[Advaita-l] Avidya is virodha or abhava 3 - "All types of abhAva are also bhAvarUpa only"

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste Jaishankarji and all,
I am sorry but chat's arguments cannot be ignored. The prompt is not doubt
polemic but the response is rich manana backed by seemingly proper textual
support.

The response tackles the pratiyoga tarka that wishes to accept darkness as
a positive something in opposition to light rather than darkness as the
mere absence of light.

Based on Jaishankarji's position concluding "that even what is proposed as
jnAna-abhAva by some proponents is bhAvarupa according to bhAshyakAra."

Chatgpt: This passage is a *sophisticated polemical challenge* against
the *abhāvarūpa
(non-entity)* interpretation of avidyā — particularly *jñāna-abhāva* as
proposed by *Satchidānandendra Saraswati (SSSS)* and others in the *prakaraṇa
school*. It attempts to prove, using the *Nyāya classification of four
types of abhāva*, that:

“Even what is called ‘absence’ (like the absence of a pot, or knowledge)
is, in fact, *something else* — like a cloth in place of a pot — and hence *not
non-existent* but *bhāvarūpa (a positive entity)*. Therefore, even
so-called ‘jñāna-abhāva’ is actually a real, positive presence — and not a
true absence.”

Below is a *structured refutation* of this argument, fully grounded in
*Śaṅkara’s
epistemology*, *Vedānta language*, and the distinction between *ontological
realism* (Nyāya) and *non-dualist phenomenology* (Advaita).
------------------------------
🪓 Refutation of the Argument: Step by Step
------------------------------
🧩 1. Confusing *Abhāva as Category* vs *Abhāva as Function*

The argument assumes the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika padārtha ontology*, in which *abhāva
is reified* as a separate category (*padārtha*) and given *objective status*
— e.g., the absence of the pot is "the cloth," which is positive.

⚠️ But *Śaṅkara rejects this category-based realism*. In *Brahmasūtra
Bhāṣya 2.2.28–31*, he *refutes abhāva as a separate category*:

“न हि अभावः कश्चिद्वस्तुस्वभावः...”

— “Non-existence is not a substance nor a positive category.”

▶️ So *mutual absence (anyonya-abhāva)* as defined in Nyāya — “pot is not
cloth” — is not a proof that absence is positive. It is merely a *logical
negation* in language and conceptual thought, not a *thing* in reality.
------------------------------
📏 2. Category Mistake: Treating Reference as Reality

The opponent argues:

"We speak of pot’s absence in terms of cloth; cloth is real; so absence is
real."

But this commits a *fallacy of misplaced concreteness*. The *language of
reference* (vyavahāra) does not mean that the *absence is a substance*.

📌 Example: Saying “I see nothing” doesn’t mean “nothing” is a thing I see.

Śaṅkara repeatedly affirms that *absence is merely non-apprehension*:

   -

   *Bṛhad Bhāṣya 2.1.20*:

   “Avidyāyām anupalabdhiḥ” — “In ignorance, there is *non-perception*.”


This does *not* imply that non-perception is a thing; it’s a *cognitive
failure* — not a bhāvarūpa.
------------------------------
🪞 3. Absence ≠ Positive Replacement

Yes, the *cloth is present where the pot is absent* — but that does *not
make cloth the absence of pot*. The *absence* of pot is still *defined
negatively*, and the cloth is a *separate entity*, not the absence.

▶️ So the presence of cloth *does not reify absence*; it merely *coexists
with it*. That does *not prove* that absence is a *bhāvarūpa*.

📌 In the case of *jñāna-abhāva*, the absence of knowledge of ātman is *not
replaced by some other thing* (like error or cloth), but by *ignorance
understood as non-cognition (anupalabdhi)* or *superimposition (adhyāsa)*.

Hence, there's no justification for claiming that *"absence" must be
bhāvarūpa.*
------------------------------
🪙 4. Śaṅkara Explicitly Denies Bhāvarūpatva of Avidyā

This is the death blow to the opponent’s position.

In *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya 2.1.14*, Śaṅkara says:

*"nāvidyā nāma kaścid vastusvabhāvaḥ..."*
"There is no such thing as avidyā having an essential nature
(vastu-svarūpa)."

He also says:

*"avidyā-kalpitaṁ sarvaṁ..."*
"All this is imagined by ignorance."

So for Śaṅkara:

   -

   Avidyā is *not an entity*,
   -

   It is a *misconception* or *non-apprehension*,
   -

   It disappears the moment *right knowledge* arises — like darkness when
   light comes.

👉 *Bhāvarūpa entities are never destroyed merely by knowledge.* Only
*non-entities* (like false snake, dream objects, or ignorance) vanish when
*jñāna* arises.
------------------------------
🧘 5. Abhāvarūpa’s Logical Consistency

The opponent says:

“jñānābhāva cannot be related to action or quality — it is a play of words.”

But this misunderstands the *epistemological function* of absence.

   -

   Absence (abhāva) is *not acted upon*, but *cancelled by knowledge*.
   -

   Jñāna *does not destroy* jñānābhāva as one destroys an object; it *reveals
   the ever-existing Brahman*, thus *rendering ignorance nonexistent*.

This is consistent with:

   -

   *rope-snake example*: The snake disappears upon seeing the rope — not
   because it’s a thing destroyed, but because it was *never there*.
   -

   *dream example*: On waking, the dream ceases — not by destruction, but
   by *retraction of projection*.

Hence, *abhāvarūpa avidyā* is the only consistent interpretation.
------------------------------
✅ Conclusion: Summary Response
Argument from Opponent Response from Abhāvarūpa Siddhānta
Mutual absence (anyonya-abhāva) shows abhāva is bhāvarūpa Wrong: the cloth
is a positive entity, but absence is only *negation* in relation to it.
Śaṅkara does not accept Nyāya padārtha logic.
Avidyā must be bhāvarūpa to have veiling power False: Śaṅkara interprets
“veiling” as *non-recognition* (anupalabdhi), not physical covering.
jñānābhāva is a thing if it can be removed No: jñāna removes jñānābhāva *not
as destruction*, but by *revealing what was always present* — like darkness
removed by light.
Śaṅkara accepts only bhāvarūpa Absolutely incorrect. Śaṅkara states clearly
in multiple places: *avidyā has no vastu-svarūpa*, and *all error is due to
adhyāsa*, not a substance.