[Advaita-l] [advaitin] Yet another Mahavakya in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad

Venkatraghavan S agnimile at gmail.com
Mon Oct 25 14:33:35 EDT 2021


Bhaskar ji, I believe I replied to your email, which was from the advaitin
group.

Regards,
Venkatraghavan

On Mon, 25 Oct 2021, 13:02 'Bhaskar YR' via advaitin, <
advaitin at googlegroups.com> wrote:

> praNAms
>
> Hare Krishna
>
>
>
> I am not able to understand this googlegroups.com vyavahAra 😊 I have
> received Sri Vinod prabhuji’s mail in my inbox whereas not received the
> mail of Sri Venkataraaghavan prabhuji !!!  Sri Venkat prabhuji have you
> written your mail addressing Advaita-L group or Advaitin group??  I think I
> am not getting any mails from Advaita-L group.
>
>
>
> Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
>
> bhaskar
>
>
>
> *From:* advaitin at googlegroups.com <advaitin at googlegroups.com> *On Behalf
> Of *Vinodh
> *Sent:* Monday, October 25, 2021 5:16 PM
> *To:* Advaitin <advaitin at googlegroups.com>; A discussion group for
> Advaita Vedanta <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [advaitin] Yet another Mahavakya in the Brihadaranyaka
> Upanishad
>
>
>
> *CAUTION:* This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not
> click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know
> the content is safe.
>
>
>
> Sri Venkatraghavan ji and Sri Prasad ji, thank you for the clarification
> that knowing does not involving any desire (or will) of the knower. It
> seems to make sense, especially with Dayanand Saraswathi's examples. In the
> video, he points to a cup and says "this is a paper cup". That this is a
> paper cup does not depend on the will or desire of the knower. As Sri
> Venkatraghavan ji had also mentioned earlier in this thread, Shankaracharya
> has made a similar observation about knowing:
>
> ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यम् । प्रमाणं च यथाभूतवस्तुविषयम् ।
>
> Whereas knowledge is born from a pramANa. pramANa has as its object, the
> thing as it is.
>
> अतो ज्ञानं कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुमशक्यम् ।
>
> Therefore it is not possible for there to be a choice with regard to
> something being known, unknown, or known in a different way.
>
> केवलं वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत् ; न चोदनातन्त्रम् , नापि पुरुषतन्त्रम् ;
>
> It is subject only to the thing. It is neither subject to an injunction,
> nor is it subject to a person's will.
>
> As sravana (which is a form of knowing through hearing) is not dependent
> on the will (or desire) of the listener, it appears therefore that it is
> not similar to manana and nididhyasana, which do require the person to
> perform a particular action through his will.
>
>
>
> Moreover, the last email by Sri Venkatraghavan ji gives a very nice
> analogy of manana and nididhyasana being angas (parts or supporting causes)
> of the main cause of Brahmajnana, which is sravanam (which is the angi). In
> this way, it does appear that manana and nididhyasana, while required (in
> most cases) for the fruition of sravana into Brahmajnana, are not
> necessarily in the same category as sravana.
>
>
>
> However, in this context, another question arises. If knowing does not
> involve any desire of the knower, why does the Brahma Sutra start by
> talking about the desire to know Brahman (brahma-jijnasa)? How does one
> interpret this given that Acharya says "ज्ञानं कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा
> कर्तुमशक्यम् ।" (it is not possible for there to be a choice with regard
> to something being known, unknown, or known in a different way)?
>
>
>
> Namaskaram 🙏
>
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 25, 2021 at 3:29 PM Venkatraghavan S <agnimile at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Namaste Bhaskar ji,
>
>
>
> Agreed, the requirement for manana and nididhyAsana is not being denied.
> If you recall, the discussion started off with what constitutes a mahAvAkya
> - the answer to this was: a sentence that reveals the identity of brahman
> with jIva is a mahAvAkya. This then moved to whether the sentence reveals
> the identity or whether a meditation on the sentence reveals it.
> Thereafter, the central thrust behind the discussion became whether
> shravaNam is the primary cause of liberation, or is it manana and
> nididhyAsana?
>
>
>
> It is in this context that it was said that the mahAvAkya, being shabda
> pramANam, is the pramAkaraNam, the primary cause for the valid cognition of
> Brahman, and mananam and nididhyAsanam are supportive causes. Hence, in
> response to Raghav ji yesterday, it was said "Even if aparoksha jnAna
> arises following manana and nididhyAsana, it is the mahAvAkya pramANa that
> gives rise to it, the other two are supporting causes."
>
>
>
> This particular reference, bRhadAraNyaka upaniShad 2.4.5 is relevant to
> the discussion and thank you very much for bringing it to light. The
> Anandagiri TIkA to this bhAShya is particularly illuminating and pertinent
> to our discussion. Pasting it here for reference:
>
>
>
> श्रवणस्य प्रमाणविचारत्वेन प्रधानत्वादङ्गित्वं मनननिदिध्यासनयोस्तु
> तत्कार्यप्रतिबन्धप्रध्वंसित्वादङ्गत्वमित्यङ्गाङ्गिभावेन यदा
> श्रवणादीन्यसकृदनुष्ठानेन समुच्चितानि तदा सामग्रीपौष्कल्यात्तत्त्वज्ञानं
> फलशिरस्कं सिध्यति । मननाद्यभावे श्रवणमात्रेण नैव तदुत्पद्यते । मननादिना
> प्रतिबन्धाप्रध्वंसे वाक्यस्य फलवज्ज्ञानजनकत्वायोगादित्यर्थः ।
>
> shravaNa, being an enquiry into the pramANa (shruti), it is the pradhAna
> (the primary) and hence the angi (the main), whereas as manana and
> nididhyAsana serve to destroy the obstacles in its (shravaNam's) result
> (being brahmapramA, the valid cognition of Brahman), are anga. Thus, as
> they have an anga-angi, part-whole relationship, when shravaNa etc (manana,
> nididhyAsana) are performed multiple times in unison, the strengthening of
> the causative factors (for the rise of brahmajnAna) leads to the attainment
> of the highest result. In the absence of manana, and only through
> shravaNam, that cannot happen. What this means is that in the absence of
> the destruction of the obstacles (to bramajnAna) through manana etc, the
> sentence will not produce a fruitful cognition.
>
>
>
> To summarise, the necessity of manana and nididhyAsana is not denied, but
> the primary means for brahmajnAna is the pramANa, being the shruti. The
> reason for this is because it is the shruti that is revealing a hitherto
> unknown truth - that the jIva and Brahman are identical. The anadhigatatva,
> or the quality of revealing something otherwise unknown, is present in
> shruti janya jnAna. In the absence of the shruti, no amount of manana and
> nididhyAsana can reveal that truth.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Venkatraghavan
>
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 25, 2021 at 9:17 AM 'Bhaskar YR' via advaitin <
> advaitin at googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
> praNAms Sri Venkataraghavan prabhuji
>
> Hare Krishna
>
>
>
> *the hearing of the texts (sravana), thinking about their meaning
> (manana), and meditation on them (nididhyasana).* *This leads to
> intuition." *
>
>
>
> and
>
>
>
> "*Mere hearing does not result in full comprehension of realization of
> Brahman*."
>
>
>
>    - Perhaps you can look into the bhAshya vAkya in bruhadAraNyaka 2-4-5,
>    nAnyathA sharvaNa mAtreNa….etc. The order of shravaNa, mananaM and
>    nidhidhyAsaM also you can find here.  nidhidhyAsitavyaH nishchayena
>    dhyAtavyaH etc.  But I don’t think, irrespective of adhikAra bedha,  this
>    vAkhya making mananaM and nidhidhyAsanam as mandatory in all cases after
>    shrvaNa during the Atma vijnAna sAdhana.
>
> Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
>
> bhaskar
>
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