[Advaita-l] akhanDaakara-vRtti‏

Venkatraghavan S agnimile at gmail.com
Wed Jul 8 10:36:30 CDT 2015


Sri SadAji
PraNams.

I am not disputing the nature of the bhAga tyAga process, or that devadatta
has attributes or not. As stated previously, I do agree that devadatta has
attributes.

The meaning of the sentence is simply that there is an underlying
devadatta. Until we have performed bhAga tyAga we don't know what those
common attributes are, but the knowledge that there is a common devadatta
implied by the sentence is not the same as the knowledge of such a
devadatta's attributes. Knowledge and verification of that knowledge are
two different steps.


Regards,
Venkatraghavan



On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 3:37 PM, kuntimaddi sadananda <
kuntimaddisada at yahoo.com> wrote:

> Shree Venkataraghavan - PraNAms - in the bhaagatyaaga lakshana only the
> contradictory attributes are dropped and not those that are common for this
> and that Devadatta. Some saadRisyam has to be there for validation of
> oneness of  Devadatta. At least the name is common here. If every attribute
> is dropped then this Devadatta could also be that yagnadatta too!
>
> In the case of tat tvam asi - the existence part is not negated existence
> as this and that -only contradictory attributes that appear to invalidate
> the equation are dropped and not to the common ones.
>
> Bhagavan Ramana puts this as
> Isha jeevayoH veshadhee bhidaa, satva bhaavato vastu kevalam. The costumes
> that Iswara and Jeeva wearing are only different but from the existence
> part is not dropped.
>
> Hari Om!
> Sadananda
>
> --------------------------------------------
> On Wed, 7/8/15, Venkatraghavan S via Advaita-l <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org> wrote:
>
>  Subject: Re: [Advaita-l] akhanDaakara-vRtti‏
>  To: "Bhaskar YR" <bhaskar.yr at in.abb.com>
>  Cc: "A discussion group for Advaita Vedanta" <
> advaita-l at lists.advaita-vedanta.org>
>  Date: Wednesday, July 8, 2015, 6:38 AM
>
>  Sri Bhaskar-ji,
>  Namaste and thanks for the email.
>
>  I am not disputing that the
>  common devadatta has attributes - he/she/it
>  clearly does. I am simply saying that the
>  sentence "this is that" is not
>  conveying any attributes, and the knowledge
>  generated by the sentence* does
>  not contain
>  any attributive content about that common devadatta*.
>
>  Regards,
>  Venkat
>
>
>  On
>  Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 11:15 AM, Bhaskar YR <bhaskar.yr at in.abb.com>
>  wrote:
>
>  >  PraNAms Sri
>  Venkatraghavan prabhuji
>  >
>  > Hare Krishna
>  >
>  > Ø  At the risk of stretching this
>  analogy, let me share my thoughts with
>  >
>  you.
>  >
>  > The question
>  was if it is possible to cognize an object without its
>  > attributes.
>  >
>  > The answer in certain cases, like
>  "soyam devadatta", you can. Please
>  > consider the sentence soyam devadatta,
>  leaving all notions of whatever or
>  >
>  whoever devadatta is.
>  >
>  > What does that sentence, taken in
>  isolation, convey? Do we know, just by
>  >
>  that sentence, if devadatta is a man, a woman, a dog, an
>  alien? We don't.
>  >
>  > The sentence simply conveys that there is
>  an object called devadatta,
>  > which is
>  commonly referred to by the sa: and ayam padAs.
>  >
>  > Ø   Yes,
>  that sentence would simply convey that there exists  some
>  object
>  > by some ‘particular’ name
>  (‘devadatta’ in this example) on which I donot
>  > know anything.
>  >
>  > Because we don't know the attributes
>  of devadatta, can we say that no
>  >
>  knowledge whatsoever is produced by the sentence?
>  >
>  > We cannot, because
>  that sentence produces knowledge that there is such a
>  > common object referred to by sa: and ayam,
>  we just dont know what exactly
>  >
>  he/she/it is.
>  >
>  >
>  Ø   As Sri Keshava Prasad prabhuji observed,
>  normally an inquisitive mind
>  > does not
>  stop by mere getting the knowledge that there is something
>  out
>  > there!!  Though knowing something
>  more on that something exists is a
>  >
>  subsequent process, as soon as some object has been pointed
>  and addressed
>  >  ‘this’ object is
>  ‘that’, our mind would grasp this sentence with some
>  > attributes only, it may be either way,
>  wrong or right immaterial here, but
>  >
>  invariably our mind associates some attribute to ‘this’
>  to know that ‘this’
>  > is nothing but
>  ‘that’.  We may recall here shankara’s observation
>  in
>  > bruhadAraNyaka here with regard to
>  ‘drum sound’ ( in second adhyAya!!?? Not
>  > sure).  Here shankara clarifies by
>  grasping the genus sound as produced by
>  >
>  the beat of the drum, that species underlying it are also
>  grasped, but
>  > ‘they cannot be grasped
>  as distinct from that genus’.  For as species they
>  > have no independent existence.  If we
>  apply this rule to this particular
>  >
>  example, this and that devadatta must have some underlying
>  common genus
>  > through which this
>  devadatta has been  equated with that devadatta.  And
>  > without this common underlying devadatta
>  there cannot be independent
>  > existence
>  for both ‘this’ and that devadatta.  Hence, this
>  underlying
>  > common genus (called
>  devadutta who is common in both this & that) must be
>  > recognized first to declare that this is
>  that devadatta.  This recognition
>  > need
>  not be directly related to currently perceiving attributes
>  of object
>  > (this devadatta)  nor it is
>  necessary that it should have the similarity
>  >  with the previously cognized ‘that’
>  devadutta, but what needs to be there
>  >
>  is some commonality which can be termed as attributes to
>  correctly identify
>  > the devadatta.  I
>  think this commonality what Sri Ananda Hudli observed
>  > while narrating his observation, he said
>  :
>  >
>  >
>  >
>  > //quote//
>  >
>  > Both the Devadatta
>  seen now as "this" and the Devadatta seen earlier
>  as
>  > "that" have attributes.
>  They are both men, with parts such as hands, feet,
>  > etc. What is going on here?
>  >
>  > Although Devadatta is
>  very much a perceivable person with attributes, the
>  > crucial point here is that the perception
>  "this is that Devadatta" does not
>  > involve any of those attributes. It is
>  exactly expressing an identity
>  > between
>  two objects, this Devadatta and that Devadatta, nothing
>  less,
>  > nothing more. So there is no
>  "appeal" made to any attribute in the
>  > knowledge "this is that
>  Devadatta", although Devadatta does have attributes.
>  >
>  > //unquote//
>  >
>  >
>  >
>  > So, bottom line is
>  ‘devadatta’ (any object) does have the attributes
>  which
>  > is common in both this & that
>  but directly not related in raising the
>  >
>  knowledge i.e. this is that devadatta.
>  >
>  >
>  >
>  > Hari Hari Hari
>  Bol!!!
>  >
>  > bhaskar
>  >
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