[Advaita-l] Avidya is virodha or abhava -4
Michael Chandra Cohen
michaelchandra108 at gmail.com
Sun Jul 6 18:01:36 EDT 2025
Namaste All,
Fourth installment begins on the same subject head but next paragraph in
Jaishankar's paper. Differently this time. I approached Chatgpt (free) with
the following prompt:
* Take the following passage and provide a detailed abhavarupa refutation
and a detailed bhavarupa counter response and compare the two: *
"Further in Tai Up Sambandha bhAshya अन्यिा दह अभािाद्भािोत्पवत्तररनत
सियप्रमाणव्यािोप इनत । - Otherwise we would be led to conclude that a
positive effect springs out of a mere absence, — a conclusion which is
opposed to all means of knowledge (pramANa). Further in the same bhAshya:
प्रध्िंसाभािोऽप्यारभ्यत इनत न सम्भिनत अभािस्य वििेषाभािाद्वििल्पमात्रमेतत्।
भािप्रनतयोगी ह्यभािः । यिा ह्यभभन्नोऽवप भािो घटपटादिभभवियिेष्यते भभन्न इि
घटभािः पटभाि इनत, एिं ननवियिेषोऽप्यभािः कियागुणयोगाद्रव्यादििद्वििल्प्यते ।
न ह्यभाि उत्पलादििद्वििेषणसहभािी । वििेषणित्त्िे भाि एि स्यात्। To say that
pradhvamsAbhAva, — non-existence of a thing after destruction, — is
produced is only a play of words, as nothing can be a quality (वििेष) of
non-existence. Non-existence is indeed only the opposite of existence. Just
as existence, though one and the same throughout, is yet distinguished by
cloth, pot, and so on, — e.g., we speak of the existence of a cloth, the
existence of a pot, and so on, — so also, though abhava or non-existence is
in itself devoid of all distinctions, yet it is spoken of as different and
in association with different acts or qualities as though it were a
substance etc. Non existence cannot, indeed, co-exist with attributes as
the blue lotus co-exists with its attributes. If it were possessed of
attributes, then it would come under the category of bhava or being."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chatgpt:
Here’s a structured response to your request: first, an *abhāvarūpa
refutation* that aligns with the tone and purpose of the passage from the
Taittirīya Upaniṣad Saṃbandha Bhāṣya; second, a *bhāvarūpa counter-response*
that tries to argue for non-existence as something positive or at least
“being-like”; and third, a comparison of both positions.
------------------------------
I. *Abhāvarūpa Refutation (Śaṅkara’s Side)*
This passage is part of a larger argument that negates the idea that
*abhāva* (non-existence) is an ontological category with positive status (
*bhāvarūpa*). Here's a close analysis and defense of that position:
1.
*Epistemic Incompatibility:*
-
The first line—*"anyaṭhā ca abhāvād bhāva-utpattir iti
sarva-pramāṇa-vyāghātaḥ"*—declares that if we admit that bhāva
(existence) can arise from mere non-existence (*abhāva*), we would
contradict *all pramāṇas* (means of valid knowledge). That is,
pratyakṣa, anumāna, and śabda all presuppose a continuity or causality
grounded in some existent locus. If a pot can come out of sheer absence,
inference collapses.
2.
*Ontological Status of Abhāva:*
-
The second part of the passage, especially *"abhāvasya viśeṣābhāvāt"*,
argues that *abhāva* lacks any specific characteristics. Unlike an
existent thing (e.g., a pot), *abhāva* cannot support *viśeṣaṇas*
(qualifiers). For example, we don't say “blue non-existence” the
way we say
“blue pot.” This proves *abhāva* has no substantiality.
-
Any linguistic attribution of distinction to *abhāva* (e.g., “absence
of pot” vs. “absence of cloth”) is mere *vikalpa-mātra*, conceptual
projection. They’re not real distinctions *in* non-existence, but in
the referents whose absence is being imagined.
3.
*Non-Production of Pradhvaṁsābhāva:*
-
The idea that *pradhvaṁsa-abhāva* (post-destruction non-existence) is
*produced* is rejected as a misuse of causal language. Production (
*utpatti*) requires a substrate or locus to manifest in; *abhāva* is
precisely the absence of such a thing. Therefore, to say “non-existence
arises” is just loose speech.
4.
*Pratiyogitva as Essential:*
-
Non-existence is always relative to something (*pratiyogin*). It is
not self-established. For example, the “absence of pot” is
always dependent
on the pot as the logical counterpositive. Thus, *abhāva* has no
independent reality. It is parasitic on *bhāva*.
5.
*Conclusion:*
-
Therefore, *abhāva* is not a real ontological category. It is a
conceptual negation (*adhyāropa*) serving pragmatic or cognitive
functions. To reify it into a positive entity is to mistake linguistic
usage for ontological substance.
------------------------------
II. *Bhāvarūpa Counter-Response*
Let us now adopt a position that takes *abhāva* as a *bhāvarūpa*, or at
least as having positive ontological status, and challenge the Bhāṣya:
1.
*Theoretical Need for Ontological Absence:*
-
Denying *abhāva* any reality whatsoever leads to metaphysical
incoherence. For instance, if destruction does not result in
something real
(i.e., *pradhvaṁsa-abhāva*), how do we *account for* the fact that
something no longer exists? To say “nothing results” is a logical evasion
of causal closure. Post-destruction non-being has a determinate
status—*it
is not just a conceptual default*.
2.
*Attributive Discrimination of Absence:*
-
The example used in the Bhāṣya—that we cannot say “blue absence”—is a
strawman. One may still say “localized absence,” “temporary absence,”
“total absence,” etc. These are not meaningless phrases; they function in
cognition, language, and even inference (*e.g., ghaṭābhāva-pramāṇa*).
3.
*Cognition of Absence is Empirical:*
-
If *abhāva* were not real in some sense, we could not *perceive* or
*know* it. Yet, *anupalabdhi* (non-cognition) is treated as a
*pramāṇa* in Advaita and other schools like Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. What is
perceived when a pot is destroyed? We do not just fail to see the pot; we
positively cognize its absence. This absence is spatially localized,
temporally bounded, and has a cognitive signature.
4.
*Non-Superimposability Argument:*
-
The fact that we don’t superimpose one absence over another—i.e., we
distinguish the “absence of pot” from “absence of cloth”—proves
that there
is at least notional individuation (*viśeṣa*). This suggests that
*abhāva* is not a mere mental nothing, but an ontologically distinct
*nihil-object*.
5.
*Function in Logical Negation:*
-
Consider logical and philosophical negations: If *abhāva* were
nothing, negation (*nāsti*) would collapse into silence. But
*nāsti-vākya* is meaningful. Thus, *abhāva* must have some
existential foothold in being—just like darkness has ontological
recognition without being a substance.
6.
*Conclusion:*
-
Hence, *abhāva* is not merely a shadow of *bhāva* but a mode of
being: it is negative being, a necessary ontological polarity.
Denying its
being-ness would distort the coherence of causality, cognition,
and logical
expression.
------------------------------
III. *Comparison of Abhāvarūpa and Bhāvarūpa Interpretations*
Point of Comparison Abhāvarūpa View (Bhāṣya) Bhāvarūpa View (Counter)
*Ontological Status* Abhāva is *not real*, it is only a *negation*
parasitic on bhāva. Abhāva is a *real negative*, a mode of being
(nihil-object).
*Cognitive Validity* Cognized only via its pratiyogin; no direct
cognition. Perceived
via *anupalabdhi* as a legitimate pramāṇa.
*Qualifiability (viśeṣaṇa)* Cannot have attributes; distinctions are
conceptual. Distinctions in absence are cognitively and linguistically real.
*Production (utpatti)* Abhāva cannot be produced; saying so is
illogical. Pradhvaṁsābhāva
arises determinately post-destruction.
*Relation to pramāṇa* Allowing *bhāva* from *abhāva* contradicts
pramāṇas. Without
acknowledging *abhāva*, pramāṇa like anupalabdhi becomes unintelligible.
*Use in discourse* Linguistic usage of abhāva is figurative. Usage is based
on real ontological and logical distinctions.
------------------------------
Summary Judgment
Śaṅkara’s abhāvarūpa stance prioritizes ontological austerity and epistemic
rigor: non-existence is a dependent, *conceptual* category that is *defined
by its opposition* to existence and serves as a cognitive placeholder. It
is not a thing.
The bhāvarūpa argument pushes back, appealing to *phenomenology, cognition,
and logical function*, arguing that *absence* must be *somehow real* for it
to be knowable, distinguishable, and causally meaningful. It seeks to
rehabilitate non-being not as substantial but as a necessary pole in the
structure of being.
Let me know if you'd like this framed using the specific terminology of
Advaita, Navya-Nyāya, or Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā.
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