[Advaita-l] Body is the disease

[Srinath Vedagarbha]

In this post, I am speaking from pUrvapxin's perspective (which are not
necessarily my own)


On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 9:17 AM, H S Chandramouli
<hschandramouli at gmail.com>wrote:

> Dear Srinath Vedagarbhaji,
>
> <<  So, basically it boils down to the fact
> that one cannot argue based on elements which are not "true" in reality. >>
>
> What is the status of a vada  when elements are a mixture of "Real " and "
> Unreal " .


pUrvapaxin asks - what is the basis of saying "Real" and "Unreal" are mixed
up even before one starts vAda and its truth value is yet to be established?


> What actually is true appears to be different  Arguments could
> be based on accepting provisionally the reality of the appearence and then
> logically proceed to the  possibility of it not being so.


On what basis you are saying appearance is different from reality even
before tatva-niScchaya was happened by vAda? So, pUrva-paxin will contend
-- if this kind of "yet-to-be" notion is already colored one's vision
before even jignAsa/analysis is started, how can be any value for
subsequent conclusion?

Also, you are saying "logically proceed" after one grants provisional
value. What is your basis in such logical anumAna used? The very definition
of anumAna is said to be "anusattya mAna iti anumAna" (pramANa which
"follows" other pramANa-s, such as pratyaksha or aagama, is called
'anumAna'). So, in order to "logically proceed", there would not be any
grounds for any anumAna used if pratyaksha is just appearance and not real
as it appears.



> Surely such a
> vada is admissible.   However such a vada need not lead to certainty of the
> conclusion, but point to only a possibility of it being so.


If my understanding is correct, "possibility" (smabhava) is not pramANa in
any school of vEdAnta. Moreover, mere "possibility" of truth (such as
"Brahma sattyaM jagan mitthyam" etc) is not sufficient enough for a sAdhaka
to vest his life in a pursuit, which may or may not be true.




> The assertion
> of it being really so is only based on Shruti Vakya.


Here too, since shruti itself is mithya and granted "provisional validity"
it cannot yield definitive tatava-niSchaya.

Take for example, all schools of vEdAnta consider shruti is pramANa based
on them being apurusheya. Even though these schools differ in establishing
apourusheyatva, nevertheless they do agree that it is so. So, pramANya for
shruti-s is due to them being apurusheya.

Now, if one argues that shruti is mithya, it simply means shruti is
kalpita/arOpita on Brahman by avidya (a.k.a avidya-kalpita). So it is one
and the same thing as saying shruti is avidya-kalpita and also saying
shruti is pourusheya for it come under another "kalpita" category. So, the
very validity, which was based on apourusheya initially, was knocked off
due to advaitin's subsequent conclusion that it is pourusheya by
implication of his siddhAnta. So, if the very validity is gone, so also
shruti pratipAdya siddhAnta, such as jagan mithyatva etc, are rendered
invalid.

So, a pUrvapaxin would argue, you cannot come to such a conclusions which
cuts the very root pillars you used to begin with.

Purva-paxin goes one step ahead and questions -- when in one's siddAnta
only Brahman is real, there cannot be any possibility of existence of
pramANa-s to establish so (that Brahman alone is sat). This situation, he
continues, is indistinguishable from any other avaidIka doctrines out
there, for both lacks any valid pramANa-s. Only difference is that in one
case pramANa are invalid although they may be real ones, and in the other
case pramANa-s are non-existing at all (tAtvIka-cally or pAramArtha-cally
speaking)l.



> Please note I am
> commenting only on the admissibility of such a vada and not on the merits
> of the vada in this particular case.
>
>
My above observations too are not specifically aimed at particular case,
but it is a  pramANa vichAra speaking from pUrva-paxin's perspective.

/SV