[Advaita-l] Avachheda Vaada

[H S Chandramouli]

Namaste.

Reg   << Sounds like they accept that the vRtti is capable of reflecting
consciousness, but do not accord that reflection a central role in the
cognitive process >>,

The reflection is indeed accorded a central role. But as an object of
cognition, not as the Subject of cognition. << अपि तु अन्तःकरणस्यैव
वृत्तिभेदो ब्रह्मविषयः । >>  << api tu antaHkaraNasyaiva vRRittibhedo
brahmaviShayaH | >>  << it is a particular psychosis (vritti) of the
internal organ itself, having Brahman for its content >>.   That appears to
me to be a fundamental difference between the Bhamati and Vivarana Schools.

Also it appears to me that such reflection of Brahman in vritti is admitted
in Bhamati only  in respect of the akhandakara vritti. And not in any other
vrittis. This also is a major difference between the two Schools and could
be considered as Bhamati School’s refutation of a main feature  of
 Pratibimba vAda.

Regards
Chandramouli

On Wed, Sep 8, 2021 at 2:04 PM H S Chandramouli <hschandramouli at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Namaste.
>
> The following may be of interest in the current context. It is an extract
> from the Introduction portion penned by Sri Anantakrishna Shastri Ji to his
> text Shatabhushani.
>
> Quote << The Bhamati, on the other hand, holds that Brahman associated
> with Avidya (ie., Upahita Brahman) is the primary import of the expression
> “Brahman”. The unassociated pure Absolute ( Suddha Brahman ) – according to
> Vachaspati, is not the object of Vedantic enquiry (Jignasya) (Vide,
> jadatvanirukti section of the Advaita Siddhi).
>
> Now, a very interesting question is raised by Vedanta Desika in this
> connection, to which the attention of all serious students of Indian
> Philosophy is earnestly solicited.
>
> If the object of Vedantic enquiry is the Upahita Brahman, then it may very
> reasonably be asked – how can knowledge of this Upahita Brahman (which in
> its own nature is false) lead a person to final emancipation (Moksha) ?
>
> In solving this puzzle, Vachaspati’s position has got to be very carefully
> analyzed first. Brahman, when associated with Avidya, becomes the Universal
> Cause. Again, when the same Brahman is associated with Vidya or Vritti
> (This term is elaborated in Note below), it becomes the object of Vedantic
> enquiry. Now, when Vedantic knowledge removes the Avidya together with the
> products of Avidya (prapancha), the Universal Cause melts away. Thereafter,
> there remains only for an instant, the Absolute associatd with Vidya. But
> this Vidya, too, having its root in Avidya, cannot continue after its root
> is once cut off. So, after the destruction of Avidya, Vidya also
> automatically ceases to exist, like fire becoming extinct on the complete
> consumption of the fuel. So, after the self-destruction of Vidya,
> self-luminous Pure Brahman alone exists. Thus the knowledge of the Upahita
> Brahman even brings in emancipation indirectly through the destruction of
> Avidya. In conclusion, it may be pointed out that in the opinion of
> Vachaspati Tattvajnana is the knowledge which removes the veil of
> ignorance, or, in other words, it is the knowledge of the object which is
> covered up by ignorance. It is absolutely immaterial whether that object is
> true or false. >> Unquote
>
> Note :: Vritti is mind-modification. The internal organ (antahkarana),
> shooting out through the door-like sense-organs (Jnanendriyas, eg eye)
> assumes the shape of external object (eg jar) and the object is perceived.
> The modification of the mind into the form of the external object is
> technically called Vritti. When the mind assumes the form of Brahman, the
> Vritti, formed thereby, is technically known as Brahmakara Vritti or
> Akhandakara Vritti. This is also called Vidya, Brahmavidya or Brahma Jnana).
> Regards
>
> On Wed, Sep 8, 2021 at 4:15 AM Venkatraghavan S <agnimile at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Namaste Subbuji,
>> What the kalpatarukAra is saying in that sentence is that in the case of
>> brahma sAkshAtkAra, the reflection of consciousness in the vRtti is not
>> because Brahman is the object of the vRtti (ब्रह्मविषयप्रयुक्तं
>> चैतन्यप्रतिबिम्बितत्वं), for that reflection happens even in the case of
>> the cognition of pots also (घटादिवृत्तिष्वपि साम्यात्) - where the
>> reflection of Brahman (consciousness) in the ghaTavRtti is present, even
>> though Brahman is not the object of the ghaTavRtti, rather the reflection
>> of consciousness in the thought happens naturally (किं तु स्वतः).
>>
>> With respect to how the akhaNDAkAra vRtti objectifies Brahman, as the
>> kalpatarukAra says वृत्त्युपरागोऽत्र सत्तयोपयुज्यते न प्रतिभास्यतया - the
>> objectification of Brahman by the vRtti is merely by its presence, not by
>> the vRtti being objectified in the cognition of Brahman.
>>
>> The siddhikAra discusses this very sentence in the advaita siddhi chapter
>> on dRshyatvam:
>>
>> अयमभिप्राय: - यथा अज्ञानोपहितस्य साक्षित्वेऽपि नाज्ञानं साक्षिकोटौ
>> प्रविशति; जडत्वात्, किन्तु साक्ष्यकोटावेव,
>> Just like even though the sAkshi is ajnAna upahita, ajnAna does not
>> become part of the witness (sAkshi), because being inert, it only
>> belongs to the category of the witnessed (sAkshya).
>>
>> एवं वृत्त्युपहितस्य विषयत्वेऽपि न वृत्तिर्विषयकोटौ प्रविशति; स्वस्या:
>> स्वविषयत्वानुपपत्ते:, किन्तु स्वयमविषयोऽपि चैतन्यस्य विषयतां सम्पादयतीति
>> न काप्यनुपपत्ति: |
>> Similarly, even though vritti upahita Brahman is objectified by the
>> vritti, the vritti itself does not become part of the viShaya koTi, that
>> which is objectified, for if it did, then it would be open to the charge
>> of objectifying itself. Rather while remaining unobjectified itself, it is
>> able to objectify consciousness. Hence, there is no untenability.
>>
>> That is, in the bhAmati / kalpataru paksha, the akhaNDAkAra vRtti's
>> ability to remove ajnAna is on account of both ajnAna and jnAna having the
>> same object - namely being उपाध्यविषयकत्वे सत्युपहितविषयकत्वात् - having
>> the upahita as the object while having no element of the upAdhi as the
>> object. Because they are samAnaviShayakam, only such a jnAna, and nothing
>> else, is capable of ajnAna nivRtti.
>>
>> Regards
>> Venkatraghavan
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, 7 Sep 2021, 18:48 V Subrahmanian, <v.subrahmanian at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Thank you Venkat ji for such a detailed and painstaking explanation.
>>>
>>> It looks like this statement of the Kalpataru //न ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारस्य
>>> ब्रह्मविषयप्रयुक्तं चैतन्यप्रतिबिम्बितत्वं, किं तु स्वतः, घटादिवृत्तिष्वपि
>>> साम्यात् - The reflection of consciousness (in the vRtti) during brahma
>>> sAkshAtkAra is not a result of Brahman being the object of the vRtti,
>>> rather it is natural, like in the case of the vRtti-s of pots etc too.
>>> चैतन्यं च ब्रह्मेति स्वाभाविको वृत्तेस्तत्सम्बन्ध इत्यर्थः
>>> The intended meaning is that consciousness, being Brahman, the
>>> association of it with vRtti-s is intrinsic / natural.//
>>>
>>> is a restatement of the Panchadashi concept of Vrttivyapti and
>>> phalavyapti. While both ghata perception and Brahman perception require the
>>> chit pratibimbita vritti to reveal the object, the ghata jnanam requires
>>> phala vyapti too to illuminate the ghata which is not svaprakasha being
>>> jada, the Brahma sakshatkara does not require the chit illumination
>>> separately as Brahman is svaprakasha. Hence kevala chit pratibimbita vritti
>>> is sufficient.
>>>
>>> If this understanding is correct, then the Vivarana concept could be
>>> seen to be admissible to the Bhamati prasthana, being avirodha.
>>>
>>> regards
>>> subbu
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>