[Advaita-l] No Parinama in Brahman says Shankara Bhagavatpada

[Venkatraghavan S]

Namaste Sudhanshu ji,
They are objects of perception to each other. shAnkara bhAshya to kArika
4.67 - जीवचित्ते उभे चित्तचैत्त्ये ते *अन्योन्यदृश्ये** इतरेतरगम्ये* ।
जीवादिविषयापेक्षं हि चित्तं नाम भवति । चित्तापेक्षं हि जीवादि दृश्यम् ।
अतस्ते अन्योन्यदृश्ये ।

"The fact of their being interdependent does not remove the implication of
change unless you say that hare's horn is an appearance to barren woman's
son. If you are saying that, then I am ok." Yes, that is what it amounts
to. One is jnAna adhyAsa, the other is artha adhyAsa. The sum total of
jnAna adhyAsa is the mind, the sum total of artha adhyAsa is the world.

"If that appearance is to some imaginary seer, that imaginary seer implies
a change by virtue of precedent imagination." It is a case of नैसर्गिकोऽयं
लोकव्यवहारः; the imaginary seer arises only because / when the imaginary
seen arises and vice versa.

Regards,
Venkatraghavan

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 12:44 PM Sudhanshu Shekhar <sudhanshu.iitk at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Venkataraghavan ji.
>
> There is some fundamental difference between asat and mithyA. MithyA
> implies appearance which is an impossibility in asat. There is mithyAtvam
> of mithya also. That is well understood. However, that is not the point
> here.
>
> //I would like to draw your attention to the fact that by "mithyA", what
> is meant is the absence of the thing in the locus of its appearance.// Yes.
> Of course.
>
> //You may argue that appearance involves change, but that change is in the
> seer, not in Brahman.// But that seer is equally an appearance. Seer and
> appearance are both imagination. Imagination implies change. So the problem
> remains unresolved.
>
> //Both (the world and the mind) are mutually dependent objects of
> perception. If you ask whether each exists independently, the answer is no.
> There is no independent proof of either's existence, because the knowledge
> of one is simply based on the knowledge of the other. //
> //Thus the world and its appearance (cognition), are both mutually
> dependent, neither of them real. The appearance of the world (and thus
> change, which is the basis of appearance), is merely a cognition which is
> as unreal as the world, the object of the cognition. Thus such a change is
> not in Brahman, but in the unreal mind / the world.//
>
> Let them be interdependent. The fact of their being interdependent does
> not remove the implication of change unless you say that hare's horn is an
> appearance to barren woman's son. If you are saying that, then I am ok.
> Anything else, the necessity of change surfaces. Without a fluctuation, a
> vibration, a movement, a change -- appearance cannot come unless the
> appearance is hare's horn and perceiver is barren woman's son. If that
> appearance is to some imaginary seer, that imaginary seer implies a change
> by virtue of precedent imagination.
>
> Sudhanshu.
>
>
>
>
>