[Advaita-l] [advaitin] A kilogram of darkness please

[Sudhanshu Shekhar]

Namaste Dennis ji.

//What do you mean by saying that X is ‘bhAvarUpa’ (in English)?
Monier-Williams gives: “really existing, real, actual”. Since we are
talking in Advaitin language, that ought to mean that it exists ‘in all
three periods of time’.//

You should see how AchArya used the term. He said --  न च घटाभावः सन्पटः
अभावात्मकः ; किं तर्हि ? भावरूप एव । He gives cloth as an example of
bhAvarUpa. That very same connotation is to be used when something is said
to be bhAvarUpa. It is neither Brahman nor horns of hare. For example, a
cloth. BhAshyakAra says that pot-abhAva, being cloth, is bhAvarUpa. So,
there is no need to refer to Monier Williams. Also, in advaita siddhAnta,
bhAvarUpa has been discussed in great detail.

//I would have said that, by that definition, like every other worldly
perception or conception, darkness is not real. You cannot mean that it is
‘sat’ since, like every other perception or conception, it is mithyā.//

Why are you taking this meaning of bhAvarUpa (as sat) when bhAshyakAra is
using the term to denote objects such as cloth.

//This is why I complain when people use Sanskrit in their discussions. It
is certainly true that some Sanskrit terms have no simple English
equivalent but it is also true that not all seekers have a comprehensive
and identical understanding of such terms.//

Seekers should put in effort to understand what is the intended meaning of
Sanskrit terms used. Non-comprehension by seekers is not a valid reason to
stop using original terms which have a definition and instead opt for vague
English words.

// We should really only use a Sanskrit term when there is no commonly
understood English equivalent.//

You are entitled to your opinion.

//My naïve understanding is that, if Śaṅkara had meant that ‘pot-absence’
is a really existing thing, he would have used unambiguous language to
state this. But he doesn’t. //

There is nothing unambiguous in the language used by AchArya. BhAvarUpa is
used for mithyA objects which is different from Brahman as well as
nirvishesha-abhAva like horns of hare.

//Any discussion about this seems to me highly contrived and of little
value in the teaching of Advaita but, since Śaṅkara obviously did this, let
us proceed.//

The fact that AchArya regarded this discussion important shows that it is
not contrived. Please remember - he has used anumAna pramANa to disregard a
common misunderstanding prevalent that pot-abhAva is mere abhAva like
nothingness/horns of hare. No. It is bhAvarUpa and hence triguNAtmaka.

//I understand that he meant that, in a discussion in a particular context,
we can treat something as actually existing because we both know what we
are talking about and there is no confusion.//

No. If both parties were believing same thing, there was no need of anumAna
pramANa used by AchArya in the first place. He is rejecting the naiyAyikAs
contention that pot-abhAva is some abhAva like horns of hare. Instead it is
a bhAvarUpa vastu like cloth. You should consider going through the topic
in more detail.

 //Suppose that you and I are having an argument about the pot that we
believe to be on the table in room X of the museum. Suppose a third person
comes in and tells us he has seen this pot on the table in room Y. This
being the case, if I go into room X, I could say that I become aware of the
absence of the pot. In that sense, it has a sort of meaning to say that the
pot-absence exists in room X. But why anyone would want to talk in this way
eludes me. Perhaps you could explain? Or perhaps I am simply
misunderstanding what is being said here? I would just say that the pot
isn’t in room X so I am prepared to accept the third person’s claim that it
is in room Y.//

If you can know about pot-abhAva in room x, you have no option but to admit
a bhAvarUpa pot-abhAva in room x. If other person cannot know that, that is
not a reason enough to postulate the non-existence thereof.

//So I can agree to your statement that “prakAsha-abhAva, which you hold as
darkness, is bhAvarUpa” (if by that you mean that the ‘absence of light’
‘exists’) but only if you accept that this is meaningful only in the
context of a discussion such as the example I give here.//

Just as AchArya meant cloth as an example of bhAvarUpa and not mere
absence, similarly prakAsha-abhAva. I fail to understand your insistence
despite the fact that AchArya is proving exactly the opposite. He is
disproving the claim that pot-abhAva is mere abhAva like horns of hare.

//It is only the thing that we are actually talking about (i.e. pot or
light) that has real (mithyā) existence. The ‘pot-absence’ or ‘darkness’
are just convenient (?) words to help our discussion. Of course, a word
such as ‘darkness’ has come to have such common usage that it is easy for
people to think that it actually refers to something in its own right –
which is why we have a problem.//

Then what is AchArya proving?* Is he explaining linguistic usage through
anumAna pramANa?* 😀

//Darkness has mithyā existence as a concept, but not as a percept. We
don’t ‘see’ darkness; when it is dark, we fail to see anything and give
this ‘absence of light’ the name ‘darkness’ for convenience.//

This is against common experience of pratyaksha. Also, it is against the
anumAna I have already presented. तमः शब्द वाच्यो
नाभावः,स्वमात्रवृत्तिधर्मप्रकारकप्रतियोगिज्ञानाजन्यप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वाद्,
घटवत्।

It is against the BhAshya portions already provided.

It stands proved as per pratyaksha, anumAna, BhAshya and Shruti that
darkness is a pramAtri-gamya mithyA-bhAvarUpa-neela-rUpa-vat-dravya.

Further, please consider the following anumAna, which I remodeled based on
BhAshyakAra's anumAna:





*घटान्योन्याभावः सन्पटः त्रिगुणात्मकः। (pot-anyonya-abhAva is triguNAtmaka,
being cloth)घटस्य प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावानामपि त्रिगुणात्मकत्वम् , घटेन
व्यपदिश्यमानत्वात् , घटस्येतरेतराभाववत् ; (pot-atyanta-abhAva,
pot-prAk-abhAva, pot-pradhvamsa-abhAva are triguNAtmaka, on account of
having transactability through pot, like pot-anyonya-abhAva)तथैव
त्रिगुणात्मकताभावानाम् । (**Therefore abhAvAs have triguNAtmakatA.)*

If you cannot refute this argument, then you must accept that
vishesha-abhAva are triguNAtmaka. Hence, your claim that darkness is
prakAsha-abhAva, even though wrong, still does not militate against its
triguNAtmakatA. Darkness remains a triguNAtmaka mithyA vastu.

Regards,
Sudhanshu Shekhar.