[Advaita-l] The Foundations of Adhyāsa - 4 (Minor arguments against the Pūrvapaksha)

[S Jayanarayanan]

 (Continued from previous post.)
 
 
The Brahma Sūtra states the Siddhānta, and Sankara begins with some slight disputations in opposition to the Pūrvapaksha.
 
  Brahma Sūtra 3.3.54:
  
  There is separation of the Self from the Body, because the existence of the Self does not depend
  on the existence of the Body, as in the case of Perception.
  
  Sankara's Commentary:
  
  The assertion that the Self is not separate from the Body cannot be maintained. The Self must be
  something separate from the Body, “because the existence of the Self does not depend on the
  existence of the Body”. For if from the circumstance that they are where the Body is, you conclude
  that the qualities of the Self are qualities of the Body, you also must conclude from the fact
  that they are not where the Body is that they are not qualities of the Body, because thereby they
  show themselves to be different in character from the qualities of the Body.
  • Now the qualities of the Body, such as form and so on, may be viewed as existing as long as the
  Body exists; life, movement, etc., on the other hand, do not exist even when the Body exists,
  i.e. in the state of death.
  • The qualities of the Body, again, such as form and so on, are perceived by others; not so the
  qualities of the Self, such as Consciousness, memory, and so on.
  • Moreover, we can indeed ascertain the presence of those latter qualities as long as the Body
  exists in the state of life, but we cannot ascertain their non-existence when the Body does not
  exist; for it is possible that even after this Body has died the qualities of the Self should
  continue to exist by passing over into another Body. This may be a mere hypothesis, but is
  sufficient to preclude the opposite opinion.
 
 
Before commencing the major part of The Argument (covered in the next post), Sankara responds to the Opponent with a few
initial points:
 
1. If the Body be identical with the Self, why is a dead Body not conscious? The very fact the word “dead” appears as a qualifier
for the Body implies that there was something that existed in the Body before death (i.e. associated with life) that rendered
it conscious.
2. The qualities of the Body such as its form (e.g. fat or tall) can be perceived by others, but the qualities that (the Opponent
agrees) belong to the conscious Self, such as Memory and Intelligence cannot be perceived by others. If the Body is the Self,
why is it that the former’s qualities (e.g. form) are perceived by others, but not the latter’s (e.g. Memory)?
3. Suppose we take up the last idea of the Opponent that the Self is an attribute of the Body. In the cases of objects possessing
attributes, e.g. the form of a particular tree, we see that the form can exist even if the tree is destroyed – maybe in another
tree which has the same form. Likewise, if the Self be an attribute of the Body, perhaps these attributes can exist even if
the Body is destroyed (i.e. it dies), by transferring the said attributes – to another Body? Sankara agrees that this is
somewhat “doubtful”, but it nevertheless provides food for thought – if the Body dies, who knows if the Self which is claimed
(by the Opponent) to be the attributes of the Body has not become the attributes of (i.e. taken up) another Body?
 
These cogent arguments make a strong preliminary case for the Self being different from the Body, but they are not as powerful as
The Argument that follows next.
 
 
(To be Continued)