[Advaita-l] advaita siddhi 19 - MadhusUdana's reply
anandhudli at hotmail.com
Sun May 15 07:37:18 CDT 2005
|| shrI gaNeshAya namaH ||
Invocation (First verse of the laghuchandrikA - GauDabrahmAnandI)
namo navaghanashyAmakAmakAmitadehine |
Obeisance to the householder (Krishna) whose appearance resembles a fresh
dark cloud, whose (beautiful) form is desired even by kAmadeva (manmatha
even though he is extremely handsome himself), who desires the particles of
flattened rice brought by sudAmA the brAhmaNa, despite the fact that He is
the desirer(Lord) of the Goddess of Wealth, kamalA (lakShmI).
shuktiGYAnena rUpyaM naShTamiti kadApyananubhavena tatrApyavyApteshcha |
etAvantaM kAlaM shuktyaGYAnamAsId-bhrama AsIdityanubhavena shuktivatsatye
aGYAnabhramAdau shuktiGYAnena tadaGYAnaM naShTamityanubhavena GYAnatvena
GYAnanivartyatvasya sattvenAtivyApteshcha |
VyAsa tIrtha says that there is never an experience of the destruction of
the silver due to the knowledge of nacre. No person ever feels, "The silver
(of the illusion) was destroyed by the knowledge of the nacre" but only
feels "all this while, there was an ignorance of nacre and
there was an illusion." Therefore the definition is too narrow (avyApti) and
does not cover the case of the silver-on-nacre erroneous cognition (bhrama).
In other words, the knowledge of nacre does not remove the false silver.
However, there is the experience that the bhrama and ignorance (ajnAna) get
destroyed by the knowledge of the nacre (shuktijnAna). But the ajnAna that
has the a real substratum (nacre) is itself real. And this real ajnAna is
removed by jnAna. This makes the definition suffer from the defect of being
too wide (ativyApti), because a real thing (the ignorance, aGYAna) is
removed by knowledge (in its capacity as knowledge) and not an unreal thing.
(Please see advaita-siddhi 18
for an explanation of GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva.)
Summarizing his arguments, VyAsa tIrtha says:
vijnAnanAshyatA mithyArUpyAdau nAnubhUyate |
kiMtvadhiShThAnavat-satye tadajnAne .nubhUyate ||
The destruction of an unreal thing such as the silver (in
nacre) is not experienced. But, (the destruction) of the real ignorance of
the substratum (the nacre) is experienced.
What VyAsatIrtha means here is that there are two defects in the definition
of mithyAtva - jnananivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h.
1)Although the silver that is perceived in error instead of the nacre is
mithyA (false), nobody experiences the destruction (sublation) of this
silver as being due to knowledge. Therefore the definition is too narrow,
since it does not apply to a thing that is mithyA.
2) The ignorance of the nacre which is the substratum (of the false
silver) is real. However, it is this ignorance that gets destroyed by the
knowledge of the substratum, nacre. Therefore the definition is too wide,
because it applies to a thing, the ignorance, that is not mithyA.
It is necessary to understand the mAdhva explanation of error or
ayathArthajnAna. This is stated in the prAmANapaddhati of JayatIrtha:
(With respect to the error of silver in nacre), the experience "The false
silver appeared (before me)" occurs after (the bhrama is over). It follows
that the nacre itself appears as the absolutely false silver. This is what
the AchArya (madhvAchArya) says.
This is based on Madhva's theory of error that is put forth, for example in
na cha shukteH rajatatvaM sadasadvilakShaNam.h |
asadeva rajataM pratyabhAdityanubhavAt.h ||
The (erroneous) silverness of the nacre is not different from reality and
unreality (as claimed by advaitins) because of the experience "the false
silver appeared" (after the illusion has ended).
Janardana's TippaNi on the pramANa-paddhati makes it clear that the mAdhva
position is different from the naiyAyika position.
nanu evaM naiyAyikamatAnna visheSha AchAryamatasya | tairapi
Aha "atyanteti" | kutrApi kadA .pyavidyamAnetyarthaH |
To meet the objection: "This position of MadhvAchArya does not differ from
the naiyAyika position. Even they (naiyAyikas) accept that the silver that
does not occur in the nacre occurs elsewhere and it appears (erroneously)
in the nacre.", (the AchArya) uses the term "atyanta". (This means) that
which does not occur anywhere, at any time.
The mAdhvas, however, ignore what happens *during* the illusion phase, since
their emphasis is on the reflection *after* the illusion is over
(bhramottarakAle shuktiviShyakaparAmarshAt.h). For example, there is no
explanation of how or why there is an activity (pravR^itti) based on the
illusory object, silver. A person may, upon mistaking the nacre to be
silver, proceed to pick it up. mAnameyodaya, a treatise on the pUrva
mImAMsA, remarks, in different context, how this pravR^itti is to be
"tattat.h GYAnasya svaviShaya eva pravR^ittikaratvaniyamAdrajataGYAnasyApi
idaMviShayatvAbhAve tatra pravR^ittirna sidhyet.h"
Any cognition can only lead to activity based on its own object or content
(of the cognition). Therefore, if the object (content) of the cognition of
silver is not the "this" (the object lying before the person under
illusion), then there would be no activity in this case.
The mAdhva theory of error, referred to as abhinava-anyathAkhyAti by ShrI
rAghavendra svAmI in his TippaNi on the pramANa-paddhati, differs from those
of other realist systems such as nyAya and vishiShTa-advaita. nyAya puts
forth what is termed anyathAkhyAti. What is seen is silver that is present
elsewhere but is (erroneously) presented here in place of the nacre.
"sarvathA .asatve pratItyanupapattestatraiva sattve vA bAdhAnupapattiriti" -
If the silver were completely false, it would not have appeared (before the
observer). If it were present right in the place where it was perceived,
there would be no sublation (of such a perception).
The maNikaNa, a summary of the tattvachintAmaNi of Gangesha, says -
"rajatatvena purovartinaM jAnAmi ityanuvyavasAyAd- eva anyathAkhyAtisiddhiH"
- by the realization "I cognize what is before me as silver", the cognition
of one thing as another (anyathAkhyAti) is established.
GYAna-prayukta-avasthitisAmAnya-viraha-pratiyogitvaM hi GYAnanivartyatvam.h
| avasthitishcha dvedhA; svarUpeNa kAraNAtmanA cha ;
satkAryavAdAbhyapugamAt.h | tathAcha mudgarapAtena ghaTasya
svarUpeNa-avasthitivirahe .api kAraNAtmanA avasthitivirahAbhAvAt.h
eva sa iti nAtItaghaTAdAv-avyAptiH|
GYAnaprayukta - that which is concomitant with GYAna of the substratum,
avasthitisAmAnyaviraha - negation of existence in general, pratiyogitvaM -
counterpositive, hi - exactly, GYAnanivartyatvam.h - sublatability by GYAna,
avasthitishcha - and existence, dvedhA- of two kinds, svarUpeNa - in its own
form, kAraNAtmanA cha - and in the form of the cause,
satkAryavAdAbhyapugamAt.h - since it is admitted in accordance with the
theory of satkAryavAda, tathAcha - accordingly, mudgarapAtena -
by the stroke of a hammer, ghaTasya svarUpeNa - in the form of a pot,
avasthitivirahe .api - even though there is a negation of existence,
kAraNAtmanA - in the form of its cause,
avasthitivirahAbhAvAt.h - due to the absence of negation of the existence,
brahmaGYAnaprayukta eva sa - it is only by GYAna of Brahman, iti - thus, na
- no, atItaghaTAdau - in the case of things of the past such as the pot
(after destruction), avyAptiH - the defect of being too narrow in
GYAnanivartyatva or the property of being sublated by GYAna is exactly the
property of being the counterpositive of a negation of existence in general
(all forms) such that the GYAna of the substratum is concomitant with the
negation. And existence of a thing can be of two kinds - 1) in its own form
and 2) in the form of the cause, since this follows from the theory of
satkAryavAda that holds that the effect exists in the cause (in a causal
form). Accordingly, even though there
is a negation of the existence of a pot in its form due to stroke of a
hammer, there is no negation of existence of the pot in its causal form
(after being destroyed by a hammer, because the
pot still exists in its causal form as clay from which it was originally
produced). The (negation of existence in its causal form) is only by the
knowledge of Brahman. Thus, the definition of mithyAtva is not too narrow
(as you contend), in the case of things of the past such as a pot (after
being struck by a hammer).
It is important to understand the term "GYAnaprayukta" as used by
MadhusUdana here. BrahmAnanda defines it in his GauDabrahmAnandI as
"adhiShThAnatatvaGYAnavyApaka", ie. such that the cognition of the
substratum is concomitant with it (ie. the negation of existence in all
forms). This is equivalent to saying:
Wherever there is the cognition of the substratum there is the negation of
the thing that is mithyA (superimposed on the substratum) in all its forms.
avasthitisAmAnyaviraha - BrahmAnanda defines it as "svasvIyasaMskAra-
anyatarasya-abhAva, the negation of (a thing) as itself and its saMskAra,
reminiscent impression. In the case of aGYAna, ignorance, MadhusUdana's
expression "svarUpeNa kAraNAtmanA cha" means "aGYAna-
tatprayuktasvarUpeNa sthUla-avasthAkAraNIbhUta-saMskArarupeNa cha", aGYAna
and the reminiscent impression that is the cause of its gross form and that
the aGYAna is concomitant with.
ataevottaraGYAnanivartye pUrvaGYAne na siddhasAdhanam.h; navA viyadAdau
brahmaGYAnanAshyatve .api tadvadeva mithyAtva-asiddhyA- arthAntaram.h;
uttaraGYAnena lInasya pUrvaGYAnasya
ataeva - Precisely for this reason, uttaraGYAnanivartye - in the case of
the sublation due to a subsequent cognition, pUrvaGYAne - (of) the previous
cognition, na siddhasAdhanam.h - there is no
redundant proof (on our part), navA- nor, viyadAdau - in the case of space
(AkAsha), etc., brahmaGYAnanAshyatve .api - even if they are destroyed by
knowledge of Brahman, tadvadeva - in the same way, mithyAtva asiddhyA - by
the fact that unreality is not established, arthAntaram.h - proving
something other than what was to be proved uttaraGYAnena - by the subsequent
cognition, lInasya - of the sublated pUrvaGYAnasya - of the previous
cognition, svakAraNAtmanA - in its causal form, avasthAnAt.h - due to
existing, avasthitisAmAnyaviraha - negation of existence in general,
anupapatteH - due to not being established.
For this reason, there can be no charge of a redundant proof in the case of
the sublation of a previous cognition by a subsequent cognition. Nor can
there be a charge of proving something other than what was intended to be
proved in the case of space, etc., that are destroyed by knowledge of
Brahman, on the grounds that their unreality is not established in the same
way (that the unreality of a previous cognition is not established). This
follows from the fact that the previous cognition exists in its causal form
and thus the negation of its existence in general cannot be established.
In the case of a cognition being sublated by a subsequent cognition, the
first cognition continues to exist in its causal state (as saMskAra or
reminiscent impression in the mind). In the case of a things such as AkAsha,
or anything in the world of duality, being destroyed by Brahman knowledge,
there is total destruction of these things in their causal and own forms as
well. It cannot be claimed that the unreality of these things is not
established and that there is an error of proving something other than what
was intended to be proved.
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