[Advaita-l] Avidya is virodha or abhava -4

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste All,
Fourth installment begins on the same subject head but next paragraph in
Jaishankar's paper. Differently this time. I approached Chatgpt (free) with
the following prompt:

* Take the following passage and provide a detailed abhavarupa refutation
and a detailed bhavarupa counter response and compare the two: *

"Further in Tai Up Sambandha bhAshya अन्यिा दह अभािाद्भािोत्पवत्तररनत
सियप्रमाणव्यािोप इनत । - Otherwise we would be led to conclude that a
positive effect springs out of a mere absence, — a conclusion which is
opposed to all means of knowledge (pramANa). Further in the same bhAshya:
प्रध्िंसाभािोऽप्यारभ्यत इनत न सम्भिनत अभािस्य वििेषाभािाद्वििल्पमात्रमेतत्।
भािप्रनतयोगी ह्यभािः । यिा ह्यभभन्नोऽवप भािो घटपटादिभभवियिेष्यते भभन्न इि
घटभािः पटभाि इनत, एिं ननवियिेषोऽप्यभािः कियागुणयोगाद्रव्यादििद्वििल्प्यते ।
न ह्यभाि उत्पलादििद्वििेषणसहभािी । वििेषणित्त्िे भाि एि स्यात्। To say that
pradhvamsAbhAva, — non-existence of a thing after destruction, — is
produced is only a play of words, as nothing can be a quality (वििेष) of
non-existence. Non-existence is indeed only the opposite of existence. Just
as existence, though one and the same throughout, is yet distinguished by
cloth, pot, and so on, — e.g., we speak of the existence of a cloth, the
existence of a pot, and so on, — so also, though abhava or non-existence is
in itself devoid of all distinctions, yet it is spoken of as different and
in association with different acts or qualities as though it were a
substance etc. Non existence cannot, indeed, co-exist with attributes as
the blue lotus co-exists with its attributes. If it were possessed of
attributes, then it would come under the category of bhava or being."

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chatgpt:

Here’s a structured response to your request: first, an *abhāvarūpa
refutation* that aligns with the tone and purpose of the passage from the
Taittirīya Upaniṣad Saṃbandha Bhāṣya; second, a *bhāvarūpa counter-response*
that tries to argue for non-existence as something positive or at least
“being-like”; and third, a comparison of both positions.
------------------------------
I. *Abhāvarūpa Refutation (Śaṅkara’s Side)*

This passage is part of a larger argument that negates the idea that
*abhāva* (non-existence) is an ontological category with positive status (
*bhāvarūpa*). Here's a close analysis and defense of that position:

   1.

   *Epistemic Incompatibility:*
   -

      The first line—*"anyaṭhā ca abhāvād bhāva-utpattir iti
      sarva-pramāṇa-vyāghātaḥ"*—declares that if we admit that bhāva
      (existence) can arise from mere non-existence (*abhāva*), we would
      contradict *all pramāṇas* (means of valid knowledge). That is,
      pratyakṣa, anumāna, and śabda all presuppose a continuity or causality
      grounded in some existent locus. If a pot can come out of sheer absence,
      inference collapses.
      2.

   *Ontological Status of Abhāva:*
   -

      The second part of the passage, especially *"abhāvasya viśeṣābhāvāt"*,
      argues that *abhāva* lacks any specific characteristics. Unlike an
      existent thing (e.g., a pot), *abhāva* cannot support *viśeṣaṇas*
      (qualifiers). For example, we don't say “blue non-existence” the
way we say
      “blue pot.” This proves *abhāva* has no substantiality.
      -

      Any linguistic attribution of distinction to *abhāva* (e.g., “absence
      of pot” vs. “absence of cloth”) is mere *vikalpa-mātra*, conceptual
      projection. They’re not real distinctions *in* non-existence, but in
      the referents whose absence is being imagined.
      3.

   *Non-Production of Pradhvaṁsābhāva:*
   -

      The idea that *pradhvaṁsa-abhāva* (post-destruction non-existence) is
      *produced* is rejected as a misuse of causal language. Production (
      *utpatti*) requires a substrate or locus to manifest in; *abhāva* is
      precisely the absence of such a thing. Therefore, to say “non-existence
      arises” is just loose speech.
      4.

   *Pratiyogitva as Essential:*
   -

      Non-existence is always relative to something (*pratiyogin*). It is
      not self-established. For example, the “absence of pot” is
always dependent
      on the pot as the logical counterpositive. Thus, *abhāva* has no
      independent reality. It is parasitic on *bhāva*.
      5.

   *Conclusion:*
   -

      Therefore, *abhāva* is not a real ontological category. It is a
      conceptual negation (*adhyāropa*) serving pragmatic or cognitive
      functions. To reify it into a positive entity is to mistake linguistic
      usage for ontological substance.

------------------------------
II. *Bhāvarūpa Counter-Response*

Let us now adopt a position that takes *abhāva* as a *bhāvarūpa*, or at
least as having positive ontological status, and challenge the Bhāṣya:

   1.

   *Theoretical Need for Ontological Absence:*
   -

      Denying *abhāva* any reality whatsoever leads to metaphysical
      incoherence. For instance, if destruction does not result in
something real
      (i.e., *pradhvaṁsa-abhāva*), how do we *account for* the fact that
      something no longer exists? To say “nothing results” is a logical evasion
      of causal closure. Post-destruction non-being has a determinate
status—*it
      is not just a conceptual default*.
      2.

   *Attributive Discrimination of Absence:*
   -

      The example used in the Bhāṣya—that we cannot say “blue absence”—is a
      strawman. One may still say “localized absence,” “temporary absence,”
      “total absence,” etc. These are not meaningless phrases; they function in
      cognition, language, and even inference (*e.g., ghaṭābhāva-pramāṇa*).
      3.

   *Cognition of Absence is Empirical:*
   -

      If *abhāva* were not real in some sense, we could not *perceive* or
      *know* it. Yet, *anupalabdhi* (non-cognition) is treated as a
      *pramāṇa* in Advaita and other schools like Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. What is
      perceived when a pot is destroyed? We do not just fail to see the pot; we
      positively cognize its absence. This absence is spatially localized,
      temporally bounded, and has a cognitive signature.
      4.

   *Non-Superimposability Argument:*
   -

      The fact that we don’t superimpose one absence over another—i.e., we
      distinguish the “absence of pot” from “absence of cloth”—proves
that there
      is at least notional individuation (*viśeṣa*). This suggests that
      *abhāva* is not a mere mental nothing, but an ontologically distinct
      *nihil-object*.
      5.

   *Function in Logical Negation:*
   -

      Consider logical and philosophical negations: If *abhāva* were
      nothing, negation (*nāsti*) would collapse into silence. But
      *nāsti-vākya* is meaningful. Thus, *abhāva* must have some
      existential foothold in being—just like darkness has ontological
      recognition without being a substance.
      6.

   *Conclusion:*
   -

      Hence, *abhāva* is not merely a shadow of *bhāva* but a mode of
      being: it is negative being, a necessary ontological polarity.
Denying its
      being-ness would distort the coherence of causality, cognition,
and logical
      expression.

------------------------------
III. *Comparison of Abhāvarūpa and Bhāvarūpa Interpretations*
Point of Comparison Abhāvarūpa View (Bhāṣya) Bhāvarūpa View (Counter)
*Ontological Status* Abhāva is *not real*, it is only a *negation*
parasitic on bhāva. Abhāva is a *real negative*, a mode of being
(nihil-object).
*Cognitive Validity* Cognized only via its pratiyogin; no direct
cognition. Perceived
via *anupalabdhi* as a legitimate pramāṇa.
*Qualifiability (viśeṣaṇa)* Cannot have attributes; distinctions are
conceptual. Distinctions in absence are cognitively and linguistically real.
*Production (utpatti)* Abhāva cannot be produced; saying so is
illogical. Pradhvaṁsābhāva
arises determinately post-destruction.
*Relation to pramāṇa* Allowing *bhāva* from *abhāva* contradicts
pramāṇas. Without
acknowledging *abhāva*, pramāṇa like anupalabdhi becomes unintelligible.
*Use in discourse* Linguistic usage of abhāva is figurative. Usage is based
on real ontological and logical distinctions.
------------------------------
Summary Judgment

Śaṅkara’s abhāvarūpa stance prioritizes ontological austerity and epistemic
rigor: non-existence is a dependent, *conceptual* category that is *defined
by its opposition* to existence and serves as a cognitive placeholder. It
is not a thing.

The bhāvarūpa argument pushes back, appealing to *phenomenology, cognition,
and logical function*, arguing that *absence* must be *somehow real* for it
to be knowable, distinguishable, and causally meaningful. It seeks to
rehabilitate non-being not as substantial but as a necessary pole in the
structure of being.

Let me know if you'd like this framed using the specific terminology of
Advaita, Navya-Nyāya, or Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā.