[Advaita-l] Where avidyā acquires positive standing - Siddhāntabindu §52–55 (Sastri's numbering)

[Michael Chandra Cohen]

Namaste.Sudhanshu ji et. al.

A point from my svādhyāya, offered for correction.

Through §52–54, SB establishes that the universal cognition *ahaṃ manuṣyaḥ*
is not *pramā*: §52 rules it neither mere *smṛti* nor *pramā* (
*śruti-yukti-bādha*), §53 supplies the śruti, and §54 the *yukti*:

*yuktaś ca — vikārī paricchinnatvenānātmatvāpatteḥ, svenaiva svasya grahaṇe
kartṛ-karma-virodhāt, dṛg-dṛśyayoś ca sambandhānupapatteḥ, bhedenābhedena
vā dharma-dharmi-bhāvānupapatteś ca.* "And [the conclusion] is well-founded
— because, were [the ātman] modifiable, it would lapse into non-self
through being delimited; because in self-apprehension of itself by itself
there is the contradiction of agent and object; because the seer–seen
relation cannot be established; and because the property–property-bearer
relation cannot be established, whether as difference or as non-difference."

It closes by fixing the self alone:

*kartṛtvāder vāstavatve 'nirmokṣa-prasaṅgāt, svaprakāśānabhyupagame ca
jagad-āndhya-prasaṅgāt … nirdharmaka-nitya-svaprakāśa-sukhātmaka evātmā.*
"Were agency and the like real, non-liberation would follow; were
self-luminosity not admitted, the world would be blind … therefore the
ātman is precisely attributeless, eternal, self-luminous, of the nature of
bliss."

Notice what this stretch does and does not do. It is wholly diagnostic: it
disqualifies a cognition and fixes the nature of the ātman. It posits no
entity, and it does not name avidyā at all. On SSS's reading, what §54
leaves unnamed is just the confusion itself — *anubhava-siddha*, evident to
everyone, requiring no *pramāṇa*:

*avidyā na pramāṇagamyā, kintu anubhavaikagamyā* (Sugamā). "Ignorance is
not accessible to any pramāṇa, but is grasped by experience alone."

§55 makes a different kind of move:

*tasmāt pariśeṣād bhrāntir iyam iti sthite tat-kāraṇam api yogyaṃ kiñcit
kalpanīyam. kalpyamānaṃ ca tad ātmany adhyastatayaiva dharmi-grāhaka-mānena
sidhyatīti na jānāmīti sākṣi-pratīti-siddham anirvācyam ajñānam eva tat. na
cedam abhāva-rūpam.* "Therefore, by elimination, when it is established
that this is *bhrānti*, some suitable cause must also be postulated (
*kalpanīyam*). And what is postulated is established — by the very pramāṇa
that grasps the property-bearer (*dharmi-grāhaka-māna*) — only as
superimposed upon the ātman: the indeterminable (*anirvācya*) *ajñāna*
attested by the witness-cognition (*sākṣi-pratīti*) in 'I do not know' (*na
jānāmi*). And this is not of the nature of mere absence (*abhāva-rūpa*)."

So across this seam: §52–54 leave avidyā unnamed — on SSS's reading, the
mere *anubhava-siddha* confusion; §55 introduces it as a postulated cause (
*kalpanīyam*) carrying pramāṇa-registered (*dharmi-grāhaka-māna*),
witness-attested (*sākṣi-pratīti*), non-negative (*na abhāva-rūpa*)
standing.

My question, held loosely: is that positive standing already required by
the §52–54 diagnosis, so §55 only makes it explicit — or is the *kalpanīyam*
of §55 the genuine addition, the point at which avidyā passes from the
*anubhava-siddha* name for the confusion to a posited positive cause the
argument now needs? On SSS's reading of the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, *adhyāsa*
simply *is* what the learned call avidyā, and the closing characterization
needs no further posited principle.

I offer this as manana, not verdict.

Namaste.

—————————————————————

Texts (SB §54–55; translations mine)

§54 युक्तश् च — विकारी परिच्छिन्नत्वेनानात्मत्वापत्तेः स्वेनैव स्वस्य
ग्रहणे कर्तृकर्मविरोधात् दृग्दृश्ययोश् च सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेः भेदेनाभेदेन वा
धर्मधर्मिभावानुपपत्तेश् च । ज्ञानानित्यत्वपक्षे
तत्तद्व्यक्तिभेदध्वंसप्रागभावसमवायज्ञानत्वजात्यादयभ्युपगमे गौरवात्,
एकत्वाभ्युपगमे चातिलाघवात्, घटज्ञानं पटज्ञानम् इत्य् उपाधिभेदपुरस्करेणैव
ज्ञानभेदप्रतीतेः । स्वतस् तु ज्ञानं ज्ञानम् इति एकस्वरूपावगमात्,
तदुत्पत्तिविनाशप्रतीत्योश् चावश्यकल्प्यविषयसम्बन्धविषयतयाप्य् उपपत्तेः,
उपाधिपरामर्शम् अन्तरेण स्वत एव घटाद् घटान्तरस्य भेदप्रतीतेस्
तत्प्रतिबन्दीग्रहासम्भवाद् आकाशकालदिशाम् अपि नानात्वापत्तेश् च ।
कर्तृत्वादेर् वास्तवत्वे ऽनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गात् । स्वप्रकाशानभ्युपगमे च
जगदान्ध्यप्रसङ्गात्, परमप्रेमास्पदत्वेन च तस्यानन्दरूपत्वात्,
निर्धर्मकनित्यस्वप्रकाशसुखात्मक एवात्मा इत्यादयः ।

"And this conclusion is well-founded, for the following reasons: were the
ātman modifiable (vikārī), it would lapse into non-self through being
delimited (paricchinnatva); in any supposed self-apprehension of itself by
itself there is the contradiction of agent and object
(kartṛ-karma-virodha); the relation of seer and seen (dṛg-dṛśya) cannot be
established; and the property–property-bearer relation
(dharma-dharmi-bhāva) cannot be established, whether as difference or as
non-difference. On the view that jñāna is non-eternal, there is prolixity
(gaurava) in having to admit individual cognition-tokens, their
destruction, prior non-existence, inherence, and the universal jñānatva;
whereas admitting jñāna's unity yields supreme parsimony (atilāghava),
since the distinction among cognitions — 'pot-cognition,' 'cloth-cognition'
— is apprehended only with reference to the difference of upādhis.
Intrinsically (svataḥ), jñāna is apprehended as one in nature, as in the
cognition 'jñāna, jñāna'; the cognitions of its origination and destruction
are equally explained by the knowledge–object relation that must in any
case be posited (avaśya-kalpya); and since the difference of one pot from
another is apprehended by itself (svata eva), without recourse to any
upādhi, no counter-instance (pratibandī) can be found — else ākāśa, time,
and direction too would incur plurality. Were agency and the like
(kartṛtvādi) real, non-liberation would follow (anirmokṣa-prasaṅga); were
self-luminosity (svaprakāśa) not admitted, the world would be blind
(jagad-āndhya-prasaṅga); and since the ātman is the locus of supreme love
(parama-prema-āspada), it is of the nature of bliss. Therefore the ātman is
precisely nirdharmaka-nitya-svaprakāśa-sukhātmaka — attributeless, eternal,
self-luminous, of the nature of bliss — and so on."

§55 तस्मात् परिशेषाद् भ्रान्तिर् इयम् इति स्थिते तत्कारणम् अपि योग्यं
किञ्चित् कल्पनीयम् । कल्प्यमानं च तदात्मन्य् अध्यस्ततयैव धर्मिग्राहकमानेन
सिध्यतीति न जानामीति साक्षिप्रतीतिसिद्धम् अनिर्वाच्यम् अज्ञानम् एव तत् । न
चेदम् अभावरूपम्, ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वेन तदभावानुपपत्तेर् उक्तत्वात् ।

"Therefore, by elimination (pariśeṣa), when it is established that this
world-appearance is bhrānti, some suitable cause for it must also be
postulated (kalpanīyam). And what is so postulated is established — by the
very pramāṇa that grasps the property-bearer (dharmi-grāhaka-māna) — only
as superimposed (adhyastatayā) upon the ātman. That cause is none other
than the indeterminable (anirvācya) ajñāna attested by the
witness-cognition (sākṣi-pratīti) in the experience 'I do not know' (na
jānāmi). And this is not of the nature of mere absence (abhāva-rūpa), since
— as already stated — the absence of jñāna cannot be sustained, jñāna being
eternal."