[Advaita-l] Two Advaitic verses with a profound combined purport

Venkatraghavan S agnimile at gmail.com
Mon Apr 1 04:50:13 EDT 2019

Namaste Raghav ji,

One difference between the two statements is that the former is aikya
sAmAnAdhikaraNya, whereas the latter is bAdha sAmAnAdhikaraNya. In both
cases, there is only one entity after the sAmAnAdhikaraNya - Brahman - but
the sAmAnAdhikaraNya involved is different. The former is identity, the
latter is sublation.

If the intended meaning of the sentences are slightly different from the
above, one can say that the former statement is one of identity, whereas
the latter statement is one of non-difference. There is a difference
between the two - only one entity is possible for identity, whereas two
entities are involved in the non-difference in question. To explain:

The first statement is of identity  - the jIva is absolutely identical with
Brahman. As a relationship requires two entities, there can be no
relationship between jIva and Brahman. This is like saying A=A.

The second statement is of non-difference. The world is non-different from
its cause, Brahman. The relationship is one of AdhyAsika tAdAtmya - the
existence that is Brahman, is superimposed onto the world, and vice versa -
the world is superimposed upon Brahman. This is like saying A=B. A and B
are two entities which are being equated in one respect.

As Madhusudana Sarasvati argues in the advaita siddhi - अभेदे
कार्यकारणभावव्याहत्या कथंचिदपि भेदस्यावश्याभ्युपेयत्वात् | नच
'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्य' इत्यधिकरणविरोध: ; उपादानव्यतिरेकेनोपदेयं
नास्तीत्यस्यैव तदर्थत्वात् | - As identity would mean that the very notion
of cause and effect is contradicted, some difference between the two must
necessarily be accepted (when speaking of the non-difference of the effect
from the cause). Nor does it contradict the section "There is
non-difference, on account of texts that speak of origin etc" (from the
brahma sUtra), for the meaning of that section is only to teach that the
effect is non-existent apart from / in the absence of the cause.

Thus ananyatvam does not mean identity, it means the non-existence of the
effect independent of the cause (mithyAtva).

Finally, yes, both kAraNatva and kArya kAraNa ananyatva are spoken of only
from a vyAvahArika viewpoint.

Kind regards,

On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 12:17 PM Raghav Kumar Dwivedula <
raghavkumar00 at gmail.com> wrote:

> Thank you for the clarification. A little following up....I was examining
> the similarity/dissimilarity between the two statements
> jIva is Brahman
> jagat is Brahman
> Both statements have validity in different contexts; yet jIva and Jagat
> are not 'related to' Brahman in the same way. What would be the best way to
> look at the dissimilarity between the above two statements?
> Did you meant to say that the first statement is pAramArthikam while the
> second statement is from a vyAvahArika dRShTi, since it still retains
> kAraNatvam as upAdhi of Brahman ?
> Om
> Raghav
> On Sun 31 Mar, 2019, 7:34 PM Venkatraghavan S, <agnimile at gmail.com> wrote:
>> Namaste Raghav ji,
>> You had asked, "Like even a pot is clay being always non-separate from
>> its
>> substratum, can we make the statement jagat is (kAraNa-dRShtyA) brahman?"
>> Such a statement can be made only from a vyAvahArika standpoint, not from
>> pAramArthika dRShTi. The kAraNatva of Brahman is also a superimposition
>> upon Brahman. There is no pAramArthika kArya kAraNa bhAva between jagat and
>> Brahman.
>> In paramArtha, there is no world at all. Only Brahman exists.
>> Regards,
>> Venkatraghavan
>> On Tue, 26 Mar 2019, 14:03 Raghav Kumar Dwivedula via Advaita-l, <
>> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>>> Namaste Venkatraghavan ji
>>> Thank you for your lucid observations.
>>> A small follow-up question.
>>>  jagat is kAryam and Brahman is kAraNam, and applying
>>> karyakAraNa-ananyatva-nyAya, jagat is non-separate from its adhiSThAnam
>>> viz., brahman.  Like even a pot is clay being always non-separate from
>>> its
>>> substratum, can we make the statement jagat is (kAraNa-dRShtyA) brahman?
>>> (Since jagan-mithyAtvam and (kAryasya) jagatah kAraNa-ananyatvaM mean the
>>> same. )
>>> Also one more point is that jIva and brahman do not enjoy an
>>> adhiSTheya-adhiSThAna sambandha like pot and clay. Whereas jagat and
>>> Brahman enjoy such a relation. Therefore while it is true that all that
>>> exists is Brahman (moxam ekam varjayitvA sarvam anRtam), and both the
>>> statements 'jIva is Brahman' and 'jagat is Brahman' are tenable in the
>>> pAramArthika sense, still, we can never say jIva is  mithyA whereas we
>>> can
>>> definitely say jagat is mithyA , unlike the jIva.
>>> Om
>>> Raghav
>>> On Tue 26 Mar, 2019, 4:43 PM Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l, <
>>> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>>> > Namaste Bhaskar ji,
>>> >
>>> > You had asked:
>>> >
>>> > "When both these (jeeva and jagat) have both lakshya and lakshaNa
>>> aspects
>>> > and satyatvaM is already attributed to brahman in the very first
>>> statement
>>> > (brahma satya) why this partiality in jeeva-jagat analyzation and
>>> > concluding  that only jeeva is satyaM ( brahma = satya, jeeva = brahman
>>> > hence jeeva is satya) and jagat is mithyA??  Why we should not consider
>>> > upalakshya in both jeeva and jagat and declare satya or why we should
>>> not
>>> > consider upalakshaNa aspect in both jeeva and jagat and say mithyA??"
>>> >
>>> > There are two reasons. The first is grammatical, and the second is
>>> related
>>> > to the process of moksha.
>>> >
>>> > As you know, to arrive at any sentence meaning, we need to understand
>>> the
>>> > word meaning first. And in understanding any word, the first
>>> word-meaning
>>> > considered is the word's primary meaning, mukhyArtha.
>>> >
>>> > However, when the primary meaning of the words constituting the
>>> sentence
>>> > leads to an illogical connotation (anvaya anupapatti),  impeding the
>>> rise
>>> > of sentence meaning, or if the intended meaning of the sentence is lost
>>> > (tAtparya anupapatti), one resorts to lakshaNA and takes the
>>> lakshyArtha -
>>> > the secondary or implied meaning of the words. The lakshyArtha may
>>> only be
>>> > taken if taking the mukhyArtha is problematic.
>>> >
>>> > In the sentence jIvo brahmaiva nApara:, if we take primary meaning of
>>> the
>>> > word jIva, the sentence meaning conveying oneness of the jIva with
>>> Brahman
>>> > would be rendered logically impossible. Further the tAtparya of the
>>> > sentence to convey abheda of jIva with shuddha chaitanya - which is the
>>> > parama tAtparya of all shruti and the knowledge
>>> > of which is the cause of moksha - would be lost.
>>> >
>>> > Hence by necessity, we discard the primary meaning of the word jIva and
>>> > take the lakshyArtha - which is shuddha chaitanya.
>>> >
>>> > In the case of the sentence jaganmithyA, the jagat, whose mithyAtva is
>>> > intended to be conveyed in the sentence, is the primary meaning of the
>>> word
>>> > 'jagat'. There is no anvaya anupapatti and tAtparya anupapatti by
>>> taking
>>> > the primary meaning. Thus, there is no need to discard the primary
>>> meaning
>>> > of the word jagat and take up the secondary meaning.
>>> >
>>> > Thus we have grammatically valid reasons for taking the jIva to be the
>>> same
>>> > as chaitanya, whereas the world is taken in its primary sense - to be
>>> the
>>> > world that we interact with daily.
>>> >
>>> > Coming to the second reason. As you know, moksha in advaita is through
>>> > jnAna. Such a jnAna should be capable of removing the cause of samsAra
>>> for
>>> > it to be capable of leading to moksha. The cause of samsAra is
>>> ignorance of
>>> > the self - not knowing who one is really. That ignorance leads to the
>>> > imagined division of the self into an "I" and "it/they". The "I" is the
>>> > jIva, in the primary sense, and the "it" is the jagat, in the primary
>>> > sense.
>>> >
>>> > For ignorance, the cause of samsAra, to be removed by knowledge,
>>> knowledge
>>> > and ignorance must have the same object. The ignorance we are talking
>>> about
>>> > has only Brahman as its object - and nothing else. There is nothing
>>> else
>>> > other than Brahman to objectify. So, knowledge too must only have
>>> Brahman
>>> > as its object. It cannot have any other thing apart from Brahman as its
>>> > object, for it to be capable of removing ignorance. Thus, the
>>> knowledge of
>>> > "I" the jIva, where "I"/ the jIva contains any aspect of avidyA within
>>> it,
>>> > will be incapable of removing ignorance and conferring moksha. Hence,
>>> it is
>>> > said that in the jIva brahma analysis, jIva is stripped of every
>>> aspect of
>>> > ignorance. But how to do that?
>>> >
>>> > Merely wishing something away does not mean that it ceases to exist.
>>> > If ignorance
>>> > is real, how can one strip away ignorance from the jIva? The jIva is
>>> > everyday faced with the world which constantly reminds him of his
>>> ignorance
>>> > and limitation. So as long as the world is real, it limits the jIva,
>>> and
>>> > this limitation is real, and oneness with Brahman is impossible.
>>> >
>>> > Here is where jaganmithyAtva comes in. If the world is unreal, the
>>> > limitation of the jIva is unreal. Hence it is taught that ignorance,
>>> and
>>> > its projection, the world, do not exist. There is no multiplicity here
>>> > whatsoever, says the shruti. Like the appearance of the non-existent
>>> silver
>>> > in the shell and the dream world within the dream, it is proven that
>>> the
>>> > entire world is a mere appearance in Brahman.
>>> >
>>> > Until this unreality of the world is understood, the removal of
>>> limitation
>>> > and ignorance from the jIva is impossible.
>>> >
>>> > Therefore, the establishment of the mithyAtva of the world is a
>>> necessary
>>> > pre-condition for the establishment in oneness, which is the cause of
>>> > moksha. It is no surprise therefore that AchAryas in the advaita
>>> tradition
>>> > have taken great pains in establishing the mithyAtva of the world,
>>> prior to
>>> > arriving at jIva brahma aikya.
>>> >
>>> > It is for this reason that the very first sentence of the advaita
>>> siddhi is
>>> > this - तत्र अद्वैतसिद्धेर्द्वैतमिथ्यात्वसिद्धिपूर्वकत्वात्
>>> द्वैतमिथ्यात्मेव
>>> > प्रथममुपपादनीयम् ।
>>> >
>>> > Kind regards,
>>> > Venkatraghavan
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