[Advaita-l] Advaita Siddhi series 023 - drishyatva hetu upapattih (part 2)

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste,

We are presently examining drishyatva (knowability) as a hetu for
mithyAtva. Six alternative meanings were offered for the meaning of
knowability. The nyAyAmritakAra dismissed each meaning as unacceptable due
to various reasons. In the last post, the siddhikAra had taken up the
defence of the first of six meanings (vritti vyApyatva, being revealed by
thought).

The previous article can be reviewed here:
http://www.advaitasiddhi.com/blog/pariccheda-1-drishyatva-hetu-upapattih-part-1

Now another objection is raised with the first meaning for drishyatva -
vritti vyApyatva . The pUrvapakshi asks:

ननु - वेदान्तजन्याखण्डवृत्तेरुपहितविषयत्वे तदानीमुपाध्यन्तराभावेन तस्या
एवोपधायकत्वात् स्वविषयत्वापत्ति:, नचेष्टापत्ति:, शाब्दबोधे
शब्दानुपस्थिताभाननियमेन वृत्ते: शब्दानुपस्थिताया भानानुपपत्ते:,
The akhandAkAra vritti that is generated through vedAnta, objectifies the
conditioned Brahman and is itself the upAdhi for Brahman, as no other
upAdhi can be present then. It must be admitted that the vritti objectifies
itself. However, this is undesirable, for it is accepted that the meaning
arising in a knowledge generated by words is limited to what the words
reveal. That which is not mentioned by the words cannot be revealed by
them.

The opponent makes the argument that vedic scripture generates the
akhaNDAkAra vritti. This vritti destroys ignorance and its products,
therefore when it arises, no other upAdhi can exist, apart from itself. If
ignorance or any of its products exist, the akhaNDAkAra vritti will remove
them. That being so, no other upAdhi can exist once the akhaNDAkAra vritti
has performed its function. How is the vritti itself known? There being no
other upAdhi to reveal it, it must be assumed that the vritti reveals
itself. This is undesirable because it violates a basic principle of Indian
epistemology - the knowledge generated by words is limited to what the
words themselves reveal. It cannot exceed the meaning conveyed by the
words. When I see a cow, I automatically know its colour. However, when I
speak the words "here is a cow", the sentence does not reveal anything more
than the presence of a cow here. It does not reveal any aspect of the cow
(like its colour, etc.) other than that which is explicitly revealed. The
mahAvAkya "aham brahmAsmi" makes no reference to the akhaNDAkAra vritti
itself, it refers to the object denoted by the akhaNDAkAra vritti. However
the akhaNDAkAra vritti is itself known. How?

यथाकथन्चिदुपपत्तौ वा न ततोऽज्ञानतत्कार्ययोर्निवृत्ति: स्यात् ; If it is
said that the vritti is somehow revealed, then such a vritti will not be
able to remove ignorance and its products. Why?

अज्ञानतत्कार्याविषयकज्ञानस्यैव तदुभयनिवर्तकत्वात्, For, knowledge that can
remove ignorance and its products will necessarily not objectify ignorance
or its products.

अन्यथा "अहमज्ञ: अयं घट" इत्यादिज्ञानानामप्युपहितविषयकत्वेन
अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वप्रसङ्ग: - Otherwise, even knowledge that objectifies
ignorance or its products, such as "I am ignorant", or "This is a pot",
which ultimately objectifies brahman conditioned by upAdhi, would be
capable of removing ignorance and its products. That is an impossibility,
therefore, the revelation of akhaNDAkAra vritti is an impossibility too.

To this, the siddhikAra says
इति चेन्न ; if this is the argument, no.

वृत्ते: शाब्दवृत्तावानवभासमानाया एवोपधायकत्वाभ्युपगमात् | There is an
exception to the vritti for the rule in relation to knowledge generated by
words. Even if the words does not explicitly refer to knowledge generated
by them, the presence of the vritti is known.

तदुक्तं कल्पतरुकृद्भि: - "शुद्धं ब्रह्मेति विषयीकुर्वाणा वृत्ति:
स्वस्वेतरोपाधिनिवृत्तिहेतुरुदयते, स्वस्या अप्युपाधित्वाविशेषात् |
As it has been said by Sri amalAnanda in the kalpataru -  the vritti that
refers to shuddha Brahman (akhandAkAra vritti), even as it arises, it does
so destroying itself and other upAdhis, because it too is an upAdhi.

एवंच नानुपहितस्य विषयता; वृत्त्युपरागोऽत्र सत्तयोपयुज्यते, न भास्यतया
विषयकोटिप्रवेशेने"ति | Therefore, the unconditioned Brahman remains
unobjectified. Until the upAdhi was there, Brahman was conditioned, after
the vritti destroyed itself, what remains is unconditioned brahman. The
usefulness of the vritti is in its existence, not by it being revealed as
part of the objectified.

अयमभिप्राय: - यथा अज्ञानोपहितस्य साक्षित्वेऽपि नाज्ञानं साक्षिकोटौ
प्रविशति;  जडत्वात्, किन्तु साक्ष्यकोटावेव, एवं वृत्त्युपहितस्य विषयत्वेऽपि
न वृत्तिर्विषयकोटौ प्रविशति; This is the implied meaning - Similar to
ignorance, which conditions the sAkshi, the witness, but ignorance itself
is not part of the witness. Ignorance being inert, can only be part of the
witnessed, not part of the witness. In the same way, even though the vritti
conditions / objectifies Brahman, the vritti itself is not part of that
which is objectified.

स्वस्या: स्वविषयत्वानुपपत्ते: किन्तु स्वयमविषयोऽपी चैतन्यस्य विषयतां
सम्पादयतीति न काप्यनुपपत्ति: | Because if it was objectified, it would lead
to the charge of self-objectification. Therefore, even while it does not
objectify itself, the vritti is able to objectify consciousness. Therefore,
there is no inconsistency.

एतेन ज्ञानाज्ञानयोरेकविषयत्वं व्याख्यातम् | This proves that knowledge and
ignorance have the same object (consciousness). How?

अज्ञानमपि हि स्वोपधानदशायामेव ब्रह्म विषयीकरोति स्वानुपधानदशायां
स्वस्यैवाभावात् | Ignorance objectifies Brahman only so long as it is an
upAdhi of Brahman. When it is no longer an upAdhi, it does not exist itself.

तथाच ज्ञानाज्ञानयोरुभयोरप्युपाध्यविषयकत्वे सत्युपहितविषयकत्वात्
समानविषयकत्वमस्त्यैव | Therefore, both ignorance and the knowledge that
dispels it, objectify the upahita (conditioned Brahman), while not
objectifying the upAdhis (avidyA). Thus both have the same object - as a
result, knowledge is able to dispel ignorance.

The development of the argument thus far has been as follows: akhaNDAkAra
vritti objectifies Brahman. However, it does not objectify itself. That is,
it has Brahman has its object, but does not have the upAdhi as the object.
Similarly, ignorance has Brahman as its object, but it does not have itself
as an object. Again, Brahman is the object, upAdhi is not the object.
Therefore such a knowledge is capable of dispelling ignorance. The examples
given by the pUrvapakshi "I am ignorant", "This is a pot", etc. do not meet
this criterion.

एतेनोपाधिविषयज्ञानानामज्ञानानिवर्तकत्वं व्याख्यातम् |
अज्ञानस्योपाध्यविषयत्वेन समानविषयत्वाभावात् | समानविषयत्वेनैव
तयोर्निवर्त्यनिवर्तकभावात् | By this, the inability of certain types of
knowledge to remove ignorance is proven. In the examples given by the
opponent, both ignorance ("I am ignorant") or its products ("This is a
pot"), collectively, the upAdhis are objectified,  in addition to Brahman
(the upahita). However, primal ignorance objectifies Brahman (upahita) but
not itself (upAdhi). As the objects of these kinds of knowledge
(upahita+upAdhi) and ignorance (upahita only) are different, these kinds of
knowledge are unable to remove ignorance. Only if ignorance and knowledge
have the same object can there be a dispelled-dispeller relationship
between the two.

Until now, we have looked at knowability from the point of view of the
BhAmati. Now, we will look at knowability from the point of the other
sub-school within advaita, the panchapAdika vivaraNam.

********Option 1a - Knowability as revelation by a thought other than one
generated by words ********
वस्तुतस्तु - शब्दाजन्यवृत्तिविषयत्वमेव दृश्यत्वम् | Actually, knowability
is objectification by a vritti generated by anything except words.
Therefore, when though the veda refers to Brahman, such a Brahman is not
considered mithyA in this view, but absolutely real.

अन्यथा "शशविषाणम् तुच्छं" इत्यादिशब्दजन्यवृत्तिविषये तुच्छे व्यभिचारस्य
दुरुद्धरत्वात् | If this is not given as the definition, a sentence such as
"the hare's horn is absolutely non-existent", which happens to have the
hare's horn as its object will end up conferring knowability to the hare's
horn. However the hare's horn is not mithyA, but asat. Without this
clarification, it would lead to the defect of vyabhichAra.

एवंच सति शुद्धस्य वेदान्तजन्यवृत्तिविषयत्वेऽपि न व्यभिचार:, तुच्छशुद्धयो:
शब्दाजन्यवृत्तिविषयत्वानभ्युपगमात् | Further, even in this view, although
pure Brahman is the object of a vritti that is born from the study of
vedAnta, there is no vyabhichAra. Both pure Brahman and asat do not have
the characteristic of being objectified by a vritti generated by anything
except words.

********Option 1b - Knowability as revelation by attributive thought
********
यद्वा सप्रकारवृत्तिविषयत्वमेव दृश्यत्वम् | alternatively, knowability is
the object of a vritti which contains the attributes of the object.
When a person sees an object, say a pot, three aspects are revealed - the
pot (visheShya), its attributes (colour, visheShaNa) and the relation
(samsarga) between the pot and its colour. The knowledge of the pot
containing information of its colour is an example of saprakAraka jnAna.
Therefore knowability as an indicator of mithyAtva is on the basis of the
knowledge containing the attributes of the object. Brahman, being
attributeless is not knowable, according to this definition. Neither is
asat knowable - thus no knowledge of an asat object can contain the
attributes of a non-existent entity.

प्रकारश्च सोपाख्य: कश्चिद्धर्म: | prakAra here must be taken as a property
that is upAkhyA (later defined as that which appears to exist in the
object).

तेन निष्प्रकारकज्ञानविषयीभूते शुद्धे निरुपाख्यधर्मप्रकारकज्ञानविषयीभूते तु
तुच्छे न व्यभिचार: | There is no vyabhichAra in the case of pure brahman as
it is the object of non-attributive knowledge, and asat, as it is the
object of knowledge that cannot assign any existent attributes in the asat
object.

अभावत्वस्यापि सोपाख्यत्वादभावत्वप्रकारकज्ञानविषयीभूते अभावे न भागासिद्धि: |
Absence or abhAva is mithyA according to the advaitins. naiyyAyikas hold
that absence is a property that can be said to exist in a place (where the
advaitins would say "The pot is absent", the naiyyAyikas would say "The
pot's absence is present"). The pUrvapakshi may claim that absence is not
the object of knowledge, thus it is not mithyA and use that to impute a
defect of bhAgAsiddhi - ie a part of the paksha which should be mithyA
would end up as not. Such a charge would be untenable, because even under
the naiyyAyika's conception of absence, the knowledge of the pot's absence
would contain the attribute of absence and therefore fall under the
definition of knowability.

उपाख्या चास्तीति प्रतीतिविषयत्वादीत्यन्यत् | upAkhya is that which appears
to be exist.

Thus ends the defence of knowability as defined as vritti vyApyatvam, or
being revealed by a vritti.

(To be continued)

Regards,
Venkatraghavan