[Advaita-l] Body is the disease
H S Chandramouli
hschandramouli at gmail.com
Wed Jan 22 01:39:36 CST 2014
Dear Sri Srinatha Vedagarbhaji,
The question arose becuse of your reply to Sri Bhaskarji's query. I quote
<< > anAditva is in siddhAnta, no doubt, but at the same time it is also in
> siddhAnta that notion of anditva is valid only from vyavahAra
> praNAms Sri Srinath Vedagarbha prabhuji
> Hare Krishna
> I failed to see where exactly Sri Ananda Hudli prabhuji said that nAnA
> jeeva and their respective avidyA-s are pAramArthically anAdi?? Ofcourse
> sarva loukika, vaidika vyavahAra, shAstra & even bandha-mOksha everything
> within the realm of vyavahAra only. The explanation that has been given
> with regard to jeeva-avidyA and anAditva too falls under vyavahAra only.
> What exactly is the problem here?? could you please elaborate.
In a vAda, when one provides a tarka/anumAna to substantiate his/her stand,
it is expected in vidvad circles that hEtu used in such argument is indeed
accepted as "true" (tAtvIka), at least in such person's own siddhAnta if
not in opponent's siddhAnta.
So in this line, when anAditva was used, I was just pointing to the fact
that it is not tAtvIka as it implies on the face of it, for such notion of
anAditva comes with a baggage, for it is conceived when one in vyavahAra,
which by definition avidyA drusTi. So, basically it boils down to the fact
that one cannot argue based on elements which are not "true" in reality. >>
You will notice that your argument was that one cannot argue on the
question because the elements are not " true It was not presented as Purva
Pakshin view, but as your view. If you had not accepted this as your view
you could have as well answered the question directly.
Practically all the points you have mentioned above have been raised as
Purva Paksha and answered by Sri Bhagavatpada in several places and really
forms the basis of Advaita Sidhanta itself. While I am sure you are
yourself aware of all the answers, it may not be practicable to cover all
these aspects in a brief way by mail. Maybe some other members could do so.
I will leave it at that.
Only one point I would like to touch upon. You wrote
> Surely such a
> vada is admissible. However such a vada need not lead to certainty of
> conclusion, but point to only a possibility of it being so.
If my understanding is correct, "possibility" (smabhava) is not pramANa in
any school of vEdAnta. Moreover, mere "possibility" of truth (such as
"Brahma sattyaM jagan mitthyam" etc) is not sufficient enough for a sAdhaka
to vest his life in a pursuit, which may or may not be true. >>
You are not interpreting me correctly. It is not the intention to say that
a sadhaka should start on his pursuit on the basis of a possibility. The
sadhaka should start on his pursuit on the basis of assertion by Shruti
which was my next sentence in the original mail. It is only to show the
limitation of reasoning in such matters which are beyond the purview of all
pramanas. Such a vada is indeed accepted as silanalogic reasoning as
compared to sillogic reasoning which is the commonly accepted inferential
reasoning ( fire and smoke ) . It is presented to provide strength to other
arguments presented in support of a contention. In fact when it is said
that Truth is to be ascertained by Shruti, Yukti and Anubhava, my
understanding is that Yukti refers to this type of reasoning.
On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 10:16 AM, Srinath Vedagarbha
<svedagarbha at gmail.com>wrote:
> In this post, I am speaking from pUrvapxin's perspective (which are not
> necessarily my own)
> On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 9:17 AM, H S Chandramouli
> <hschandramouli at gmail.com>wrote:
> > Dear Srinath Vedagarbhaji,
> > << So, basically it boils down to the fact
> > that one cannot argue based on elements which are not "true" in reality.
> > What is the status of a vada when elements are a mixture of "Real " and
> > Unreal " .
> pUrvapaxin asks - what is the basis of saying "Real" and "Unreal" are mixed
> up even before one starts vAda and its truth value is yet to be
> > What actually is true appears to be different Arguments could
> > be based on accepting provisionally the reality of the appearence and
> > logically proceed to the possibility of it not being so.
> On what basis you are saying appearance is different from reality even
> before tatva-niScchaya was happened by vAda? So, pUrva-paxin will contend
> -- if this kind of "yet-to-be" notion is already colored one's vision
> before even jignAsa/analysis is started, how can be any value for
> subsequent conclusion?
> Also, you are saying "logically proceed" after one grants provisional
> value. What is your basis in such logical anumAna used? The very definition
> of anumAna is said to be "anusattya mAna iti anumAna" (pramANa which
> "follows" other pramANa-s, such as pratyaksha or aagama, is called
> 'anumAna'). So, in order to "logically proceed", there would not be any
> grounds for any anumAna used if pratyaksha is just appearance and not real
> as it appears.
> > Surely such a
> > vada is admissible. However such a vada need not lead to certainty of
> > conclusion, but point to only a possibility of it being so.
> If my understanding is correct, "possibility" (smabhava) is not pramANa in
> any school of vEdAnta. Moreover, mere "possibility" of truth (such as
> "Brahma sattyaM jagan mitthyam" etc) is not sufficient enough for a sAdhaka
> to vest his life in a pursuit, which may or may not be true.
> > The assertion
> > of it being really so is only based on Shruti Vakya.
> Here too, since shruti itself is mithya and granted "provisional validity"
> it cannot yield definitive tatava-niSchaya.
> Take for example, all schools of vEdAnta consider shruti is pramANa based
> on them being apurusheya. Even though these schools differ in establishing
> apourusheyatva, nevertheless they do agree that it is so. So, pramANya for
> shruti-s is due to them being apurusheya.
> Now, if one argues that shruti is mithya, it simply means shruti is
> kalpita/arOpita on Brahman by avidya (a.k.a avidya-kalpita). So it is one
> and the same thing as saying shruti is avidya-kalpita and also saying
> shruti is pourusheya for it come under another "kalpita" category. So, the
> very validity, which was based on apourusheya initially, was knocked off
> due to advaitin's subsequent conclusion that it is pourusheya by
> implication of his siddhAnta. So, if the very validity is gone, so also
> shruti pratipAdya siddhAnta, such as jagan mithyatva etc, are rendered
> So, a pUrvapaxin would argue, you cannot come to such a conclusions which
> cuts the very root pillars you used to begin with.
> Purva-paxin goes one step ahead and questions -- when in one's siddAnta
> only Brahman is real, there cannot be any possibility of existence of
> pramANa-s to establish so (that Brahman alone is sat). This situation, he
> continues, is indistinguishable from any other avaidIka doctrines out
> there, for both lacks any valid pramANa-s. Only difference is that in one
> case pramANa are invalid although they may be real ones, and in the other
> case pramANa-s are non-existing at all (tAtvIka-cally or pAramArtha-cally
> > Please note I am
> > commenting only on the admissibility of such a vada and not on the merits
> > of the vada in this particular case.
> My above observations too are not specifically aimed at particular case,
> but it is a pramANa vichAra speaking from pUrva-paxin's perspective.
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