[Advaita-l] No Parinama in Brahman says Shankara Bhagavatpada

[H S Chandramouli]

Namste Praveen Ji,

A quick initial response, covering  just one fundamental point (in my
view).

Reg  << True, but this was already covered with tucCha and mithyA. However,
he is not convinced as to how something non-existent can derive from
brahman as it is non-existent >>,

 Well. Certainly I expected this question, but from Sudhanshu Ji !!.  In
fact , in my view, that is the crux of the problem  being discussed. Well,
the answer is,  it is an axiom in logic that  only an “ Existing “ entity
can have any activity like appearence.  And not a nonexisting entity.  It
is a Declaration, to be accepted as  truth, without any questions. It is
based on this, and other axioms as well,   as foundation that the logical
structure is built. This position, that it is an axiom and not an
established truth in logic,  is what is completely overlooked in the
objection raised above.

Shruti ( as interpreted by Sri Bhagavatpada) does not accept such a
position. For a logical reasoning o this, one can see Advaita Sidhi, pp
138-141, consideration of second definition of mithyatva, reply to
objection that there is no difference between the lakshanas of asat and
mithya, both being nonexistent in all three periods of time. Of course, it
is not presented there in response to a query similar to the one raised
here nor in the form I have presented here. But it certainly  furnishes a
clue to our current question.

Regards

On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 12:56 PM Praveen R. Bhat <bhatpraveen at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Namaste Chandramouliji and others,
>
> On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 12:22 PM H S Chandramouli via Advaita-l <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>
>>
>> Following line of reasoning can be tried.
>>
>> J (jagat) and  A (asat) are two entities which are nonexistant. Third
>> Entity B (Brahman) which is Ever Existant, Changeless (Nitya) entity.
>> Difference between J and A is that J can and does   derive from B its
>> ability to Appear as an existant entity while A is unable to do so. This
>> by
>> its mere proximity to Brahman and not by any effort on the part of
>> Brahman.
>> ( Usual illustration of Sun and its activating effects  on entities in
>> Jagat with no effort on the part of Sun . Needs no repetition ).   All
>> changes are confined to  within Jagat. And none in Brahman. All
>> experiences
>> are for entities in Jagat, Again the ability to have experience derived by
>> concerned entities  from  Brahman, with no change or experience for
>> Brahman.
>>
>> This is the position of the Shruti.
>>
>
> True, but this was already covered with tucCha and mithyA. However, he is
> not convinced as to how something non-existent can derive from brahman as
> it is non-existent. If you say it is not tucCha kind of asat but mithyA
> asat that derives, then the question he will ask is if it is same as
> brahman or different from brahman just like Ramanujacharya kept on listing
> one after another Aropa till he exhausted at seven, all of them are
> answered with one anirvachanIya. This is a trap that logic has. One can't
> help it. At a certain point, no logic will work. This logic appears so
> strong that one may even doubt the Shruti; that is why we place Shruti as
> the highest and only pramANa for AtmajnAna. If we think logic counters
> Shruti, then that logic is wrong, it has no place in Shruti. If you ask for
> another logic, none exists, else Shruti would have given it. netI netI is
> the only resort. It is indeed mindboggling, but beyond that it is
> undoubtedly easy. It is said that Bhagavan Ramana Maharshi couldn't even
> see the difficulty that others face in such a straightforward jnAna! It is
> pratyakShavat pratyakSha/ aparokSha/ sAkShAt. How then can anumAna based on
> pratyakSha counter it!
>
> On a related note, a mandAdhikArI doesn't mean mandabuddhi adhikArI, since
> the person is very sharp to use logic. He is manda because he will crawl
> for answers unless shraddhA brings in blessings for the question to be
> dropped. Among others who don't have questions are of three types:
> --one who doesn't have questions as all questions are seen through as
> bogus; the questions are refuted as mithyA as and when they come up as one
> doesn't slip from tattva; they are uttama or tending to uttama.
> --one who has no questions, but as soon as one hears someone else's
> question that one has not considered himself, stands answered with what one
> has already learnt; they become madhyama.
> --one who has no questions, since manana is insufficient and others'
> questions become his own and he starts doubting all his knowledge and
> perhaps even the path itself, losing any mandAdhikAra also he has. More
> sAdhana is needed for chittashuddhi and sharpness of buddhi. A mandAdhikArI
> is better since at least he has his own questions.
>
> gurupAdukAbhyAm,
> --Praveen R. Bhat
> /* येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति, तं केन विजानीयात्। Through what should one know
> That owing to which all this is known! [Br.Up. 4.5.15] */
>