[Advaita-l] ​Re: [advaitin] A talk on avidyA by Manjushree

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

I took up with Smt. Manjushree Hegde and she was kind enough to clarify as
follows: ""Let me reframe Jaishankarji’s argument for clarity’s sake:
Very clearly, Jaishankarji’s points out that every vyākhyānakāra argues
that mūlāvidyā exists as long as the world is perceptible, and does not
exist ultimately (pāramārthika-standpoint). No vyākhyānakāra argues that it
exists ultimately (for this would negate “advaita”).
Jaishankarji also pointed out that the world appears for a jīvan-mukta too
– he eats, sleeps, and moves like any ordinary person; he addresses the
questions of sādhaka-s, and sometimes, his body suffers diseases like
cancer, etc. According to the vyākhyānakāra-s, the only way to account for
the jivanmukta who exists in this world, and participates in it, is
mūlāvidyā.
Thus, according to the vyākhyānakāra-s, mūlāvidyā (the cause) shares the
nature of the world (the effect) – it is non-existent (ultimately); but as
long as the world appears, its operation is in play.
I hope I have not misrepresented the pūrvapakṣa here? If I have, then I’m
entirely willing to correct myself.
Let me articulate Swamiiji’s position.
According to the above arguments, we must accept that a jivanmukta – while
he understands that the world is only a play — operates in it on the basis
of mūlāvidyā. It is only after videhamukti that the “play” entirely
disappears. What is the pramāṇa for the statement that the play will,
indeed, disappear after videhamukti? Only śruti.
And this, right here, is Swamiji’s problem. When/if we accept mūlāvidyā, we
cannot rely on anubhava pramāṇa (whose anubhava, what pramāṇa?); we must
resort to “argument from authority”— śruti pramāṇa. And this cuts across
the very foundation of advaita-vedānta, and reduces it to another school of
philosophy that demands faith/belief for it to be true.
Advaita vedānta stands on anubhava-pramāṇa, it does not require śruti for
it to be true. Its sanctity lies in the fact that it is verifiable here&now.
If mūlāvidyā exists in the three states of jāgrat, svapna and suṣupti— and
it also exists in a jivanmukta — and only does not exist only in
videhamukti, how is this verifiable in my experience?
---------------------
When the vyākhyānakāra argues for a mūlāvidyā that exists in suṣupti and in
a jivanmukta, on what basis is this statement made? On indriyānubhava.
Which belongs to the field of avidyā. Conclusions that are drawn using
faulty instruments can only be faulty.
I’d be happy to elaborate on this point if it is required.
-----------------------
I agree that vyākhyānakāra-s rely on adhyāropāpavāda to elucidate their
points— but the application of the method is carried out differently by
them.
Very beautifully, Jaishankarji pointed out that the vyākhyānakāra-s teach
that kārya-kāraṇa is only an adhyāropa, and ultimately (from the
pāramārthika-standpoint), the labels stand negated, and this is apavāda.
Yes, for the vyākhyānakāra-s, the “apavāda” occurs only in videhamukti. The
adhyāropa is ontologically accepted until such a moment occurs. This
understanding is vastly different from adhyāropāpavāda as a strictly
pedagogical technique that by śruti is used to draw the sādhaka-s attention
to his ever-existing anubhava. Swamiji takes the latter position, and the
traditional advaitins take the former.
I could have perhaps articulated this better in my talk. My apologies."

On Mon, Nov 21, 2022 at 2:16 PM Jaishankar Narayanan via Advaita-l <
advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:

> Dear  Michael Chandra Cohen ji,
>
> You ask - what is Mithya?
>
> Mithya / Asat / Anrtam - these are all ontological terms used by Advaitins
> and Bhasyakara. For a definition see BG Bhashya 2.16
> न असतः अविद्यमानस्य शीतोष्णादेः सकारणस्य न विद्यते नास्ति भावो भवनम्
> अस्तिता ॥ न हि शीतोष्णादि सकारणं प्रमाणैर्निरूप्यमाणं वस्तुसद्भवति । विकारो
> हि सः, विकारश्च व्यभिचरति । यथा घटादिसंस्थानं चक्षुषा निरूप्यमाणं
> मृद्व्यतिरेकेणानुपलब्धेरसत् , तथा सर्वो विकारः कारणव्यतिरेकेणानुपलब्धेरसन्
> । जन्मप्रध्वंसाभ्यां प्रागूर्ध्वं च अनुपलब्धेः कार्यस्य घटादेः
> मृदादिकारणस्य च तत्कारणव्यतिरेकेणानुपलब्धेरसत्त्वम् ॥
>
> Also Taittiriya Bhasya 2.1
> सत्यमिति यद्रूपेण यन्निश्चितं तद्रूपं न व्यभिचरति, तत्सत्यम् । यद्रूपेण
> यन्निश्चितं तद्रूपं व्यभिचरति, तदनृतमित्युच्यते । अतो विकारोऽनृतम् , ‘
> वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्’ (छा. उ. ६ । १ । ४) एवं सदेव
> सत्यमित्यवधारणात् ।
>
> To summarise - that which is a modification, an effect, available for sense
> perception, not separately available from its cause, has beginning (not
> available before) and end (not available after), that which after being
> ascertained in one form, changes from that - is mithya, asat , anrtam.
>
> Now the world is mithya, asat, anrtam and its cause avidya is also of the
> same nature - mithya, asat, anrtam. It cannot be a totally non-existent
> jnaana-abhaava. So Vedanta Sara is correct in identfying Maya / Avidya as
> kinchit bhavarupa - as real and as existent as the mithya / asat world.
> Obviously it has no existence from a Paaramaartika drishti / standpoint.
> Does avidya as an upadhi not create dvaita? Shankara has already answered
> this in Br. Up Bh 3.5.1
> नामरूपोपाध्यस्तित्वे ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ (छा. उ. ६ । २ । १) ‘नेह नानास्ति
> किञ्चन’ (बृ. उ. ४ । ४ । १९) इति श्रुतयो विरुध्येरन्निति चेत् — न,
> सलिलफेनदृष्टान्तेन परिहृतत्वात् मृदादिदृष्टान्तैश्च ;
>
> The essence of my quotation from 3.5.1 bhashya is - The mithya vyavahaara
> (worldly transactions) due to differentiation is there for those who accept
> things as different from brahman (ignorant) and for those who do not (the
> jnaani). Now according to Swamiji if knowledge destroys vyakta-adhyaasa
> (not just ajnaana) then how can he account for statements like these? How
> does he even explain Jeevan-mukti?
>
> How can a non-existent thing be a pedagogical tool? It makes immense sense
> to say moola-avidya is as real as the world appearance and use it as a
> pedagogical tool (adhyaaropa) rather than proposing an abhaava. As the
> world is negated, moola-avidya also is destroyed / negated along with it as
> mithya / anrtam / asat.
>
> Why ajnaana cannot be jnaana-abhaava has been discussed in Swaaraajya
> Siddhi and in Samkshepashaareeraka. I may have to refer the books to get
> the exact verses.
>
> with love and prayers,
> Jaishankar
>
> Message: 8
> > Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2022 07:25:49 -0500
> > From: Michael Chandra Cohen <michaelchandra108 at gmail.com>
> > To: A discussion group for Advaita Vedanta
> >         <advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
> > Subject: Re: [Advaita-l] [advaitin] A talk on avidyA by Manjushree
> > Message-ID:
> >         <CAAz9PvFjjhwR33SJzEhejMZbJbBnjDsO4-nf9-=
> > xaKwSYMCZ8g at mail.gmail.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
> >
> > Namaste Jaishankara Narayan, thank you for your reflections in reply. I
> > have taken the liberty of sharing your response on Facebook and will, in
> > turn, share here worthy responses.
> >
> > To  your first point, what is mithya? Vedanta Sara is
> > staunchly mulAvidyAvada. .The text lists 5 definitions of maya/avidya all
> > of which denote some kind of positive, bhavarupa, existent.
> > To your second point, a) please translate Brbh 3.5.1. -- b) " Now the
> above
> > (pedagogical tool) applies exactly to moolavidya. " -- moola avidya is an
> > existent, Eshwara's Maya Shakti, a positive bhavarupa avidya and not
> simply
> > a teaching tool?
> > To your third point, please be specific, how exactly and where has jnana
> > abhava been dealt with?
> >
> > On Mon, Nov 21, 2022 at 1:02 AM H S Chandramouli via Advaita-l <
> > advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
> >
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