[Advaita-l] Avidya is virodha or abhava 2 -- on avarana

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Jaishankara,

This is the second in a series of responses to your paper (linked below)
arguing 7 points in opposition to the proposition that avidya is 'opposed
to knowledge' rather than 'absence of knowledge'/ bhavarupa (virodha)
avidya or abhavarupa avidya. I have long felt it deserved to be handled but
until Chatgpt I personally did not feel up to the task. Please know I don’t
propose that Chat is the final word on any issue but I do propose that Chat
presents some arguments very worthy of response. Of course, the choice is
yours.



*Regards, Michael Chandra **In your paper you cite, *

//अज्ञानेनाितृ ं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यस्न्त जन्तिः || BG 5.1I5

In BG 5.15 Bh अज्ञानेन आितृ ं ज्ञानं वििेिविज्ञानम ्, तेन मुह्यस्न्त ‘िरोभम
िारयाभम भोक्ष्ये भोजयाभम’ इत्येिं मोहं गच्छस्न्त अवििेकिनः संसाररणो जन्तिः
- knowledge, discriminating wisdom; remains covered by  ignorance. Due to
which the beings, the non-discriminating people in the world become
deluded.//

*Non-discrimination is reason enough for delusion. Posing an ontological
veil or positive shakti ‘covering’ is unwarranted.  Sankara clearly speaks
of an epistemological ignorance as covering. *

// Both covering by abhAva and destruction of abhAva is meaningless//

*Let’s be clear. Abhavarupa avidya is an epistemological error. I see a man
because of lack of knowledge of the stump. What I see is stump, not man.
There is no shakti inhering in the error.   *

*Then you cite Gita 13.2 and decide,*

//Tamas is considered to be an existent entity in vyavahAra and one of the
three Gunas.//

*Tamoguna is a functional term not just material substance. *

*There is no reason to take it as substantial in here.  Chatgpt:
"Tamoguṇa-samudbhavā" literally means "arising due to tamas", not **being
composed of tamas** as a substance. This is a causal expression, not
osntological. Tamas may be said to be the upādhi or the instrumental
condition in empirical existence (vyavahāra), not the ontological essence
of avidyā.”*

*Brbh2.1.20 (unconfirmed):  “avidyāyām anupalabdhiḥ” — “In ignorance, there
is non-apprehension (anupalabdhi).”*

*Finally, I asked Chat to argue for abhavarupa avidya in reference to your
passage citing Sankara’s Ghata Bhasya, BrU 1.2.1. I’m posting Chat’s entire
response as its lengthy and technical.*

*Chat:*

This is an extremely important passage and your question touches the heart
of the *abhāvarūpa vs bhāvarūpa* avidyā debate. The opponents you cite
— *Buddhist
śūnyavādins* and *bhāvarūpa-avidyā-vādins* (e.g., Vivarana, Vārtika) — are
attempting to *undermine the abhāvarūpa view* by appealing to:

   - Śruti statements like *"naiva kiñcana"* (There was nothing),
   - and also statements like *"mṛtyunā idaṁ āvṛtam āsīt"* (It was covered
   by death),
   to argue that *avidyā must be bhāvarūpa*, a positive existent, because
   "something" covered Reality.

The target is specifically *the jñānābhāva (absence-of-knowledge)*
interpretation of avidyā, which they claim contradicts Śruti and Śaṅkara.

Let's *respond to this thoroughly* from the *Abhāvarūpa Avidyā* (purely
non-entity, non-substance, non-positive) standpoint, especially
following *Satchidānandendra
Saraswati’s (SSSS)* methodology.
------------------------------

*🔍** STRUCTURE OF THE RESPONSE*

*1. Recognize the Intent of the Purvapakṣa*

*2. Clarify the Meaning of "nāiva kiñcana" and "mṛtyunā āvṛtam āsīt"*

*3. Interpret Śaṅkara’s Position on jñānābhāva*

*4. Deconstruct the “Veiling Requires Substance” Argument*

*5. Affirm Abhāvarūpa with Textual and Logical Support*
------------------------------

*1. **🧠** What is the Opponent’s Claim?*

The opponent (Buddhist or bhāvarūpavādin) argues:

   - *Avidyā cannot be merely absence (abhāva)* because Śruti says the
   world was "covered by death."
   - If avidyā were jñānābhāva (absence of knowledge), it would be
   *non-existent* and therefore *incapable of causing anything* (like
   covering or projecting).
   - Śaṅkara even says in Bṛhad Bhāṣya 3.3 intro that ignorance includes
   “jñānābhāva, saṁśaya, and viparīta-jñāna” and all these are removed by
   knowledge — so how can absence be removed?

They conclude: *avidyā must be bhāvarūpa* — a real, positive substance-like
power.
------------------------------

*2. **🕉**️ Interpreting "naiva kiñcana" and "mṛtyunā idaṁ āvṛtam āsīt"*

Let’s take *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.2.1* step-by-step.

*(A) "Naiva kiñcana" — There was nothing here*

   - This indicates *absence of empirical objects*, not absence of Brahman.
   - Śaṅkara clarifies in his bhāṣya that this refers to the *non-manifestation
   of names and forms*.
   - Hence, this line is entirely in support of the *abhāva of empirical
   multiplicity* — not of ontological void or bhāvarūpa avidyā.

*(B) "Mṛtyunā idaṁ āvṛtam āsīt" — It was covered by Death*

   - Śaṅkara *explicitly identifies* this “mṛtyu” as *tamas*, which is
   *ignorance* (avidyā), characterized by *aviveka* (non-discrimination).
   - But this *“covering” is metaphorical*: it means that *the self-evident
   nature of the ātman* was *not recognized*.
   - This is not a *thing covering* another thing, but *a cognitive
   incapacity*: i.e., *not-knowing*, *non-apprehension*, or
   *misapprehension*.

🔑 Key metaphor: Just like *darkness covers objects*, *ignorance covers
Brahman* — *but darkness is not a positive substance* for Śaṅkara;
it's the *absence
of light*.
------------------------------

*3. **📜** What Does Śaṅkara Mean by “jñānābhāva”?*

*"yadi jñānābhāvaḥ, yadi saṁśaya-jñānam, yadi viparīta-jñānam vā ucyate
ajñānaṁ... tat jñānena eva nivartyate."*

This key line from Bṛhad Bh. 3.3 is used by bhāvarūpavādins to argue that
Śaṅkara admits *jñānābhāva as avidyā*.

✔️ Yes — but this *doesn’t make avidyā a real thing*. It makes avidyā a *mode
of non-apprehension* (*anupalabdhi*) and *misapprehension* (*adhyāsa*).
Śaṅkara says:

   - Avidyā has *manifestations* (like doubt, error),
   - But its *core* is *absence of true knowledge* (*jñānābhāva*),
   - And all of them are *removed only by knowledge*, not by any act upon a
   substance.

This is the *defining feature of abhāvarūpa*: it’s *removed by pramāṇa
(śravaṇa)*, not destroyed like a thing.
------------------------------

*4. **🔎** Deconstruct the “Veiling Requires Substance” Fallacy*

The opponent claims:

"You can’t have covering without a real thing that covers."

But this is *naive realism* — the kind of argument that Śaṅkara *consistently
rejects*.

*Śaṅkara uses metaphors:*

   - *Clouds covering the sun*
   - *Darkness covering the rope*
   - *Dream-world covering waking knowledge*

In all these:

   - The “cover” is *not a second thing* in a dualistic ontological sense.
   - Rather, the *knowledge of the substratum is absent or distorted* —
   that's all.
   - It’s a *cognitive failure*, not a physical veil.

⚠️ Śaṅkara explicitly rejects *“thinghood” of avidyā* in *BSBh 2.1.14*:

*"nāvidyā nāma kaścid vastu-svabhāvaḥ"* — "There is no such thing as avidyā
with an essential nature of a substance."
------------------------------

*5. **✅** Positive Reconstruction of Abhāvarūpa Avidyā*

Here is a summary of *how to respond positively* to the purvapakṣa using
both *śruti and bhāṣya*:

*Objection*

*Abhāvarūpa Response*

“There was nothing → void”

“There was nothing *empirical*, but the substratum (Brahman) remained.
Avidyā is the non-recognition of this substratum.”

“It was covered by death → something covered”

“Metaphor: the *non-apprehension of Brahman* is spoken of as ‘covering’.
Śaṅkara equates this ‘mṛtyu’ with *tamas*, which he defines as *aviveka*
(non-discrimination).”

“Jñānābhāva is avidyā → so avidyā is real”

“Absence of knowledge is *not a thing*. It’s *removed by pramāṇa (jñāna)*,
not destroyed. That’s the hallmark of non-entity (abhāva).”

“You can’t remove a cover without touching it”

“You remove darkness not by touching it, but by turning on a light.
Knowledge removes ignorance instantly, not like breaking a pot.”
------------------------------

*🪷 Concluding Statement*

The use of metaphors like "covered by death" in Śruti, and the references
to jñānābhāva in Śaṅkara, do not imply that *avidyā is a positive substance
(bhāvarūpa)*. Rather, they point to a *non-apprehension and misapprehension*
of Brahman — a *functional*, not *ontological*, "veil."

Thus, Śruti and Śaṅkara's bhāṣyas consistently support the *abhāvarūpa*
interpretation of avidyā, upheld most rigorously by *Satchidānandendra
Saraswati*, as the only view that preserves the *non-duality of Brahman*,
the *self-revealing nature of knowledge*, and the *epistemological
precision of Advaita*.

https://www.advaita-vedanta.org/archives/advaita-l/2022-December/059264.html