[Advaita-l] Question on adhyaasa

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Subbuji
Thank you. I think the term adhyAsa, when talking of the 'attributes' of
the Atma being 'adhyasta' on anAtma, is epistemological rather ontological.

That is, it is an adhyAsa of the nature of अन्यस्यान्यधर्मावभासता
/ अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धि: , and not तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयं. The former
requires the prior acceptance of two things (tat and atat), which are only
possible because of the latter. Both concepts are indicated by the same
term, adhyAsa, but we have to carefully analyse which is being used where.

Regards,
Venkatraghavan



On Tue, 4 Dec 2018, 01:37 V Subrahmanian <v.subrahmanian at gmail.com wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Dec 4, 2018 at 5:44 AM Venkatraghavan S <agnimile at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Namaste,
>> A side question to consider in relation to anyonyAdhyAsa -
>>
>> If in the conception of adhyAsa, the adhyasta is mithyA and adhiShThAna
>> is satya, the non-self and its attributes can  be superimposed  on the
>> self, because the latter is real and can be the adhiShThAna for the
>> adhyAsa. However, anyonyAdhyAsa says that the nature of the self is
>> superimposed on the non-self too. How can this be true though? How can the
>> non-self, which is mithyA, be the adhiShThAna for the self's nature, which
>> is real?
>>
>> Therefore, is the term anyonyAdhyAsa not a mutual superimposition, but
>> merely a confusion of one for the other, brought about by the one
>> superimposition of the non-self on the self?
>>
>
> Very interesting, though. We see in the very opening sentence of the
> Adhyasa bhashya that there is an anyonyadhyasa:
> युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोर्विषयविषयिणोस्तमःप्रकाशवद्विरुद्धस्वभावयोरितरेतर
> भावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम् , तद्धर्माणामपिसुतरामितरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः — इत्यतः
> अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य
> तद्धर्माणां चाध्यासः तद्विपर्ययेणविषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च विषयेऽध्यासो मि
> थ्येति भवितुं युक्तम् । तथाप्यन्योन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकता
> मन्योन्यधर्मांश्चाध्यस्येतरेतराविवेकेनअत्यन्तविविक्तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोः
> मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य ‘अहमिदम्’ ‘ममेदम्’ इति नैसर्गिको
> ऽयं लोकव्यवहारः ॥
>
> There are two dharmi-s, one the vishayi and the other the vishaya. And
> there are two dharma-s too, of the vishayi and of the vishaya. So, First
> there is the dharmi adhyasa of taking the vishaya to be the vishayi and
> vice versa. And there is their dharma adhyasa too, the vishaya's dharma-s
> are adhyasta on the vishayi and the vishayi's dharma-s are adhyasta on the
> vishaya.
>
> Now, for your question:   //However, anyonyAdhyAsa says that the nature of
> the self is superimposed on the non-self too. How can this be true though?
> How can the non-self, which is mithyA, be the adhiShThAna for the self's
> nature, which is real? // the answer is:
>
> It is not that the //If in the conception of adhyAsa, the adhyasta is
> mithyA and adhiShThAna is satya//  That is, it is not that the adhyasta is
> mithya per se; it is mithya only in a locus that is not appropriate. Thus,
> the snake in a zoo or park is not mithya; only a snake apprehended in the
> locus rope is mithya. So too, the nature of the Self namely existence,
> consciousness, is not mithya but only when they are experienced in the
> wrong locus the not-self that they are mithya. Thus, the idea of
> anyonyadhyasa is error-free seen this way.
>
> Also, the existence and consciousness are by default everywhere. As taught
> in the BGB 2.16, in 'the pot is, the cloth is..', the is-ness, the dharma
> of the Atman/Brahman never undergoes vyabhichara, that is, they never
> become non-existent. But the pot, cloth, etc. in that statement is
> vyabhicchari, that is, in pot the cloth is absent and vice versa. Extending
> this, the anatma and its dharmas are vyabhichari and mithya and the Atma
> and its dharmas are avyabhichari and satyam. This is the essence of the BGB
> 2.16.
>
> regards
> subbu
>
>
>>
>> Thanks
>> Venkatraghavan
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>