Response to specific points in Shrisha's repsonse to my mail.

[Vidyasankar Sundaresan]

I see that this is getting cross-posted to the dvaita and advaita lists,
so I'll keep it brief. I did say earlier that my first response would be
the last, but evidently, I spoke too soon. After this post, I promise,
silence.

On Thu, 5 Dec 1996, Shrisha Rao wrote:

[...]

> If you have no access to my dreams, how do you know that I dream too,
> or that we even mean the same thing by "dream"?  Or "dream object"?
>

Fine, I have no wish to claim anything about you.

[...]

> I am not aware that there is any system except in things like
> fingerprinting, where a match with a certain number of points of
> congruence is expected for an analogy to be accepted.  An analogy
> should correctly represent whichever aspect of the real thing it is
> illustrating, that is all.  There is no need to have specific number
> of congruences, etc.  And in fact, all this talk of congruences is
> off-track, since I did not specify a need for such.  What I was asking
> was if you were also drawing a parallel between the states of dreaming
> and waking, on the one hand, and between waking and the absolute, on
> the other, as you didn't like to see Guruprasad do? -- that's all.

I was under the impression that tattvavAdins generally insist on a certain
number of congruences for any analogy. Maybe it is only the Gaudiyas who
do so, one forgets. In any case, it is besides the point.

> > So long as the universe exists, yes, vide "yatra tu dvaitamiva bhavati".
> > We advaitins do not deny that duality appears in the perceived universe,
> > do we?
>
> In which case, as I was pointing out not too long ago, the universe,
> and the dualistic truth, must be real as well?  Because the duality

Real only in the vyAvahAric sense, not paramArthata:. Never overlook the
force of the qualification, "So long as the universe exists". If you say
that the universe always exists, then I say that you deny the possibility
of any moksha at all. There is only the endless cycle of rebirths in your
universe, if it is eternal.

> appears, and "nAsato vidyate bhAvaH, nA.abhAvo vidyate sataH," etc.;
> nothing that is not real would appear, and nothing that appears is
> not real.

nAsato vidyate bhAva: = na asato vidyate bhAva: = the unreal cannot
appear. Your translation says the same thing. However,

nAbhAvo vidyate sata: = na abhAvo vidyate sata: = "the real cannot
disappear". It does *not* mean "nothing that appears is not real". Your
translation reads into the Sanskrit a meaning that is not originally
there. Let me modify your translation slightly - "nothing that appears is
unreal". You cannot object to this modification, because not real is the
same as the unreal, in your categorization, is it not?

However, even if I provisionally grant that this modified translation has
some merit to it, advaita is not refuted. Remember that for us, the unreal
and the false are two different categories. We do not say that the world
appearance is wholly unreal. We only say that it disappears in the
paramArtha view. Before you say that it cannot so disappear, prove to me
that you really know what the paramArtha of advaita is. But you cannot,
can you, since the paramArtha of advaita is indistinguishable from a
hare's horn for you. What a pity!

Anyway, since the world appearance disappears in the paramArtha view, it
is not wholly real either, because you see, according to the correct
translation of the gItA verse, the really real cannot disappear. In the
paramArtha view, there is only the one brahman, therefore it is the only
real we really accept. The universe disappears, so we do not accept it to
be ultimately real.

[irrelevant digressions about scientific theorem proving deleted]

> > Furthermore, I would like to point out that we advaitins never leave the
> > experiencer out of any analysis of experience. When we say, "valid by
> > itself", we always mean that "valid by itself for the perceiver". It gets
> > tiresome to repeat "for the perceiver" everytime, so we leave it out. I
> > was after all writing the above on an advaita list, where everybody knew
> > my assumptions, presumably. I honestly did not know that you were a list
> > member too. I will be more careful in my choice of words the next time
> > around.
>
> That wanders...

Your habit of "evaluating" something another says is very tiresome and
irritating. I'd appreciate it if you would, for a moment, remove your
tinted glasses and again read what I said. If you want any advaitin to
take your criticism of advaita seriously, you have to first make the
effort to understand advaita properly. And to do that, remember that no
statement is made in advaita without a tacit reference to the perceiver.
In the absence of a proper understanding of advaita, your ad hoc
criticisms merit no reply.

[..]

> Yes, they are, but they are unable to make a detailed exposition of
> the concept of prAmANya-svatastva, &c.  That is what I said.
>
> > However, so long as they are under error, they never know it. They
> > assume that they are right.
>
> Strictly not true!  If that were the case, then there would never be
> any error-correction at all.  It is only when one is in error and one
> knows it, that one is motivated to change.  If it were that when one
> is wrong one does not know that one is wrong, then one will forever be
> wrong only.

Why so? You tend to talk too much in absolutes. Is there no role for a
guru in correcting error? No one corrects a fundamental error unless it is
pointed out by another, or by a contradiction resulting from assuming the
error to be true, or from another perception that contradicts the first
perception that caused the error. Till such time as this event does not
take place, the error continues, and the man subject to error does not
know it.

Besides, you seem to be arguing for the sake of argument. I said, "so long
as one is in error". You add a qualifier to my statement, "when one is in
error, *and one knows it*", the portion between *'s being completely
absent in my statement. As such, your criticism is totally unfounded. The
moment one knows one is in error, one obviously takes steps to correct it.
My point is that the revealing knowledge, that shows the previous
knowledge to be erroneous, is self-valid. I leave ample room for error
correction. As an aside, I would feel much more comfortable debating with
you if you did not jump to conclusions so.

[...]

>
> > Quite obviously, you and I mean
> > very different things by pramANa svatastva. I would appreciate it if you
> > kept *my* meaning in mind when you respond to a statement *I* make. Do
> > not impose your meanings on my statements.
>
> Is there an exposition of your style of prAmANya-svatastva?  I'd be
> interested, genuinely.  As far as I know, your concept is strictly
> your own, not even that of your school as such.

This from a man who once argued with me on srv, that Kumarila Bhatta was
not a Purva Mimamsaka at all. I am not convinced that you know any of the
philosophical systems or the authors you claim to know well: not Mimamsa,
not advaita. Please read the standard treatises on the topic of prAmANya
svatastva in advaita. Your comment about my understanding of advaita's
handling of prAmANya svatastva might earn you some brownie points from
some, nothing more.

[...]

> > But you are mistaken if you think that this is a
> > flaw in our system. Sruti denies multiplicity in ultimate reality,
> > including multiplicity of perceivers, and we advaitins see no reason to
> > doubt it, or to explain away the explicit Sruti.
>
> -- even if it means having to explain away "explicit" cognition of
> multiplicity, and "explicit" Shruti that says otherwise?  On what
> basis is there a decision to favor one explicit Shruti over another,
> although it means junking the explicit experience as well?

We do not need Sruti to give us knowledge which is obtained by other
pramANas. Sruti takes note of multiplicity in the universe, but it denies
multiplicity in the state of moksha, which is brahman.. Therefore it
says, "he who sees multiplicity here, is afraid. He who sees only One is
unafraid and goes beyond fear." If you wish to assert that this Sruti
upholds multiplicity in moksha, fine, let us go our separate ways. We get
back to atattvamasi vs. tattvamsi, and then there can be no further
discussion. We can each roundly denounce the other, and then shut up.
But let me point out that we advaitins are the ones who are not afraid of
moksha, we assert only One. If you wish to remain in a state of fear and
assert multiplicity, it's your choice.

> By the way, if you see no reason, here's one: there are two kinds of
> opposition of pramaaNa -- `virodha' and `pratirodha'. The former is
> when something is opposed by a stronger pramaaNa, and the latter when
> something is opposed by a pramaaNa of like strength.  When there is a
> case of pratirodha, then both mutually-opposed pramaaNa-s tie each
> other up completely and cannot be used to decide the case, which needs
> recourse to some other source.  When there is virodha, the stronger
> pramaaNa runs over the weaker and decides.
>
> Now, the explicit Shruti statements supporting and denying duality are
> in a position fo deadlock, for being both Shruti and of the same
> worth.  Thus, the non-dualistic conclusion from Shruti is pratiruddha,
> and duality is decided by the evidence of experience, which has no
> barrier at all.  One cannot assert that the abheda-Shruti is
> generically a stronger pramaaNa and that there is virodha, since the
> opposite conclusion, that the bheda-Shruti is stronger, is also
> possible with equal efficacy, and there is no way of favoring the one
> over the other except due to a pre-existing bias.

I can see that you have absolutely no idea of the concept of Mimamsa into
Sruti. So be it. Ever heard of arthavAda? For the rest, regarding
multiplicity in moksha, see above. Sruti is not strengthened by agreement
with pratyaksha. You are implicitly giving pratyaksha a higher status than
Sruti in your argument, because you seem to think that pratyaksha can
decide in the case of a deadlock between Sruti vAkyas that mention duality
and those that deny it. "Dhik" on your so-called allegiance to Sruti.

[..]

> Your sleep is very unique, I must say. That, however, seems to
> conflict with the idea that the "I" is the only thing common between
> the three states.  At least in your case, Shruti also is in common.
>
> > Sometimes I
> > even get the impression that I understood it better while asleep than ever
> > before.
>
> Sometimes I get the impression that I could fly better while dreaming
> than awake; that's hardly the point.
>

Maybe, but can you really fly as well, once you wake up? On the other
hand, the understanding about something gained in a dream state continues
into the waking state as well. Let me quote your own example to you:
Kekule's theory about the structure of benzene. Note that unlike what you
think, this does not say anything that goes against advaita. All this says
is that the waking and the dream state are at the same level of reality.
In fact, this goes against your penchant for giving a higher reality to
the waking state.

> > I do not see any reason to assert that the knowledge gained from
> > Sruti is channelled only through the waking state. At least for me, it is
> > channelled through waking, dreaming and sleeping states.
>
> -- which, as I said, is a straightforward conflict with the notion
> that only the "I" is common to all three.

Shrisha, I keep forgetting that with you, every word and every sentence
takes the character of philosophically rigorous, iron-clad proposition. I
was using "sleep" in a rather loose way here. I have to reword my original
statement. Take away the word sleeping. I did not mean it in the sense of
the deep sleep of sushupti. One would have to characterize any state of
sleep in which there is any object at all, as a kind of a dream state. In
sushupti, there are no objects.

Vidyasankar

ps. The point of all my postings on this thread is this. If you wish to
prove that advaita is internally contradictory, well, good luck. You
cannot prove internal contradictions in advaita unless you assume the
advaita assumptions and then come to a reductio ad absurdum conclusion.
Every dvaita argument that tries to prove that advaita is internally
contradictory, does so by first imposing assumptions that are foreign to
advaita itself. This is not a valid method of argumentation, and I have no
wish to point this out every time I see a fallacious argument following
this line.

Henceforth silence, I absolutely promise. Shrisha's response to this
will elicit no further response from me. However, remember, that is not to
be mistaken as a sign of defeat. Nowhere is it accepted that he who talks
the most or the loudest, wins. Shrisha can, "although vanquished, argue
still, with words of learned length and thundering sound." I do not wish
to give him the opportunity.