[Advaita-l] Partlessness of Brahman and Maya

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Venkataraghavan ji,

interesting observations. However, I would like more clarity on the
following:-
//Why do you say that guNa-s are not nirguNa / niravayava? Even if pradhAna
is admitted to be sAvayava because of the presence of guNa-s, the guNa-s
themselves are admitted to be partless and attributeless by the pUrva
pakshi. That is why in the bhAShya, it is said यतः
सत्त्वरजस्तमसामप्येकैकस्य समानं निरवयवत्वम्.//

//the guNa-s themselves are admitted to be partless and attributeless by
the pUrva pakshi// Where exactly have gunas themselves been held as nirguNa
in the bhAshya? I understand guNas are admitted as niravayava, but how
nirguNa? What does it even mean to say guNa is nirguNa? Pl clarify here. It
is a very unsettling statement to me to say guNa are nirguNa.

Sudhanshu.



On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 4:29 PM Venkatraghavan S <agnimile at gmail.com> wrote:

> Namaste Sudhanshu ji,
>
> On Tue, 18 Jun 2019, 09:09 Sudhanshu Shekhar, <sudhanshu.iitk at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>> By corollary, it means TikAkAra thinks of something as niravayava AND
>> nirguNa which is not ParamAtman. I cannot think of any such thing. Neither
>> prAdhAna nor constituent guNa fit in the category of nirguNa+niravayava.
>>
>
> Why do you say that guNa-s are not nirguNa / niravayava? Even if pradhAna
> is admitted to be sAvayava because of the presence of guNa-s, the guNa-s
> themselves are admitted to be partless and attributeless by the pUrva
> pakshi. That is why in the bhAShya, it is said यतः
> सत्त्वरजस्तमसामप्येकैकस्य समानं निरवयवत्वम्.
>
> That is also the basis for the sUtra स्वपक्षदोषाच्च -  sAnkhya will have
> to admit that there is a niravayava, nirguNa entity in their system, which
> changes. When such a flaw exists in their own system, by the rules of
> debate, they cannot level it against the advaitin.
>
> However, the same charge does not apply to the advaitin, because of shruti
> and anubhava pramANa. The source for both Brahman's upAdAna kAraNatva on
> the one hand and its nirguNatva, niravayavatva, avyayatva, etc. on the
> other, is the shruti (श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्), and anubhava, i.e., the
> dream world conjured by the sleeper, (आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि),
>
> Interestingly, BhAshya also does not mention this either in 2.20 or 13.32.
>> It rests content with vyaya-abhAva through sAvayava-dwAra AND vyaya-abhAva
>> through guNa-dwAra.
>>
>> Yes, the bhAShya does not mention it there, because in that context
> shankarAchArya is commenting on the sloka-s from the perspective of
> advaita, not criticising the opponent's system as in स्वपक्षदोषाच्च. In any
> case, the TIkAkAra adds that reference in gItA 13.32 even when the
> bhAShyakAra does not do so, in order to address the charge similar to the
> one that was brought up in the कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति adhikaraNa.  That is the
> purpose of a sub-commentary - to expand upon the bhAShya and cover areas
> that are not mentioned explicitly.
>
>>
>> *Only problem is - AkAsha, which is triguNAtmaka i.e. comprises three
>> guNa - how can it be called as niravayava? That is to ask - are not
>> niravayavatva and saguNatva mutually contradictory. This assumes importance
>> in view of clear assertion of nirayavatva to AkAsha by BhAshyakAra in
>> 13.27. This also assumes importance in view of the fact that in BSB 2.1.29,
>> BhAshykAra did not object when opponent said PradhAna to be sAvayava owing
>> to its triguNAtmakatva. So question to be pondered is - how can niravayatva
>> of AkAsha and triguNAtmakatva of AkAsha co-exist.*
>>
>> Praveen ji, V Subramanian ji, Venkataraghavan ji. Pl share your views on
>> the last para.
>>
>
> The point about 13.27 is that AkAsha's nirvavayavatva is invoked not for
> its own sake, but to examine the relationship between the kshetra and
> kshetrajna. The question asked is how can the kshetrajna, who is partless
> like space, have a samyoga or samavAya association with the kshetra? The
> opponent's intention is not necessarily to establish that AkAsha is
> niravayava, but that the kshetrajna is, and therefore no relationship is
> possible between the kshetra and kshetrajna.
>
> However, the argument can be made that since the example is being used to
> convey such a meaning, it makes sense to conclude that the example first
> contains niravayavatvam. A counter-argument is that not every position by
> the opponent must be necessarily rejected in every instance. If that were
> the case, shankarAchArya should first have rejected the doubt on the basis
> that samavAya itself is an impossibility, so the charge that samavAya is
> not possible between the kshetrajna and kshetra is a futile one. He does
> not do so, because the point he wishes to make is a larger one - that their
> relationship is an AdhyAsika, superimposed one.
>
> In any case, whether bhAShyakAra intends to convey that AkAsha is partless
> through such a statement, or not, there is a case to be made both for
> AkAsha's sAvayavatvam and niravayavatvam. The former, because of the
> reasons you outlined. The latter, because it does not have parts or limbs.
> It is that much alone that, in my opinion, must be understood as
> necessarily present in AkAsha in order to raise the question that no
> samyoga or samavAya relationship is possible for the kshetrajna with the
> kshetra.
>
> Regards,
> Venkatraghavan
>
>>

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