / asat - ie non-existent. Thus arguing that such a thing is an upAdhi
would be impossible, as it is non-existent itself.
This concludes the chapter on the refutation of upAdhi in the inference on
the world's unreality.
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